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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

In the Matter of the Estate of

MELVIN PETERSON,
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2007-0000266
DECISION ON APPEAL

The trial court's "Order Granting Petition to Compel Sale of Home and
Payment to Department" is vacated and the matter is remanded for the trial court
to set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law on the issues it decided.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Melvin Peterson was born on

and died at the age of 83 on March 3, 2007.

Melvin owned real property in Moyie Springs, Idaho. On December 6, 2001, he conveyed the
real property to his daughter, Cathie Peterson, and retained a life estate interest. Before his
death, but after reaching the age of 55, Mr. Peterson applied for and received state medical
assistance (Medicaid) benefits in the amount of $171 ,386.94.
Cathie Peterson was appointed Personal Representative of Melvin Peterson's estate on
July 26, 2007. The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (hereafter, "the Department") filed
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a "Claim Against Estate" and an "Amended Claim Against Estate," each of which was
disallowed by the Personal Representative. The Department petitioned the court to allow the
claim. At the hearing on the petition, the court minutes reflect that counsel for the Personal
Representative agreed that the Department's claim should be allowed. As a result, the court
entered an order on April 14, 2008, allowing the claim, stating: "subject to the availability of
estate funds as may be determined at a later time by the Court, the Personal Representative shall
allow said claim in the amount of $171,386.94."
On May 5, 2008, the Department filed a "Petition to Require Payment of Claim," which
asked the court to order the Personal Representative to promptly pay the $171,386.94 claim
against the estate. On May 28, 2008, the Personal Representative filed an objection to the
Department's petition to require the payment of the claim. A hearing was held on June 3, 2008.
On June 12, 2008, the trial court entered an "Order on Petition to Require Payment of Claim,"
granting the Department's petition, and ordering that the life estate interest Mr. Peterson held in
the real property at the time of his death be deemed an asset of the estate for the limited purpose
of Medicaid estate recovery by the Department.

The court also ordered that the Personal

Representative pay the Department's claim to the extent of available assets in the estate.
On August 6, 2008, the Personal Representative filed a "Motion to Hire Appraiser."
After a hearing, the trial court entered an order approving the hiring of an appraiser on
September 23, 2008. The appraisal, showing a total value of the real property of $139,000 at the
time of Mr. Peterson's death, was filed with the trial court on July 15, 2009. On the same date,
the Department filed a "Petition to Compel Sale of Home and Payment to Department." A
hearing was held on this petition on July 28, 2009. On August 11, 2009, the trial court entered
an "Order Granting Petition to Compel."
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II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
On August 20, 2009, Cathie Peterson, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Melvin
Peterson, filed a Notice of Appeal from the trial court's August 11, 2009, Order granting the
Department's petition to compel the sale of Melvin Peterson's home. On November 13, 2009,
Cathie Peterson filed an Appellant's Brief in which she presented the following issues on appeal:
(I)

The Magistrate erred as no evidence was ever taken and no findings of fact and
conclusions of law were ever made;

(2)

The Magistrate misapplied Idaho Code § 56-218 in determining that a life estate
interest in the estate existed;

(3)

The Magistrate misapplied Idaho Administrative Code provisions 16.03.05.833,
.837, and .841 in determining the value of the life estate interest;

(4)

The Magistrate does not have jurisdiction over real property vested in a person
who is not a party to the proceeding, and does not have jurisdiction over real
property not vested in the estate;

(5)

The Magistrate erred in purportedly concluding that the decedent had an interest
at the time of his death (or alternatively, in determining the extent of such
interest) in the real property; and

(6)

The estate is entitled to recover attorney's fees on appeal to the district court.
The Department maintains that the issues raised by the Personal Representative are

inapplicable because the appellant did not appeal the applicable decision made by the trial court.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 83(u)(l) sets forth the standard of review for appeals to the
district court from the magistrate's division, as follows:
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Upon an appeal from the magistrate's division of the district court, not involving a
trial de novo, the district court shall review the case on the record and determine
the appeal as an appellate court in the same manner and upon the same standards
of review as an appeal from the district court to the Supreme Court under the
statutes and law of this state, and the appellate rules of the Supreme Court.
The Idaho Supreme Court in Hawkins v. Hawkins, 99 Idaho 785, 589 P.2d 532 (1978), explained
the import of Rule 83(u)(l ):
We read [I.R.C.P. 83(u)(l)] as saying that a district court, in making an
appellate review of a magistrate's decision, should perform that task in the same
manner as this Court performs its appellate review of the trial decision of a district
court. In reviewing a magistrate's findings, therefore, the district courts should
adhere to the well recognized rule that findings based on substantial and
competent, though conflicting, evidence will not be set aside on appeal. Prescott
v. Prescott, 97 Idaho 257, 542 P.2d 1176 (1975); lsaguirre v. Eschevarria, 96
Idaho 641, 534 P.2d 471 (1975); I.R.C.P. 52(a).
Furthermore, upon the appellate review conducted in a district court, the
district court is, as is this Court on an appeal where the district court has been the
factfinder, empowered to affirm, reverse, remand (including remand for a new
trial with instructions), or modify the judgment. I.R.C.P. 83(u)(2). Where the
trial court's findings of fact are confused or in conflict, or where findings on a
particular issue are lacking, and resort to the record does not show clearly what
findings are correct, the district court ordinarily will not modify the judgment.
Frederickson v. Deep Creek Irr. Co., 15 Idaho 41, 96 P. 117 (1908); 5B C.J.S.
Appeal and Error § 1874 (1958). The district court will either remand for new
findings, or, alternatively, act under LC. § 1-2213(2) and I.R.C.P. 83(u)(2) and
conduct a partial or whole trial de novo.
Id at 788-789, 589 P.2d at 535-536.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) requires that a trial court, sitting without a jury, enter
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. In the Matter of the Estate of Spencer, 106
Idaho 316, 678 P.2d 108 (Ct. App. 1984), the Idaho Court of Appeals explained this requirement:
Rule 52(a), I.R.C.P., requires a trial court in all actions tried upon the facts
without a jury to "find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of
law thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment." The rule also
provides that "[i]f an opinion or memorandum decision is filed, it will be
sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law appear therein."
Ordinarily, in reviewing a decision of the district court on appeal from a
magistrate, we must determine from the trial court (magistrate) record whether
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substantial evidence supports the magistrate's findings of fact and whether those
findings support the magistrate's conclusions of law. Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho
559, 633 P.2d 1137 (1981); Ustick v. Ustick, 104 Idaho 215, 657 P.2d 1083
(Ct.App.1983). If so, and if correct legal principles have been applied, then the
district court's decision affirming a magistrate's judgment will be upheld. Id Only
where the record is so clear as to give the appellate court a complete
understanding of the material issues and the basis of the magistrate's reasoning
will the absence of findings of fact not result in a remand for adequate findings.
See Pope v. lntermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 646 P.2d 988 (1982); In re
Estate o/Stibor, 96 Idaho 162, 525 P.2d 357 (1974).

Id at 320, 678 P.2d at 112.

In the case of In re Estate of Stibor, 96 Idaho 162, 525 P.2d 357 (1974), the Idaho
Supreme Court was presented with a district court's affirmance of a magistrate's refusal to admit
a will to probate. The magistrate's decision was rendered by memorandum opinion, without the
entry of specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id at 163. Reversing the district court,
the Supreme Court stated:

Even though IRCP 52(a) recognizes that findings of fact and
conclusions of law may be embodied in a memorandum opinion, still both the
findings and conclusions must be specially stated if they are to fulfil their
designed purpose. This court has held that the absence of findings of fact
may be disregarded by the appellate court if the record is so clear that the
court does not need their aid for a complete understanding of the issues.
(citation omitted). However, in this case the record is not that clear. The
assignments of error are directed to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the
magistrate's decision. It cannot be determined upon what facts the magistrate
based his decision.

***
When the district judge was considering the appeal in this case, explicit
findings of fact and separate conclusions of law by the magistrate would have
clearly reflected the basis of the magistrate's decision, and then the district court
more readily could have determined whether facts sustained the magistrate's
decision and whether he had correctly applied the appropriate principles of law.
Moreover, with such findings of fact, the district court could have properly
determined whether this was such a case as should have been tried de novo before
the district court. LC.§ 1-2213.
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Id at 164, 525 P.2d at 359. (Emphasis supplied).
IV. PERTINENT ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
The dispositive issue in this case is whether findings of fact and conclusions of law must
be set forth in regard to the August 11, 2009, Order, as well as in the June 12, 2008, Order, in
accord with l.R.C.P. 52(a). Before that issue is addressed, however, a decision must be made as
to whether the August 11, 2009, Order or the earlier June 12, 2008, Order is the final, appealable
order. The parties present the following arguments which will be addressed in the "Discussion"
portion of this decision.
A.

Which Order Is Final And Appealable?
1.

The Department's Position

The Department claims that the June 12, 2008, "Order on Petition to Require Payment of
Claim" decided all of the important issues in this matter and was appealable under Idaho Code
§ 17-201(4), (5), and (7). Specifically, the Department asserts that the June 12, 2008, Order
made two important decisions which were appealable within forty-two (42) days after entry of
the order. Part of the order required that the estate pay the Department's claim; thus, according
to the Department, the order was appealable under LC.§ 17-201(4). The second portion of the
order found that the life estate interest is an asset of the estate for purposes of Medicaid estate
recovery, which effectively mandated that the real property be partitioned to pay the
Department's claim. Thus, according to the Department, the order was appealable under Idaho
Code§ 17-201(4), (5), and (7). The Personal Representative, however, did not appeal the June
12, 2008, Order.
From the Department's perspective, the Personal Representative, with the present appeal
of the August 11, 2009, "Order Granting Petition to Compel," attempts to challenge the decisions

DECISION ON APPEAL - 6 -

made in the June 12, 2008, Order.

Because the earlier order was not appealed within the

statutory time period, the Department contends that the order became final forty-two (42) days
after entry.
The Department also asserts that it was the Personal Representative's refusal to comply
with the June 12, 2008, Order which necessitated the Department's filing of its "Petition to
Compel Sale of Home and Payment," which asked the court to order the Personal Representative
to sell the real property in order to pay the Department's claim. The Department argues that the
Personal Representative cannot reach the issues decided in the June 12, 2008, Order by refusing
to comply with that order, and thus, force another proceeding and a subsequent order to compel
compliance. The Department claims that the order requiring compliance, entered on August 11,
2009, does not revisit the issues decided by the earlier order. Thus, the only issues the Personal
Representative may raise on appeal are those stemming from the order to compel.

The

Department believes those issues consist of: (1) the lack of findings of fact and conclusions of
law; and (2) the allegation that the trial court misapplied the provisions of the Idaho
Administrative Code to determine the value of the life estate interest.
2.

The Personal Representative's Stance

The Personal Representative takes issue with the Department's characterization of the
June 12, 2008, Order.

The Personal Representative asserts that Idaho Code § 17-201,

specifically, subsections 4, 5, and 7, do not make the June 12, 2008, Order appealable, as that
order did not, according to subsection (4), set apart property; or, according to subsection (5),
direct partition ofreal property; or, according to subsection (7), partition any part of the estate.
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B.

The Requirement of Findings Of Fact and Conclusions of Law
The Personal Representative maintains that the trial court erred by failing to make

findings of fact upon which to base its conclusions. Thus, according to Cathie Peterson, by
failing to make a record and provide an understanding of the basis for its reasoning in the two
orders, this matter should be remanded. Cathie Peterson also argues that the trial court failed to
admit any evidence, or take testimony, or set forth findings and conclusions as to the
applicability of Idaho Code § 56-218. She also argues that the trial court failed to properly
consider the applicable statutes, rules, and common law principles and their effect at the time the
court's decisions were made.
The Department counters by arguing that findings of fact were not required because there
was no trial of any issue of fact.

According to the Department, the underlying facts were

presented to the trial court in the form of sworn statements, and no factual issue was ever raised.
The Department contends that the issues presented in the Appellant's Brief are all issues of law,
not fact.

V. DISCUSSION
A.

The June 12, 2008, Order Was Interlocutory And Not Appealable
In the Matter of the Estate of Spencer, 106 Idaho 316, 678 P.2d 108 (Ct. App. 1984), the

Idaho Supreme Court stated:
Absent a statutory basis for appeal, there is no right to appeal. Wilson v.
DeBoard, 94 Idaho 562, 494 P.2d 566 (1972); Miller v. Gooding Highway
District, 54 Idaho 154, 30 P.2d 1074 (1934) .... Such a basis, if any exists, must be
found in LC. § 17-201, or LC. § 1-2213, as modified by LR.C.P. 83(a), for
appeals from the magistrate division to the district court.
Id at 318, 678 P.2d at 110.
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Idaho Code § 17-201 provides a statutory basis for appeals in probate matters. Section
17-201 provides in relevant part:
An appeal may be taken to the district court of the county from a judgment, or
order of the magistrates division of the district court in probate matters:

4.
Against or in favor of setting apart property, or making an allowance for a
widow or child.
5.
Against or in favor of directing the partition, lease, mortgage, sale or
conveyance of real property.
7.
Refusing, allowing or directing the distribution or partition of an estate, or
any part thereof, or the payment of a debt, claim, legacy or distributive share.
Idaho Code§ 17-201(4), (5) and (7)
In the June 12, 2008, Order, the court concluded that (1) Idaho Code § 56-218(4)
provides for the inclusion of the value of the life estate interest Mr. Peterson held in real property
at the time of his death as an asset of the estate for the limited purpose of Medicaid estate
recovery by the Department; and (2) the Personal Representative must amend the Inventory to
include the life estate interest and assign to that interest an appropriate value. The trial court did

not determine any value, nor distribute, nor set aside, nor partition the life estate in the order
itself Accordingly, no basis for appeal of the June 12, 2008, Order exists pursuant to Idaho
Code§ 17-201(4), (5), and/or (7). Therefore, that order is interlocutory, not final, and thus, not
appealable. The August 11, 2009, Order, however, is final and appealable, as it sets the value of
the life estate interest at $53,712, less the decedent's proportionate share of closing or settlement
charges incurred, and it orders that the Personal Representative pay the Department's claim.
In the case of In the Matter of the Estate of Spencer, supra, the Idaho Supreme Court
stated that "the review of a final judgment allows the review of all interlocutory orders to which
an objection (which preserves the issue for review) has been raised." 106 Idaho at 319, 678 P.2d
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at 111 (citations omitted). In this case, the Personal Representative filed an objection to the
Department's petition to require the payment of its claim, and the trial court effectively overruled
those objections by entering the June 12, 2008, Order. Therefore, the review of the final order
entered on August 11, 2009, allows the review of the interlocutory June 12, 2008, Order, to the
extent that certain issues in this appeal relate to those earlier proceedings.

B.

The Failure To Set Forth Findings Of Fact Is Cause For Remand
The Idaho Supreme Court decided that "the absence of findings of fact may be

disregarded by the appellate court if the record is so clear that the court does not need their aid
for a complete understanding of the issues." In re Estate of Stibor, 96 Idaho 162, 164, 525 P.2d
357, 359 (1974). In this case, no findings of fact or conclusions oflaw were contained within the
August 11, 2009, Order. Further, a review of the Transcript of the July 28, 2009, hearing on the
Department's "Petition to Compel Sale of Real Property and Payment to Department," as well as
the Transcript of the June 3, 2008, hearing on the "Petition to Require Payment of Claim,"
reveals that no findings of fact or conclusions of law were announced in open court on the
record.
At the June 3, 2008, and July 28, 2009, hearings, the court heard oral argument from the
parties on several issues, including the applicability of Idaho Code § 56-218 in determining
whether the life estate interest should be included as an asset in the estate, as well as the
applicability of Idaho Administrative Code provisions 16.03.05.833, .837, and .841 in
determining the value of the life estate interest. In addition, the trial court must have concluded
that it had jurisdiction over real property which is vested in a person who is not a party to the
proceeding, as well as the real property itself which may or may not be vested in the estate. No
explanation was provided as to how these conclusions were reached.
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The Personal

Representative has assigned as errors the court's rulings on these and other issues. Because these
assignments of error are directed to the necessity and/or sufficiency of the evidence considered to
reach these conclusions, where no findings of fact have been set forth, it cannot be determined
upon what facts the trial court based its decision. See In re Estate of Stibor, 96 Idaho 162, 164,
525 P.2d 357, 359 (1974).
The Idaho Supreme Court also held:
Only where the record is so clear as to give the appellate court a complete
understanding of the material issues and the basis of the magistrate's reasoning
will the absence of findings of fact not result in a remand for adequate findings.
In the Matter ofthe Estate ofSpencer, 106 Idaho 316, 320, 678 P.2d 108, 112 (Ct. App. 1984).

Because there were no findings of fact made, this results in a lack of clarity and understanding on
the part of the appellate court as to the basis for the trial court's reasoning on the material issues.
Remand of this case is necessary in order for findings of fact and conclusions of law to be set
forth.

C.

Attorney's Fees on Appeal Are Denied
The Personal Representative requests an award of attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to

Idaho Code § 12-117. This code provision states that the court "shall award the prevailing party
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the
nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Because the nonprevailing
party in this case, the Department, did act with a reasonable basis in fact or law, the request for
attorney's fees on appeal is denied.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the trial court's August 11, 2009, "Order Granting Petition to
Compel Sale of Home and Payment to Department" is vacated and the matter is remanded so that
findings of facts and conclusions of law can be established.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

2..5 ~
day of May, 2010

.,,

DECISION ON APPEAL - 12 -

~~
J:ge
Steve Verby
District

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid,

this

l'7'1' day of May, 2010, to:

W. Corey Cartwright
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
Human Services Division
3276 Elder, Ste. B
P 0 Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0036

John A. Finney
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
Old Power House Building
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
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Attorneys at Law
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Phone:
(208) 263-7712
Fax:
(208) 263-8211
ISB NO. 5413
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STATE Of IDAHO

~~~8tllK
SY~RK.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN .AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
In the Matter of the Estate
of,
MELVIN PETERSON,
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2007-266
AMENDED PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE'S INVENTORY

COMES NOW CATHIE L. PETERSON, Personal Representative of the
Estate, by and through her attorney, JOHN A. FINNEY, and files
this Amended Inventory of the Estate, pursuant to the Order On
Petition To Require Payment Of Claim entered June 12, 2008 and
following the Decision On Appeal dated May 25, 2010, as follows:
1.

The Decedent died March 3, 2007, intestate.

CATHIE L.

PETERSON is the Court appointed Personal Representative of the
Estate.
2.

The Amended Estate Beginning Inventory as of the date

of death, March 3, 2007, consisted of the following:
A.

Real Estate
** Medicaid Life Estate Inclusion Only**

AMENDED PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S INVENTORY - 1

Tax #5, being part of Lot Five (5), Block Two
(2), Moyie Springs Townsite and described as
follows:

B.

c.

Commencing at the Northeast Corner of Lot
Five (5), Block Two (2), Moyie Springs
Townsite; thence West along the North Line of
Lot Five (5), a distance of 40 feet to a
point; thence Southwesterly along Moyie
Street a distance of 140 feet to a point;
thence South 63 feet to a point; thence East
95 feet at a point on the East line of Lot 5;
thence North 125 feet to the POINT OF
BEGINNING.

0.00

Stocks, Bonds & Certificates of Deposit
None

0.00

Mortgages, Notes & Cash
(1) Mountain West Bank Acct# ****2078
as of 03/30/07
(2)

(3)

D.
E.

First American Title Escrow
Acct #*****452 (1/2 interest) as
of 03/02/07
Boundary Community Hospital Refund

11,344.35
2,163.74

Other Miscellaneous property
Miscellaneous Furniture, & clothes
Approved or Allowed Claims
(1)
Principal Financial Group
RPS No.XXXXX4185
(2)

Boundary Community Hospital
- Withdrawn

(3)

State of Idaho, Department of
Health & Welfare

SUB-TOTAL
3.

1,288.35

0.00

-362.88

-171,386.94
-$156,711.12

The Estate has incurred significant cost and expense in

attorney fees and costs and will incur additional costs of
administration.
4.

The Estate does not have sufficient assets to satisfy

all claims.
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DATED this

i:zf'~y

of June, 2010.

HN A. FINNEY
ttorney for CATHIE L.
PETERSON, Personal
Representative of the Estate
of MELVIN PETERSON

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing AMENDED PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S INVENTORY was served
by deposit in First Class, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, this z;z,,,,.,,c:/
day of June, 2010 and was addressed to:
Cathie L. Peterson
P.O. Box 442
Moyie Springs, ID 83845

Carl Peterson
1016 South Whitman # 105
Tacoma, WA 98465

W. Corey Cartwright
Deputy Attorney General
Division of Buman Services
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036

Provincial Financial Group
Principal Life Insurance
Company
Repetitive Payment Services
P.O. Box 4926
Grand Island, NE 68802-4926

Boundary Community Hospital
Attn: Suzi Bishop
6640 Kaniksu Street
Bonners Ferry, Idaho 83805

By~-3:~
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Jun.

30. 2010 3:03PM
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--.·.- - - ' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL

FILED

JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Human Services Division
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT
Deputy Attorney General
Human Services Division
3276 Elder, Ste. B
PO Box 83720
Boise ID 83720-0036
Telephone: (208) 332-7961
ISB No. 3361
(cartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

In the Matter of the Estate of

)
)
)

MELVIN PETERSON,

)

Case No. CV-2007-266
PETITION FOR FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)
)

Deceased.

COMES NOW the State ofldaho, Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter the
"Depai1ment"), through undersigned counsel, and petitions this court for findings of fact and
conclusions of law, in accordance with the Decision on Appeal signed by District Judge Steve
Verby on May 25, 20 I 01 as follows:

I.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
I.

Melvin Peterson was born

and died at the age of 83 on March 3,

2007.
PETITION FOR FINDINGS OF FACT AND
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Prior to his death, and after the age of 55, the Department paid Medicaid benefits

on Melvin Peterson's behalf in the sum of at least $171,386.94.
3.

The Department file.cl an Amended Claim Against estate in the amount of

$171,386.94 on December IO, 2007.
4.

By order dated April 4, 2008, the court orderoo the Department1s claim allowed.

Said order was not appealed and is now final.
5.

Melvin Peterson owned real property in Moyie Springs which, on December 5)

2001, he conveyed to his daughter Cathie Peterson, retaining a life estate.
6.

Melvin Peterson possessed this life estate interest at the time of his death.

7.

On June 12, 2008, the court entered its Order on Petition to Require Payment of

CJaim. Said order, (I) Ordered payment of the Department's claim to the extent of available
estate assets, (2) Required that the life estate held by Melvin Peterson prior to his death be an
asset of the estate for the limited purpose of Medicaid estate recovery, (3) Required the personal
representative to include the life estate as an asset of the estate in the estate inventory, and (4)
Required the personal representative to assign an appropriate value to the life estate based on its
value at the time of Melvin Peterson's death.
8.

On September 23, 2008, the court entered its Order Approving Hiring of

Appraiser, to detennine the fee simple value of the real property subject to Melvin Peterson's life
estate.
9.

Subsequently, an appraisal was produced estimating the fee simple value of the

real property at the time of Melvin Peterson's death at $139,000.
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On August 11, 2009, the court entered its Order Granting Petition to Compel.

Said order required the personal representative to (1) List the real property for sale at its current
fair market value, (2) Accept the first reasonable offer from a qualified buyer, (3) Share seller

closing costs between the personal representative and the estate in proportion to the life estate
value, (4) Pay $53,712 of proceeds to the estate, less proportionate costs, to the estate, and (5)
Close the estate and pay the Department's claim. The order further provided that if the personal
representative failed to carry out the court's order, she would be subject to removal as personal
representative.
11.

The personal representative appealed the court's August 11, 2009, Order Granting

Petition to Compel! and also appealed issues from the court's June 12, 2008, Order on Petition to
Require Payment of Claim.
12.

The District Court has now issued its Decision on Appeal, vacating the August 11,

2009, Order, and remanded the matter "so that findings of facts and conclusions of law can be
established."
II.

REQUESTED FINDINGS OF FACT
The Department allegesi avers, and requests findings of fact as follows:
13.

On December 5, 2001, the decedenti Melvin Peterson, conveyed bis real property

in Moyie Springs to Cathie Peterson. by Gift Deed, retaining a life estate. A true and correct
copy of said Gift Deed is attached hereto as Exhibit "Ai'' and incorporated herein by reference.
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Melvin Peterson was in possession of this life estate at the time of his death)

March 3, 2007, at which time he was 83 years of age.
15.

The Department has an allowed claim for Medicaid recovery pursuant to Idaho

Code§ 56-218, against the estate of Melvin Peterson, in the sum of $171,386.94.
16.

Cathie Peterson was appointed personal representative for this estate on July 26,

2007, and is in possession of the real property described in Exhibit "A."

17.

Pursuant to an appraisal obtained by and at the request of the personal

representative, the real property was worth $139,000 at the time of the decedent's death. A true

and correct copy of the appraisal is attached hereto as Exhibit "B," and incorporated herein by
reference.
Ill.
REQUESTED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Department requests conclusions ofJaw as follows:
18.

This is a probate proceeding governed by the Idaho Probate Code and Idaho Code

§ 56-218, and the court has in rem jurisdiction over the property of the estate and, pursuant to

Idaho Code§

15-3~ 105j has

exclusive jurisdiction of fonnal proceedings to determine how

decedents' estates subject to the laws of this state are to be administered, expended and
distributed.
19.

The court has personal jurisdiction over Cathie Peterson, pursuant to Idaho Code

§§ 15-3-401and15-3-602.
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The life estate, as it existed the moment before the death of Melvin Peterson. is an

asset of the estate, for purposes of the Department's Medicaid recovery claim, pursuant to Idaho
Code§ 56-218(4).

2 I.

Had Melvin Peterson transferred the life estate to Cathie Peterson the moment

before his death, the value of the transferred asset would have been detennined pursuant to
IDAPA 16.03.05.837. which is .38642 of the fair market value, or $53,712.38. The life estate
factor of .38642 of the fair market value of the real property is the appropriate valuation of the
estate's interest in the real property gifted to Cathie Peterson by the Gift Deed of December 5,
2001.

22.

Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 56-218(4). the estate is the owner of a 38.642%

undivided interest in the real property described in Exhibit "A. n
23.

The personal representative is unde1· a duty to settle and distribute this estate as

expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent with the best interests of the estate, and must use the

authority conferred upon her by the probate code to do so.
24.

The personal representative has authority to bring an action to partition real

property in which the estate has an interest, including the undivided interest in the real property
described in Exhibit "A," pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 15-3-703 and 15-3-715(6) and (8).

25.

Pursuant to Idaho Code § l 5-3- I05, the court has authority to require the personal

representative to take such actions as she is otherwise authorized by law to take.
26.

The court has authority to require the personal representative to pay the

Department's claim, and if necessary. to partition the real property by selJing the real property, to
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pay the Department's claim, or if she is unwilling to do so, to replace the personal representative
so that a successor personal representative may bring an action for partition against Cathie
Peterson.

WHEREFORE, the Department requests as follows:
1.

That the court make findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with this

petition;
2.

That the court enter its Order upon said findings and conclusions as follows:

a.

That the personal representative shall immediately pay the Department's

claim in fulJ;
b.

Ifthere are insufficient assets of the estate to pay the Department's claim,

she shall liquidate sufficient assets of the estate, up to all of the assets of the estate, to pay
the Department's claim, or so much of the claim as the proceeds of the assets of the estate
may pennit, which liquidation shall include the following:

i.

That the Personal Representative shall use all due diligence and

vigor to forthwith prepare and list for sale the home located at P.0. Box 442

(Roosevelt), Moyie Springs, Idaho;
ii.

That the listing price shall be reasonable and reflect fair market

value for the home and area;

iii.

That the Personal Representative shaJJ accept the first reasonable

offer received from a qualified buyer;
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That any closing or settlement charges for such items as realtor

commissions, title insurance and related items, shall be shared, the estate's share
being .38642 of said costs;

v.

That the decedent's estate shall be entitled to receive the life estate

value of .38642 of the net proceeds, less the estate 1s proportionate share of closing
or settlement charges incurred as set forth, above;

vi.

That upon receipt of net sale proceeds by the estate, the Personal

Representative shall timely prepare and file all necessary papers to close this
estate and pay the Department the monetary value of all assets contained in the
estate, less reasonable costs of estate administration as may be determined by the
Court, if necessary.

c.

That upon the failure of the Personal Representative to comply with this

Order, she may be removed as personal i·epresentative and a successor personal
representative may be appointed in her place and stead, or such other judicial remedy as

may be appropriate;
d.

That if the personal representative is removed she shall remain subject to

the jurisdiction of the court for any necessary orders surcharging her for any breach of her

fiduciary duty which the court may detennine has resulted in loss or damage to the estate.
3.

For such other and further relief as may be appropriate herein.
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DATED this 30th day of June, 2010,

t)~~

W. C\T CARTWRIGHT
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed,
postage pre-paid, to the foJlowing:
JOHN A. FINNEY
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEYt P.A.

Attorneys at Law
Old Power House Building
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint, ID 83864
DATED this

3Q day of June, 2010.

kjru.~

Lisa M. Warren, Paralegal

Division of Human Services
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Deputy Attorney General
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Telephone; (208) 332-7961
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THB STATE 0F IDAHO, JN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
.•

In the Matter of the Estate of

MELVIN PETERSON,
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2007-266

MOTION TO STRIKE

)

COMES NOW the State ofldaho, Department of Health and WeJfare (hereinafter the

"Department"), tluough undersigned counsel, and, pursuant to Rule 12(f), Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, moves this court for an order striking that portion of the "Demand for Notice and

Special Appearance" that is not simply a 14Demand for Notice" as provided in Idaho Code§ 15-3204. This motion is made because:

I) Cathie Peterson is attempting to re-litigate issues that have already become final;

MOTION TO STRIKE - l
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2) The "motion" in paragraph 3 is vague, fails to identify any order which Cathie
Peterson finds offensive, and is not authorized by any provision in the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure or the Idaho Probate Code.
This motion is supported by the Department's Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Strike filed herewith.
DATED this 22nd day of September, 2010,

~fit

CARTWRIGIIT
Deputy Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed,
postage pre~paid, to the following:

JOHN A. FINNEY
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
Old Power House Building
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint, ID 83864

BRENT C. FEATHERSTON
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM1 CHTD.
Attorney at Law
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864
DATED this

22-

day of September, 2010.

j~ ~. fNatvv~
Lisa M. Warren, Paralegal
Contracts and Administrative Law Division
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

In the Matter of the Estate of

)
)

Case No. CV-2007-266

MELVIN PETERSON,

)
)

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO STRIKE

Deceased.

)
)

COMES NOW the State ofldaho, Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter the
11

Department"), through undersigned counset and submits the following memorandum of points

and authorities in support of its Motion to Strike:

I.
BACKGROUND FACTS
Cathie Peterson was appointed personal representative for this estate on July 26~ 2007.

Since that time~ over a three year period, several contested proceedings involving her have
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO STRIKE
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occurred in this matter including the Department's Petitions for Allowance of Claim, Petition to

Require Payment of Claim, motions relating to the hiring of an appraiser, Petition to Compel
Sale of Home and Payment to Department, an appeal to the District Court. and remand for

findings of fact and conclusions of law. A Notice of Hearing setting a pre-trial conference and
trial setting was filed and served on the parties on July 30, 2010. The Department served a
Notice of Deposition on Cathie Peterson on September 7, 2010. The pretrial conference is
currently set for October 5, 2010, and the trial is set for October 21, 2010.
Cathie Peterson has now, at this late date, retained an attorney to protect her personal
interests in the real property of this estate, and has filed a "Demand for Noticen pursuant to Idaho
Code § 15-3-204. Included in the "Demand for Notice" are false and unsupported statements and
a vague motion purportedly raised under Rule l 2(b):

The nature of Demandant's interest is fee title holder in certain real
property against which the State ofldaho, Department of Health and Welfare,
asserts a claim as creditor of the above entitled estate and which Property has been
the subject of Motions, Petitions and Court Orders all without notice, service of
process or jurisdiction over the Demoodant. Cathie Peterson.
3.
* * * The undersigned moves to vacate and dismiss all orders
entered with regard to her real property pursuant to LR.C.P. Rule 12(b).
2.

Demand for Notice and Special Appearance (underline added).
II.
ARGUMENT

Rule l 2(f), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, provides as follows:
(f) Motion to Strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to

a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is pennitted by these rules. upon motion
made by a party within twenty (20) days after the service of the pleading upon the
pa1fy or upon the court's own initiative at any time, the court may order stricken

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO STRIKE
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from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant. immaterial.
impertinent. or scandalous matter.
Rule 12(f), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (underline added).
Cathie Peterson is not a stranger to these proceedings. When she sought and obtained
appointment as personal representativel she voluntarily submitted herself to the personal
jurisdiction of the court.

15-3-602. Acceptance of appointment-Consent to jurisdiction - By
accepting appointmentl a personal representative submits personallx to the
jurisdiction of the court in any proceeding relating to the estate that may be
instituted by any interested person. Notice of any proceeding shall be delivered to
the personal representative, or mailed to him by ordinary first class mail at his
address as listed in the application or petition for appointment or as thereafter
reported to the court and to his address as then known to the petitioner.

Idaho Code § 15-3-602 (emphasis added). There is only one Cathie Peterson. While she may
have two roles in this case> she is a single person who long ago submitted herself personally to
this court. She may now have another attorney to represent her personal interests, but she
remains one person who has long been a party to these proceedin_g.9. Claims that these
proceedings have taken place "without notice> service of process or jurisdiction over the
Demandant, Cathie Peterson" are scandalous, impertinent and false.
The petitions that are currently pending before the court are the Department's Petition to
Compel Sale of Home and Payment to Department, which is on remand for findings of fact and
conclusions oflawi and the Department's Petition for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
These Petitions seek orders against the personal representative of this estate. If Cathie Peterson
and the personal representative were distinct individuals (which they are not), she would not have
standing to challenge the Department's petitions. While she may be an •'interested person,. as

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO STRIKE
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defined by Idaho Code§ 15-1-201(25), she would not have the standing of "parti' to b1ing a
Rule 12(b) motion.

The Unifonn Probate Code provides for fonnal proceedings which are initiated by
Petition and notice of hearing. The Probate Code provides for certain specified actions that may
be brought by an interested person against the personal representative. For example, an
interested person can seek supervised administration. Idaho Code§ 15-3-501. An interested
person can seek an order requiring the personal representative to post bond. Idaho Code § 15-3605. An interested person can seek an order restraining the personal representative. Idaho Code
§ 15w3~607. All of these are actions against the personal representative. Nothing gives an

interested person the right to seek to dismiss a petition brought by a creditor against the personal
representative.
Here, Cathie Peterson is attempting to litigate the same issues that have already been
decided in this case. Mounting absurdity upon absurdity) she is attempting to separate herself
into two and then litigate with the Department. now as an "interested person," instead ofI as the

pe1-sonal representative. Nothing in the Probate Code permits such a procedure.
Cathie Peterson may avoid the effect of any orders issued pursuant to the Department's
Petitions by the simple expedient of resigning as personal representative. If that were the case,
any action to require the partition of the real property would have to be brought against her
personally by the successor personal representative. In such a proceeding she would have the
opportunity to assert her rights as an individual (to the extent her participation in these
proceedings does not result in orders that would be res judicata against her). However, Cathie

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO STRIKE
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Peterson remains as personal representative of this estate. She cannot on the one hand act as the
personal representative, and at the same time take a position contrary to the estate she represents
as an "interested person,"

Cathie Peterson's vague attempt at a Rule 12{h) motion is insufficient, redundant,
immaterial, and impertinent, and should be stricken.

DATED this 22nd day of September, 2010,

Deputy Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed,
postage pre-paid, to the following:

JOHN A. FINNEY
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
Old Power House Building
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint, ID 83864

BRENT C. FEATHERSTON
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM! CHTD.
Attorney at Law
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864

DATED this

Z 2--day of September, 2010.

~ f1A. . V(}a,-w~

Lisa M. Warren, Paralegal
Contracts and Administrative Law Division
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

S. KAY CHRISTENSEN, ISB No. 3101
CHIEF, CONTRACTS AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DMSION
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT
Deputy Attorney General
3276 Elder, Ste. B
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83 720-0009
Telephone: (208) 332-7961
Facsimile: (208) 334-6515
ISB No. 3361
cartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

In the Matter of the Estate of
MELVIN PETERSON,
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2007-266

PETITION FOR REMOVAL OF
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
FOR CAUSE

COMBS NOW the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter the
"Department"), through undersigned counsel, a creditor herein, and, pursuant to Idaho Code §
15-3-611 petitions this court to remove Cathie Peterson as personal representative herein, as
follows:

1.

Melvin Peterson was bor

2007.

PETITION FOR REMOVAL OF
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - 1

and died at the age of 83 on Mal'ch 3,

Sep. 22. 2010 2:19PM

2.
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Prior to his death, and after the age of 55, the Department paid Medicaid benefits

on Melvin Peterson's behalf in the sum of at least $171,386.94.
3.

Cathie Peterson was appointed personal representative of this estate on July 26,

4.

The Department filed an Amended Claim Against estate in the amount of

2007.

$171,386.94 on December 10, 2007.
5.

By order dated April 4, 2008, the court ordered the Department>s claim allowed.

Said order was not appealed and is now final.
6.

Melvin Peterson owned real property in Moyie Springs which, on December 5,

2001, he conveyed to Cathie Peterson! retaining a life estate.
7.

On June 12, 2008, the court entered its Order on Petition to Require Payment of

Claim. Said order, among other things, (1) Required that the life estate held by Melvin Peterson
prior to his death be an asset of the estate for the limited purpose of Medicaid estate recovery, (2)
Required the personal representative to include the life estate as an asset of the estate in the estate
inventory, and (3) Required the personal representative to assign an appropriate value to the life
estate based on its value at the time of Melvin Peterson's death.
8.

On June 22, 2010, the personal representative presented an "Amended Personal

Representative's Inventory" listing the life estate with a value of $0, thereby flaunting the order
of the court.

PETITION FOR REMOVAL OF
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - 2
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On September 17, 2010, Cathie Peterson, through attorney Brent C. Featherston,

filed a Demand for Notice and Special Appearance which includes a motion "to vacate and
dismiss all orders entered with regard to" Cathie Peterson's real property.
IO.

Idaho Code§ 15-3-611 provides as follows:

(a) A person interested in the estate max petition for removal of a personal
r.m;!resentative for cause at any time. Upon filing of the petition, the court shall fix
a time and place for hearing. Notice shall be given by the petitioner to the pe1'sonal
representative, and to other persons as the court may order, Except as otherwise
ordered as pmvided in section 15-3-607 of this Part, after receipt of notice of
removal proceedings, the personal representative shaJl not act except to account,
to co1rect maladministration or preserve the estate, If removal is ordered, the court
also shall direct by order the disposition of the assets remaining in the name of, or
under the control of, the personal representative being removed.
(b) Cause for removal exists when removal would be in the best interests
of the estate, or if it is shown that a personal representative or the person seeking

h1s appointment intentionally misrepresented material facts in the proceedings
leading to his appointment, or that the personal representative has disregarded an
order of the court. has become incapable of discharging the duties of his office. or
has mismanaged the estate or failed to perfonn any duty pertaining to the office.
Unless the decedent's will directs otherwise, a personal representative appointed at
the decedent's domicile, incident to securing appointment of himself or his
nominee as ancillary personal representative, may obtain removal of another who
was appointed personal representative in this state to administer local assets.

Idaho Code § 15-3-611 (underline added).
11.

The personal representative herein has disregarded an order of the court by failing

to "assign an appropriate value to the life estate based on its value at the time of Melvin
Peterson's death."
12.

The personal representative has become incapable of discharging her fiduciary

duties in this estate because she has taken a position, personally in direct opposition to her duty

to the estate as pe1'sonal representative.
PETITION FOR REMOVAL OF
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - 3
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It would be in the best interests of the estate to remove Cathie Peterson as

personal representative so that the remaining issues in this matter can be finally detennined and
this estate concluded.

DATED this 22nd day of September~ 2010l

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed,
postage pre~paid, to the following:
JOHN A. FINNEY
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
Old Power House Building
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint, ID 83864

BRENT C. FEATHERSTON
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHID.
Attorney at Law
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864
DATED this 22..-cJayofSeptember, 2010.

Jc~fl<.~
Lisa M.
Paralegal

Warren,
Contracts and Administrative Law Division
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
In the Matter of the Estate of

)
)

Case No. CV-2007-266

MELVIN PETERSON,

)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REMOVAL

Deceased.

COMES NOW the State ofidahoi Depa11ment of Health and Welfare {hereinafter the
"Department11), through undersigned counsel, a creditor herein, and submits the following
memorandum of points and authorities in support of its Petition for Removal of Personal
Representative for Cause:
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I.
BACKGROUND FACTS

Melvin Peterson was bor

and died at the age of83 on March 3, 2007.

The Department has an allowed claim against this estate in the amount of$171,386.94. Cathie
Peterson was appointed pel'sonal representative of this estate on July 26, 2007. On June 12,
2008, the court entered its Order on Petition to Require Payment of Claim. Said order, among

other things, (1) Required that the life estate held by Melvin Peterson prior to his death be an
asset of the estate for the limited purpose of Medicaid estate recovery, (2) Required the personal
representative to include the life estate as an asset of the estate in the estate inventory, and (3)
Required the personal representative to assign an appropriate value to the life estate based on its

value at the time of Melvin Peterson's death. On June 22, 2010, the personal representative
presented an 11Amended Personal Representative's Inventory'' listing the life estate with a value
of $0. On September 17, 2010, Cathie Peterson, through attorney Brent C. Featherston, filed a
Demand for Notice and Special Appearance which includes a motion "to vacate and dismiss all
orders entered with regard to" Cathie Peterson's real property.
II.

ARGUMENT

Removal of a personal representative for cause is governed by Idaho Code§ 15-3-611
which provides as follows:
15-3-611. Termination of appointment by removal-Cause-Procedure
(a) A person interested in the estate may petition for removal of a personal
representative for cause at any time. Upon filing of the petition, the court shall fix
a time and place for hearing. Notice shall be given by the petitioner to the personal

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OP
PETITTON FOR REMOVAL - 2

Y:\MR.C•ses\Esf~te\PetetSOnMelvln\Pleadlngs\Memo In S11ppo11

Pelltion to Remove.wpd

Sep. 22. 2010 2:20PM

No. 2438

P. 21/26

representative, and to other persons as the court may order. Except as otherwise
ordered as provided in section 15-3-607 of this Part, after receipt of notice of
removal proceedings, the personal representative shall not act except to account,
to correct maladministration or preserve the estate. If removal is ordered, the court
also shall direct by order the disposition of the assets remaining in the name of, or
under the control of, the personal representative being removed.
(b) Cause for removal exists when l'emoval would be in the best interests
of the estate, or if it is shown that a personal representative or the person seeking
his appointment intentionally misrepresented material facts in the proceedings
leading to his appointment, or that the personal representative has disregarded an
order of the court. has become incapable of discharging the duties of his office. or
has mismanaged the estate or failed to perform any duty pertaining to the office.
Unless the decedent's will directs otherwise, a personal representative appointed
at the decedent's domicile, incident to securing appointment of himself or his
nominee as ancillary personal representative, may obtain removal of another who
was appointed personal representative in this state to administer local assets.
Idaho Code§ 15-3-611 (underline added).
A.
Cathie Peterson Has Chosen Sides in this Matter and it Would Be in the Best Interest of
the Estate That She Be Removed as Personal Representative.

A personal representative is a fiduciary who holds the assets of the estate for the benefit
of creditors and others interested in the estate. Idaho Code §§ 15-3-703 and 711. A personal

representative has a duty to proceed expeditiously to administer and settle an estate. Idaho Code
§ 15-3~703.

A personal representative has a duty to maximize the value of the estate. In the case of
Matter of Estate of Thomas, 532 N.W.2d 676 (N.D. 1995), the court addressed the personal
representative's attempt, to the dettiment of creditors, to convey estate property to a devisee for
less than the actual value of the property:
A personal representative is a fiduciary who must observe the standards of care
applicable to trustees. The personal representative's fiduciary obligation requires
that he act reasonably for the benefit of the heirs, creditorsl and other parties
interested in the estate. Section 30.lul8ul2, N.D.C.C., provides that the personal
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representative is liable to interested persons for damage or loss resulting from a
breach of his fiduciary duty.
The personal representative must settle and distribute the estate as
expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent with the best interests of the estate.
The personal representative must inventory and determine fair market value of the
decedent's property. If the Rersonal representative sells estate property. he must
obtain the best possible price:
I~ in the administration of the estate. the personal representative
undertakes to sell property of the estate. his fiduciary obligation requires
him to secure the best price obtainable under the circumstances. He may
not merely sit dormant and accept such offers as are tendered to him, but
must make diligent, impartial effort to obtain the best offer possible.
Thus, an executor's trust is not discharged by selling at the appraised price
unless there is evidence to show that was the best price that could be
obtained in the exercise of reasonable diligence.

31 Am.Jur.2d Executors and Administrators § 768 (1989) (footnotes omitted)

Estate ofThomas1 532 N.W.2d at 686 (citations omitted; underline added).
A personal representative is not permitted to take sides in a dispute between one heir or

claimant and another. Matter of Estate ofWise1 20 Kan.App.2d 624, 627, 890 P.2d 744, 746
(1995) (executor may not take sides in a dispute regarding distribution of an estate); Matter of
Estate of Pence, 511 N. W.2d 651, 652 (Iowa App. 1993) ("An executor or an administrator must
be concerned with the preservation of the estate for both the creditors and the beneficiaries and
cannot act to protect one group with complete disregard to the other''); Estate of Denman, 94
Cal.App.3d 2891 156 Cal.Rptt. 341 (Cal.App. 4 Dist. 1979) ("The executor serves as a neutral
stakeholder with a fiduciary obligation'1); In re Miller's Estate, 259 Cal.App.2d 536, 544, 66
Cal.Rptr, 756, 762 (Cal.App, 5 Dist. 1968)

e1t is unquestionably true that, generally speaking, an

executor or administrator of an estate should remain neutral in the estate proceedings as between
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parties such as heirs and devisees with conflicting claims to portions of the estate"); In re
Jacobson's Estate, 387 A.2d 590, 591 (D.C. 1978) ('1Rather than champion particular claims
against the estate, an executor is expected to remain neutral as to all creditors''); In re Morine's
Estate, 363 A.2d 700, 703 (Me. 1976) ([T)he executor may not take sides in the adjudication of
the individual claims of beneficiaries one against another"). There can no longer be any question
in this case, but that Cathie Peterson has taken sides against the interest of the Department.
Cathie Peterson is the owner of real property in which the court has already detennined
the Depa11ment has an interest. Her conflict of interest is greater than where a personal
representative may also be an heir, or where the estate assets are separate from the assets of the
personal representative. If the estate is maximized, Cathie Peterson loses a portion of her
property interest. If the estate is maximized, her interest in her property is minimized. If the
asset is partitioned Cathie Peterson may lose the property entirely. Because Cathie Peterson is
living on the real property, it is Jn her best interest to delay the administration of the estate.
Also in this case, Cathie Peterson has now taken a position in direct opposition to the
estate she represents as shown in the Demand for Notice and Special Appearance in which she

seeks "to vacate and dismiss all orders entered with regard to her real property." Clearly, Cathie
Peterson has put herself in a role where she can no longer both serve as personal representative

and litigate her own personal interests in the estate property. These confHcdng roles are
demonstrated by the following table:
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Cathie Peterson

Personal ReRresentative
Duty to maximize the estate

Interest in minimizing estate value

Duty first to creditors

Interest first to her personal interest

Duty to proceed expeditiously

Interest in delaying distribution

Cannot take sides

Has already taken sides

Clearly, the conflict of interest has become an impediment to the administration of this
estate. It would be in the best interest of the estate for Cathie Peterson to be removed as personal
representative.
B.

The Personal Representative Herein Has Disregarded an Order of the Court.
On June 12, 2008, the court entered its Order on Petition to Require Payment of Claim.

Said order required the personal representative to "assign an appropriate value to decedenes life
estate interest held in real property at the time of death." The question of the valuation of the
property "at the time of death11 had been contested in the proceeding leading up to the order and it

was clear to all parties what the order meant. However, on June 22; 2010; the personal
representative presented an "Amended Personal Representative's Inventory" listing the life estate
with a value of $0. Zero is simply not a ''value" it is no value at all) contrary to the clear meaning
and intent of the court. This is not a good faith attempt to value the life estate at the time of
death of the decedent. In presenting this inventory, the personal representative has "disregarded

an order of the court'' and should be removed.
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Ill.

CONCLUSION
It is time for an orderly administration of this estate. All parties' interest may be heard

and fairly decided without the legal maneuvering and wrangling on the part of Cathie Peterson
that has heretofore marked these proceedings. Cathie Peterson should be removed as personal
representative. As a private individual she can take such actions as are permitted by law to

protect her interests in her real property.
DATED this 22nd day of September, 2010,

Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed,
postage pre·paid, to the following:

JOHN A. FINNEY
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
Old Power House Building
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint> ID 83864
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.
Attorney at Law
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864
DATED this 22-dayofSeptember, 2010.

.:iittt., JI!.(.~

Lisa M. WaiTen, Paralegal
Contracts and Administrative Law Division
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FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, ISB NO. 4602
Attorney at Law
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
brent@featherstonlaw.com
(208) 263-6866
(208) 263-0400 (Fax)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
MELVIN PETERSON,
Deceased.

eatlimtm .law ~inn dti£
'.Da:nidP. !feat/ierston
'.Brent C. !feat/ierston*
Jerem:g P. !feat/ierston
Jilttomeys at Law

2.

The nature of Demandant's interest is fee title holder in certain real property against
which the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, asserts a claim as creditor
of the above entitled estate and which Property has been the subject of Motions,
Petitions and Court Orders all without notice, service of process or jurisdiction over the
Demandant, Cathie Peterson.

3.

Demandant, through counsel, makes demand for notice of the following matters all
petitions, applications, and filings concerning the above estate. Demandant files this
Demand for Notice and Special Appearance without waiving issues of jurisdiction,
venue, service of process and due process, pursuant to l.R.C.P. Rule 4(i)(2). The
undersigned moves to vacate and dismiss all orders entered with regard to her real
property pursuant to l.R.C.P. Rule 12(b).

4.

Notice shall be given to Demandant's attorney, whose name and address are set forth
above.

DATED:9-

DATED:

(~-I~

r-.1? 2£2/tJ
Attorney for Demandant

Itfaf'w &3864

7"a;c{208} 263-o400

DEMAND FOR NOTICE and SPECIAL APPEARANCE - 1
Itfafic &

'Wasliington

DEMAND FOR NOTICE
and SPECIAL APPEARANCE
(I.C. 15-3-204)
(I.R.C.P. Rule 4(i)(2))

Demandant, Cathie Peterson, individually, has a financial or property interest in the
above estate proceedings, in which decedent died on March 3, 2007.

{208) 263-6866

• £icensetf in

CV 2007-00266

1.

12.3 s. Sec.anti Ave.
Santfpoint~
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)
)
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II
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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I hereby certify that on the
day of September, 2010, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following
manner:
U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand delivered
[ ] Facsimile No. (208) 263-8211
[ ] Other: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

John A. Finney, Esq.
FINNEY, FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A.
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint, ID 83 864

M

W. Cory Cartwright, Esq.
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
Human Services Division
3276 Elder, Suite B
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0036

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand delivered
[ ] Facsimile No . .>.::(2=0=8),__ __
[ ] Other: - - - - - - - - -

M
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B~~----

~£aw!f(nncfit4.
'.DanidP. :Featlierston
'.Brent C. :Featherston*
Jeremy P. :Featherston
J!.ttamey; at £aw
113 S. Secomf.J'l.ve.
Samfpoint, Iaalio 83864

(208) 263-6866

7'•7( (208) 263-0400
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JOHN A. FINNEY
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Phone:
(208) 263-7712
Fax:
(208) 263-8211
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

In the Matter of the Estate
of,
MELVIN PETERSON,
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2007-266
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S
FINAL ACCOUNTING AND PETITION
FOR DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION;
and NOTICE OF HEARING
(October 21, 2010 9:30 a.m.)
Fee Category:
J(l) (a) - $25.00
J(l) (d) - $ 9.00

COMES NOW CATHIE L. PETERSON, Personal Representative of the
Estate, by and through her attorney, JOHN A. FINNEY, and files
this Final Accounting and Petition for a Decree of Distribution,
as follows:
1.

The Decedent died March 3, 2007, intestate.

CATHIE L.

PETERSON and CARL PETERSON are the sole surviving issue and heirs
at law of the Decedent.

CARL PETERSON executed a Renouncement Of

And Consent To Appointment as Personal Representative, the
original of which is on file with the Court.
2.

CATHIE L. PETERSON is the Court appointed Personal

Representative of the Estate.
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S FINAL ACCOUNTING
AND PETITION FOR DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION - 1

3.

The Personal Representative published a Notice to

Creditors on August 16, 2007, August 23, 2007, and August 30,
2007; and the time to make a creditor's claim has expired.
4.

A Notice to Known Creditor to the State of Idaho

Department of Health and Welfare, dated August 6, 2007, was filed
August 8, 2007.
5.

The .Amended Estate Beginning Inventory was

$(156,711.12), which consisted of:
A.

Real Estate
** Medicaid Life Estate Inclusion Only**
Tax #5, being part of Lot Five (5), Block Two
(2), Moyie Springs Townsite and described as
follows:

B.

c.

Commencing at the Northeast Corner of Lot
Five (5), Block Two (2), Moyie Springs
Townsite; thence West along the North Line of
Lot Five (5) , a distance of 40 feet to a
point; thence Southwesterly along Moyie
Street a distance of 140 feet to a point;
thence South 63 feet to a point; thence East
95 feet at a point on the East line of Lot 5;
thence North 125 feet to the POINT OF
BEGINNING.

0.00

Stocks, Bonds & Certificates of Deposit
None

0.00

Mortgages, Notes & Cash
(1) Mountain West Bank Acct# ****2078
as of 03/30/07
(2)

(3)

D.
E.

First .American Title Escrow
Acct #*****452 (1/2 interest) as
of 03/02/07
Boundary Community Hospital Refund

Other Miscellaneous property
Miscellaneous Furniture, & clothes
Approved or Allowed Claims
(1)
Principal Financial Group
RPS No.:XX:XXX4185

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S FINAL ACCOUNTING
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1,288.35

11,344.35
2,163.74
0.00

-362.88

(2)

Boundary Community Hospital
- Withdrawn

(3)

State of Idaho, Department of
Health & Welfare

SUB-TOTAL
6.

-171,386.94
-$156,711.12

An Amended Claim Against Estate was filed by the State

of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, for medical
assistance benefits in the amount of $171,386.94 was allowed.
7.

A "claim" letter dated August 3, 2007 was received from

Provincial Financial Group for $362.88.
8.

This claim was allowed.

A claim was made by Boundary Community Hospital which

was later withdrawn and the sum of $2,163.74 reimbursed to the
estate, which was deposited to the estate checking account.
9.

The breakdown of the estate checking account activity

is as follows:
MOUNTAIN WEST BANK CHECKING ACCOUNT No.****2078
Beginning Balance of Account as of 03/30/07

1,288.35

Payments Received from First American Title
Escrow Acct #*****452 (1/2 interest)

5, 451.25

Boundary Community Hospital Refund

2,163.74

Sum Received from Sale of ~ Interest First
American Title Escrow Acct #*****452

5,779.81

Payment of Approved Partial Attorney Fees &
Costs

(6,549.14)

BALANCE in Checking Account

$8,134.01

10.

The Estate does not have sufficient funds or assets to

satisfy the costs of administration and the allowed claims, as
significant debts exceed the available assets.
11.

The costs of administration to date are as follows,

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S FINAL ACCOUNTING
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with additional costs of administration being incurred.
Attorney Fees to 6/22/2010
Costs to 6/22/2010
ADDITIONAL ESTIMATES
Attorney Fees to Distribution
Costs to Distribution
Recording Fee - Assignment
Filing Fee - Final Acct/Decree
Certify & Record Decree (Est 5pgs)

$9,425.00
$1,063.64
$TBD
16.00
34.00
25.50

TOTAL ATTORNEY FEES & COSTS
12.

$TBD
$TBD

The remaining funds held by the Personal Representative

in the sum of $8,134.01 appear to be sufficient to satisfy the
remaining unpaid costs of administration incurred to date and to
be incurred up to the date of distribution.
13.

Any sums remaining after the payment of the final costs

of administration, shall be disbursed to the extent of said
funds, pursuant to the classification of claims of Idaho Code §
15-3-805(4) to the claimant State of Idaho Department of Health
and Welfare, with insufficient funds to disburse to the remaining
claimant (15-3-805(6)).
14.

Upon disbursement of the funds, the Estate should be

closed and the Personal Representative discharged.

NOTICE OF HEARING
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a hearing has been set upon said
petition on October 21, 2010, at the hour of 9:30 o'clock a.m., at
the Courtroom of the above entitled Court at Bonners Ferry,
Boundary County, Idaho, at which time all interested persons must
appear and show cause, if any they have, why the petition should
not be granted by the Court.

If no persons appear to contest the

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S FINAL ACCOUNTING
AND PETITION FOR DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION - 4

accounting or proposed distribution, then the Court may enter a
Decree of

Distribut~oJ1

DATED this

1,2,

in conformity with this Petition.

day of September, 2010.

~~y-r.~
for CATHIE L.
PETERSON, Personal
Representative of the Estate
of MELVIN PETERSON

~ttorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S FINAL ACCOUNTING AND PETITI0,,!1...,,4_
FOR DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION was mailed, postage prepaid, this J/b"'day of September, 2010 and was addressed to:
Cathie L. Peterson
P.O. Box 442
Moyie Springs, ID 83845

Carl Peterson
1016 South Whitman # 105
Tacoma, WA 98465-2301

W. Corey Cartwright
Deputy Attorney General
Division of Human Services
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036

Provincial Financial Group
Principal Life Insurance
Company
Repetitive Payment Services
P.O. Box 4926
Grand Island, NE 68802-4926

Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864

By:fvCi·J:~
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
MAGISTRATE DIVISION
In the Matter of the Estate of

MELVIN PETERSON

- - - - - - - - -Deceased.
-----

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No: CV-2007-0000266
ORDER DENYING AMENDED
MOTION FOR AUTOMATIC
DISQUALIFICATION - IRCP 40(d)(1)

On September 23, 2010, Attorney Brent C. Featherston filed an IRCP 40(d)(1)
motion for automatic disqualification of the undersigned judge, on behalf of Cathie
Peterson "individually". Cathie Peterson has been the Personal Representative of the
Estate of Melvin Peterson in this proceeding since her appointment by this Court on July
27, 2007.
Since her appointment as Personal Representative of the estate, Ms. Peterson
has pursued both the interests of the estate as well as her own personal interests in this
litigation. One example of Ms. Peterson pursuing her purely personal interest as the
Personal Representative is the litigation of the issue of the Court's personal jurisdiction
over her and her real property in the course of an appeal to District Court.
Probably in response to the Court's prior admonition of an apparent conflict of
interest to the Personal Representative's attorney, John Finney, Ms. Peterson has now
appeared "personally" through Mr. Featherston.

1. ORDER DENYING AUTOMATIC DISQUALIFICATION

IRCP 40(d)(1)(D) provides in part that when a "new party" is joined in an action
after the time for disqualification has passed, the "new party" shall have the right to file for
disqualification within 14 days of first appearance.
In the above-entitled proceeding, Cathie Peterson is not a "new party" as
contemplated by IRCP 40(d)(1)(D). She has been a litigant in this proceeding since its
inception, and has pursued her own personal financial interests as well as those of the
estate. The fact that she and her attorney belatedly recognized the potential conflict of
interest does not render her a "new party" with the right to an automatic disqualification.
Additionally, IRCP 40(d)(1)(D) applies to new parties "joined in an action". Ms.
Peterson individually has not been involuntarily joined, but instead chose to appear in her
personal capacity years after her personal interest in the probate of the estate became
apparent.
For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Peterson's motion for automatic disqualification is
deemed untimely and is thJlefore denied.
DATED this

97 day of

ptember, 2010.

2. ORDER DENYING AUTOMATIC DISQUALIFICATION

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, regular
mail, postage prepaid, and/or delivered, this di]__ day of September, 2010, to:

Brent C. Featherston
Attorney at Law
113 South Second Ave.
Sandpoint, ID 83864
John A. Finney
Attorney at Law
120 E. Lake St., Ste. 317
Sandpoint, ID 83864

W. Cory Cartwright
Dep. Attorney General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0036

3. ORDER DENYING AUTOMATIC DISQUALIFICATION
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The Petition for Removal of Personal Representative for Cause of the State ofldaho,
Department of Health and Welfare, having come before the Court, and the Court finding that
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NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Cathie Peterson shall be, and
hereby is, REMOVED as personal representative of this estate;
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IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED as follows:
1) That Cathie Peterson shall take no actions to the detriment of this estate and shall not
dispose of, conceal, or damage any asset of this estate, whether or not disputed by her, pending
the appointment of a successor personal representative and a final order of this court wrapping up
this estate;
2) That Cathie Peterson shall, upon appointment of a successor personal representative,
deliver all assets of this estate, including documents pertaining to this estate to the successor
personal representative;
3) That Cathie Peterson shall remain subject to the personal jurisdiction of this court for
the purpose of any further orders necessary to administer and wrap up this estate, including any
order surcharging her for any loss or damage to the estate for any malfeasance heretofore or
hereafter committed, or for the repayment of any sums the court may determine were wrongfully

retained or withheld.
DATED this

;t!f

2_ day of Octob
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed,
postage pre-paid, to the following:
JOHN A. FINNEY
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
Old Power House Building
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint, ID 83864
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.
Attorney at Law
113 South Second A venue
Sandpoint, ID 83864
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT
Deputy Attorney General
3276 Elder, Ste. B
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83 720-0009

·1""
DATED this _
_ day of October, 2010.
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO

zrno ocr -1

S. KAY CHRISTENSEN, ISB No. 3101
CHIEF, CONTRACTS AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DIVISION

P 12: 2t~

STATE OF iD.t>.HO

COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

GLENDA POSTm•. CLERK

W. COREY CARTWRIGHT
Deputy Attorney General
3276 Elder, Ste. B
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0009
Telephone: (208) 332-7961
ISB No. 3361
cartwriw@dhw.idabo.gov

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF

Case No. CV-2007-266

MELVIN PETERSON,

PETITION FOR FORMAL
APPOINTMENT OF SUCCESSOR
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

Deceased.

(1.C. §§15-3-301, and 15-3-613)

PETITIONER, LARRY E. TISDALE, CHIEF, BUREAU OF FINANCIAL OPERATIONS,
DIVISION OF MEDICAID, STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
WELFARE, STATES AND REPRESENTS TO THE COURT THAT:
1. Petitioner's interest in this matter is that of a creditor of the estate of Melvin Peterson.
2. This Court appointed Cathie Peterson as personal representative of the above named estate
on July 26, 2007.
3. The above referenced estate is still in administration.
4. Petitioner is qualified to act as successor personal representative.

PETITION FOR FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF
SUCCESSOR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - 1

WHEREFORE, PETITIONER REQUESTS THAT:
1. Upon the acceptance and qualification of Larry E. Tisdale, Chief, Bureau of Financial
Operations, Division of Medicaid, State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, as
personal representative of the above named estate, accepting Cathie Peterson's resignation
as personal representative of the above named estate.
2. The Court appoint Larry E. Tisdale, Chief, Bureau of Financial Operations, Division of
Medicaid, State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, as successor personal
representative of the above named descendant, to act without bond.
3. The Court authorize and direct Cathie Peterson to transfer title in the assets of the estate,
and to distribute them, to Larry E. Tisdale, Chief, Bureau of Financial Operations, Division
of Medicaid, State ofidaho, Department of Health and Welfare.
4. After Cathie Peterson as personal representative has made distribution of the assets to Larry
E. Tisdale, Chief, Bureau of Financial Operations, Division of Medicaid, State of Idaho,
Department of Health and Welfare, a receipt for the same be filed with the Court,
discharging Cathie Peterson as personal representative of the above named estate.
5. Upon qualification and acceptance by Larry E. Tisdale, Chief, Bureau of Financial
Operations, Division of Medicaid, State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare,
Letters of Administration be issued.
DATED this _2_ day of October, 2010.

~LC):CXJ

PETITION FOR FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF
SUCCESSOR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - 2

VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss:
)

County of Ada

Larry E. Tisdale, being first duly sworn on oath, states that he has read the foregoing
document, knows the contents thereof, and believes the same to be true and correct to the best of his
knowledge and belief.

DATED this 2_ day of October, 2010.

LA E:TISDALE, Chief
Bureau of Financial Operations
Division of Medicaid
State ofldaho, Department of Health and Welfare
P. 0. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83 720-0009
(208) 287-1150

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this
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NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO
My Commission Expires: '(-l 3-<Jc?
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day of October, 2010.
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PETITION FOR FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF
SUCCESSOR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - 3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR
FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF SUCCESSOR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE was
served on the "l~ day of October, 2010 to:
CATHIE L PETERSON
C/O JOHN A FINNEY
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY PA
120 E LAKE STREET SUITE 317
SANDPOINT ID 83864
BRENT C FEATHERSTON
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM CHTD
ATTORNEY AT LAW
113 SOUTH SECOND AVENUE
SANDPOINT ID 83864

PETITION FOR FORMAL APPOINTMENT OF
SUCCESSOR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - 4

~

d...

Hand-delivered

Hand-delivered

.,LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF IDAHO
S. KAY CHRISTENSEN, ISB No. 3101
CHIEF, CONTRACTS AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DIVISION
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT
Deputy Attorney General
3276 Elder, Ste. B
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0009
Telephone: (208) 332-7961
Facsimile: (208) 334-6515
ISB No. 3361
caiiwriw(iidhw.idaho.gov

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
IN THE MATIER OF THE ESTATE OF:

)

)
MELVIN PETERSON,

Case No. CV-2007-266

)

Deceased.

)
)

ACCEPTANCE OF APPOINTMENT
(LC. § 15-3-602)

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Ada

)

) SS.

The undersigned hereby accepts appointment to the office of personal representative of
the estate of the above named decedent and agrees to perform and discharge the trust of said
office. The undersigned hereby submits personally to the jurisdiction of this Court in any
proceeding relating to the estate that may be instituted by an interested person as defined by the
Idaho Uniform Probate Code.

ACCEPTANCE OF APPOINTMENT - I

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

_s_ day of October, 2010.

NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO
My Commission Expires:
7,. \~-l(s:>

ACCEPTANCE OF APPOINTMENT - 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ACCEPTANCE OF APPOINTMENT was served on the ~day of October,
2010, to:
CATHIE L PETERSON
C/O JOHN A FINNEY
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY PA
120 E LAKE STREET SUITE 317
SANDPOINT ID 83864

'i.... Hand-delivered

BRENT C FEATHERSTON
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM CHTD
ATTORNEY AT LAW
113 SOUTH SECOND AVENUE
SANDPOINT ID 83864

0\ Hand-delivered

ACCEPTANCE OF APPOINTMENT - 3
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FILED

JOHN A. FINNEY
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Phone:
208-263-7712
Fax:
208-263-8211
ISB No. 5413
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
In the Matter of the Estate
of,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MELVIN PETERSON,

Deceased.

Case No. CV-2007-0266
NOTICE OF APPEAL
I.R.C.P. 83
Category: L2
Fee:
$53.00

TO: THE RESPONDENT IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, AND
THE RESPONDENT'S ATTORNEY, W. COREY CARTWRIGHT, DEPUTY ATTORNEY
GENERAL AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN

TIU~T

CATHIE PETERSON, in her

capacity as the PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF MELVIN
PETERSON, herein APPELLANT, appeals pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83 and
Idaho Code§ 17-201, as follows:
1.

The title of the court from which the appeal is taken

is the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the First
Judicial District of the State of Idaho in and for the County of
Boundary, Magistrate.Judge Justin W. Julian, presiding.
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1

dt~

2.

The title of the Court to which the appeal is taken is

the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State
of Idaho in and for the County of Boundary.
3.

The date and heading of the judgment or decision from

which the appeal is taken is the Order Removing Personal
Representative, entered October 7, 2010.
4.

The appeal is taken upon both matters of law and

matters of fact.
5.

The testimony and proceedings of the original trial or

hearing were recorded by the Boundary County Clerk and are in
the possession of the Boundary County Clerk.

The proceedings

resulting in the order were held on October 7, 2010.
6.

The issues on appeal upon which the appellant intends

to assert in the appeal (but such list is not an exhaustive
list), and provided that any such list of issues on appeal shall
not prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal
thereafter discovered by the appellant is as follows:
a.

Did the Magistrate err in removir1g Cathie

Peterson as Personal Representative pursuant to the
statutory provisions?
b.

Did the Magistrate err in asserting jurisdiction

over real property not vested in the estate?
c.

Did the Magistrate err in its purported assertion

of jurisdiction over real property vested in a person not a
party to the proceeding?
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2

d.

Upon remand, should the Magistrate be removed

from further proceedings in the matter?
Dated this

l~~y

of October, 2010.
~

~~;j;~~
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY, P.A.
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was served by deposit in First Class, U.S. mail, postage
prepaid, as indicated, this (')....~day of October, 2010 and was
addressed to:
W. Corey Cartwright
Deputy Attorney General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0009
Brent Featherston
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd.
Attorneys at Law
113 S. Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3

Oct. 12. 2010 12:04PM

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
IN THE MATIER OF THE ESTATE OF:

)

MELVIN PETERSON,

)

) Case No. CV-2007-266
)
)
)
)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~->
Deceased.

ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF
SUCCESSOR PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE
(J.C. 15-3-401)

The Court having entered its Order Removing Personal Representative on October 7,
20 i 0, and the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, being a creditor herein and
being qualified for appointment as successor personal representative;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED THAT Larry E. Tisdale, in
his capacity as Chief, Bureau of Financial Operations, Division of Medicaid, State ofldaho,
Department of Health And Welfare, be and hereby is; appointed as successor personal
representative of the decedent's estate to act without bond.

ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF
SUCCESSOR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - I

Oct. 12. 2010 12:04PM

No. 2917

P. 3

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF SUCCESSOR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE was
served via facsimile, on the \~ day of October, 2010, to:
CATHIE L PETERSON
CID JOHN A FINNEY
FINNEY FINNEY & FINNEY PA
120 E LAKE STREET SUITE 317
SANDPOINT ID 83864
FACSIMILE~ (208) 263-8211
BRENT C FEATHERSTON
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM CHTD
ATTORNEY AT LAW
113 SOUTH SECOND AVENUE
SANDPOINT ID 83864
FACSIMILE~ {208) 263-0400
W COREY CARTWRIGHT
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
3276 ELDER STE B
POBOX83720
BOISE ID 83720-0009
FACSIMILE-(208) 334-6515

ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF
SUCCESSOR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - 2 ;;)~~
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F\LED

JOHN A. FINHBY
FINNEY FINNEY & FlNHBY, P.A.
Attorneys at. Law
Old Power Bouse Building
120 Eaat Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint., Idaho 83864
Phone: (208) 263-7712
Fax: (208) 263-8211

ISB No. 5413
Attorney for Appellant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FXRST JUDICIAli DISTRICT or TllE
STATE 01" IDAHO, IN AND FOR TD COU'l:ftY OF BOUNDARY
In the Mattei; of the Estate
of,

)
)

MILVDt PETUSON,

Caae No. CV-2007-0266

)

APPELI.JUf'l' I

s

BRIEi'

)
)
)
)

Deceased.

------------~-------------------~

)
COMES NOW the Appellant, CATHIE PETERSON, PERSONAL

:REPRESENTATIVE OF TD ESTATE 01' MELVIN PBTBRSON, by and throu9h
counsel, JOHN A. FINNEY, of FINNEY FINNEY

&

FINHBY, P.A. , and

submits this Appellant's Brief pursuant to the Notice Of Settlinq
Transcript On Appeal And

B~iefing

Schedule, filed December 20,

2010, as follows:

X•

STADMINT OF 'l'RE CASE
A.

Nature Of The Caae

This is an appeal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 83 and Idaho Code
17~201

§

in th• above referenced estate from the Magistrate

Division of the District Court of the First Judicial Dietriot of

the State of Idaho in and for the County of Boundazy, Magistrate
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 1
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Judge Justin W. Julian, presidi.ng.

The judgment or decioion from

which the appeal is taken is the Order Removing

Pe~•onal

Representative, entered October 7, 2010, which is based upcn
proceedings held on October 7, 2010 (as well as prior proceedings
in the estate proceeding) and any appointment of a Suocessor
Personal Representative.
'l'he nature of the issues on appeal is the Magistrate's
continued assertion of jurisdiction over real property not vested
in the estate (which is vested in a person not a party to the
proceeding) and the Magistrate'• act of therefore removing Cathie
Peterson as Personal Representative and appointing a creditor of
the estate as Peraonal Representative.

The culminating iasue is

whether the Magistrate should be removed from further proceiadinqs
.in the matter.
B.

Course Of Proceedings Zn The Magistrate Court Below

Following the prior appeal and Decision On .Appeal
and

~eman.ding

the valuation and

o~der

reve~sing

of sale deciaion by the

Magistrate, Cathie Peterson As Personal Represeni:ative Of Th•
Estate Of Melvin Peterson, continued completing the remaining
administrative matters in the estate and filed the l'BRSOHA:L

REPUSEN'l'ATIVE'S FINAL ACCOON'l'ING AND PETITION FOlt DECREB OF

DISTRIBUTION; and NOTICE OF REAltING, setting th• matter for
hearing on October 21, 2010.
Following t.he Decision on Appeal, the State of Idaho,
Department Of Health And Welfa.J:e (herein "Department") first
sought entz:y of Findings of
any further proceedings.

Fa~t

and Conclusions of Law, without

When that effort was unsuocessful, the

Department then initiated written d.:iaoovezy and notice up a
APPILLAN1'' S BIUJili' - 2
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.

The Departznent then filed its' Petition For Removal

Of Personal Repr••entative For Cause and its'

Memo~andum

In

Support Of Petition For Reinoval, each dated September 22, 2010.
Cathie Peterson As

Perao~al

Representative Of The Estate Of

Melvin Paterson, objected to the various relief requested by the
Department.
The petition for removal and the objection thereto oame for
hearing on October 7, 2010 at which time the Ma9istrate entered
an Order

R~ovinq

Personal Representative, as well as accepting a

petition to appoint and orderin9 the appointaent of Larry B.
Tisdale, Chief, Bureau Of rinancial Operations, Division Of
Medicaid, State of Idaho, Department Of Health And Welfare to
serve as successor Personal Representative of the Estate of
Melvin Petersen.
On or about October 13, 2010, Cat.hie Petersen as Personal
Representative filed her Notice Of Appeal

p~rsuant

to l.R.C.P. 83

and Idaho Code § 17-201 (specifically includi.ng subsection 1).
This prooeedinq follows.
C.

Statement Of Fact•

In this

~atter

the Magistrate baa not heard any testimony

nor taken any evidence.

All •uc:h m.attei;s have come •• positions

or attachments by counsel, essentially as

offe~s

of proof, or

baaed upon filings in the matter.
The Department sought and the Magistrate terminated the
appointment of Cathie Petersen as Personal Representative and
appointed an employee of the Department as Successor Personal

Representative, upon no showing of any legal cause and contrary
to the priority for appointment by Idaho statute.
APPELLAN'l''S BRIEF - 3
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teJ:mination and appointment rune contrary to the prior Decision
On Appeal regarding tit1e to the property.

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

The iaaues on appea1 the appel1ant identified in the Notioe
Of Appeal are, ae follows:

a.

Did the Magistrate err in removing Cathie Peterson

as Personal Representative

p~rsuant

to the statutoi:y

provisions?

b.

Did the Magistrate err in asserting jurisdiction

over real property not vested in the estate?
c.

Did the Magistrate err in its purported assertion

of jurisdiction over real property vested in a person not a
party to the proceeding?
d.

Upon remand, should the Magistrate be removed from

further proceedings in the matter?

III . .ARGOMllNT

A.

Standai:d Of Review

In the Matter 0£ Estate of Spencer, 106 Ida.ho 316, 320, 679
P.2d 108, 112 (Idaho App., 1984), the applicable standard of
review was set forth as follows:
Ordinarily, in reviewing a decision of the dietriot court on
appeal f'rom a magistrate, we must dete.i:mine from the trial
court (magistrate) record whether substantial evidence
supports the magietrate's findings of fact and whether those
findings support the JD.agistrate'a conclusions of law.
Nicbolis v. Blas•r, 102 Iclaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 (1981);
Uatick v. Uatick, 104 Idaho 215, 657 P.2d 1083
(Ct.App.1983). If so, and if correct legal principle• have
been applied, then the district court'• decision affirming a
magistrate's judgment will be upheld. Id. Only whe~e the
record is ao clear as to 9ive the appellate court a complete
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 4
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understanding of the materia1 issues and the basis of the
magistrate's reasoning will the absence of findings of fact
not result in a rem.and for adeq\1.ate findings. See Pope v.
Intenzrountafn Gaa Co., 103 Idaho 217, 6'6 P.2d 988 (1982);
In re Z8tate of Stibor, 96 Idaho 162, 525 P.2d 357 (1974).
The standard would similarly apply to the District Court'• review
of a decision of the Magistrate Court in a probate matter.
The Magistrate Brred As No Evidenoe Was Ever Taken And

B.

t;o Findings Could Be Made

As shown by the record and the Transcript of the proceedings
on October 7, 2010, th• Magistrate did not hear any testimony nor
taken any other evidence, document• or otherwise.
As set forth in the Matter of Estate of SJ>!l!cer, 106 Idaho
316, 320, 67B P.2d 108, 112 (Idaho App., 1984) (citations

omitted), "Only wh•re the record is so clear as to give the
appellate court a complete understanding of the material issues
and the basis of the magistrate's reasoning will the absence of

findings of fact not result i.n a remand for adequate fi:n.din9a."
The Magistrate could not make any findings of fact nor make any
conclusions, aa no hearing was held on the Personal
Representati~'s

Final Aclcounting- And Petition For Decree Of

Distribution.

Similarly no object.ion was filed to the accounting

and petition.

Lastly, no evidence was introduced at the October

7, 2010 bearing.
~ha

Magistrate failed to take any evidence and failed to

even set forth findings and conclusion as to the applicability of
the requirements to meet the statute for remova1 proffered by the
Department.

The Magistrate failed to properly consider the

statutes regarding priority and once again failed to recognize
the jurisdictional limitations regarding the real property not
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - S
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vested in the estate.
C.

The Magistrate Mis-Applied Idaho Code

§

15-3-611 In

Determining Removal Por Cause
Idaho Code

§

15-3-611

p~ovides,

as follows:

§ 15-3-611. Termination of appointment by rem.oval Cause - ProQedure

(a) A person interested. in the estate may petition for
removal of a personal representative for oause at any tinle.
Upon filing of the petition, the court shall fix a tim.e and
place for bearing. Notice shall ba given by the petitioner
to the personal representative, and to other pei:sons as the
court may order. Except as otherwise ordered as provided in
section 15-3-607 of this Part, a~ter recaipt of notice of
removal proceeclinge, the per•onal representative shall not
act except to account, to co~rect maladministration or
preserve the estate. If removal is ordered, the court also
shall direct by order the disposition of the assets
remaining in the name of, or under the control of, the
personal representative being removed.

(b) Cau•• for removal exists when r911loval would be in
the beet interests of the estate, or if it is shown that a
personal representative or the person seeking his
appointment intentionally misrepresented material facts in
the proceedin9a leadin9 to his appointment, or that the
personal representative bae diareqarded an order of the
court, has become incapable o~ discharging the duties of his
office, or has miSlnanaged the estate or failed to perform
any duty pertaining to th• ct:f'ice. O'nless the decedent'•
will directs otherwise, a personal rep~esentative appointed
at the decedent's domicile, incident to seourinq appointment
of him.self or his nominee as ancillary personal
representative, m.ay obtain rem.oval of another who was
appointed personal representative in this atate to
administer local assets.
As set forth in Kolouch v. First See. Bank of Idaho, 128

Idaho 1B6, 192, 911 P.2d 779, 785 (Idaho App., 1996) for removal
of a personal representative to be in the best interest of the
estate, there must be actual evidence presented of financial
mismanagement.

It is not sufficient to remove a Personal

Representative with priority for appointment as an heir and to
appoint a creditor, without soae sort of

act~al

evidence on the

FROM FINNEY FINNEY
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There was no evidence before the

Magistrate.
Pursuant to Idaho Code

§

15-3-203 "Pz-ioi:ity among persons

seeking appointment as personal. representative," Cathie Patarsen

has priority as an heir of the deoedent (subaeotion (a)(S)) ahead

of the Department as a creditor of the decadent (aubaection
(a) (6)).

As set forth in Matter of Bowman's Estate, 101 Idaho

131, 133-134, 609 P.2d 663, 665 - 666 (Idaho, 1980), "I.C. s 153-203 establishes the priority for appointment
representatives.

o~

personal

It is our conclusion that those provisions are

mandatory and not to be disregarded."

The Magistrate's erroneous basis for ram.oval is summarized
on paqe 13 of the transcript from. the October 7, 2010 hearing, as

foll.ows:

"COURT: I quess that was kind

o~

my point.

'l'hat the

Department as • oreditor would seem to have a higher level of of standing if, uh, there's a probl.em with the way the estate' a

currently being administered."

The Magistrate (and the

Department) considers the administration of the estate to be a

"problem" because the Pez:sonal Representative filed an appeal and
had the Magistrate's prior valuation and sal.e order for property
not vested in the estate rever•ed and remanded.

'l'he Magistrate's

problem with the administration is that the Magistrate still
wants to assert jurisdiction over real property not vested in the
estate and assert jurisdiction over real property veated in a
person not a part:y to the proceeding.
Aaauming for argument only, if the Magistrate is correct
that Cathie Petersen as Personal Representative of the Estate has
a conflict of interest becauoa ohe is the vested own.er of the
APPELLAN1'' S lUUEl!" - 7
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:real estate that the Department urge111 is an asset (in some form
or another) of the estate, then that

e~act

same conflict of

interest exists for the State of Idaho, Department of Health .And
Welfare as its position is in conflict with th.a vestinq of the

real estate.

If these so called oonfliets of interest are

sufficient to disqualify for cause, then the Department is not a
proper Successor Personal Representative, and an independent
third

pa~ty

D.

should be appointed as Successor.

The Magistl::ate Should Be Raaoved Prom :Further
Procaedinqs Ypon Remand

The Magistrate's removal of Cathie Petersen as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Melvin Petersen, and the
appointment of the Department as Successor
Jil9preaentative is in error.

~eraonal

Aqain the Magistrate act.ad without

any evidence upon which to make any findings or conclusions of
law.

The Magistrate's rulinqs :i.n this matter have been a.

continued ebuse of disoretion, illustrating an inability to
impartially

p~oceed,

even with direction upon ram.and.

Milgiatrate

Justin Julian should be disqualified and a different Magistrate
should be appointed. to the proceeding following upon raaand.

IV.

CONCLUSION

'l'ha orders removing Cathie Petersen and appointing an

employee of the Oepartaent as Successor Personal Representative,
for the grounds set forth above, were entered upon reversible
error, and are not supported by fact or law, and should be
reversed.

Upon rem.and, a new Magistrate should be appointed for

the remaininq proceeding• of the Bstate.
APPELLAN'l''S BRIEF - 9
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DATED this

~ ~Y

of January, 2011.

for Appellant Ca
Petersen •• Personal
Representativ. of the Estate
of Melvin Petersen

CERTIFICA'l'B OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and

foregoing was served as indicated this
and was addressed to:
W. Corey Cart~right
Deputy Attorney General
P.O. Box 83720

Boiae, Idaho 83720-0009
(Vi• U.S. Mail)

Brent Feathereton
Featherston Law •irm, Chtd.
Attorneys at Law
113 S. Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
(Via U.S. Mail)

APPEI.IJ\NT'S BR.IEF - 9

00~~~9t_copy
~y

of the

of January, 2011

The Honorable Steve Verby
Bonner County Courthouse
Chambers
Sandpoint, Idaho
(Via Hand Delivery)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from an order in a probate case removing the personal representative for
cause. The underlying dispute involves a creditor's claim filed by the State ofldaho, Department
of Health and Welfare (the "Department") for Medicaid estate recovery as provided in Idaho
Code§ 56-218. "Medicaid estate recovery'' is a program required by federal Medicaid law that
seeks to recover assets of deceased Medicaid recipients, from their estates, in order to reimburse
the taxpayers for expenditures made during the Medicaid recipient's life. The Department's
claim involves the value of a life estate which the Medicaid recipient had retained upon gifting
his real property to his daughter, who is also the removed personal representative.
Course of Proceedings
Cathie Peterson was appointed personal representative in this matter July 26, 2007.
The personal representative mailed a "Notice to Known Creditor" to the Department on
August 6, 2007. She also published a Notice to Creditors with a first publication date of August
16, 2007.
On November 19, 2007, the Department filed a timely Claim Against Estate, in the
amount of $171,134.28, and a Demand for Notice.
Without stating any reason, the personal representative denied the Department's claim,
mailing a "Disallowance of Creditor's Claim and Request for Itemization" to the Department on
November 28, 2007.
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On December 10, 2007, the Department filed an Amended Claim Against Estate in the
amount of$171,386.94. 1 At the same time, the Department filed a Petition for Allowance of
Claim.
The following day, the personal representative, again, disallowed the Department's claim
without stating any reason. See Notice ofDisallowance of Claim dated December 11, 2007. In
response, a Petition to Require Payment of Claim was filed by the Department on December 19,
2007, and a Petition for Allowance of Amended Claim was filed on December 28, 2007.
About January 2, 2008, the personal representative filed a document called "Objections"
in which she objected to the procedure, but still did not state any reason for the disallowance of
the claim.
After a hearing on March 25, 2008, the court entered its Order Granting Petition for
Allowance of Amended Claim.
On May 5, 2008, the Department filed a Petition to Require Payment of Claim, which
together with the Department's Briefin support of Petition to Require Payment of Claim, set
forth the Department's demand for payment of the value of the life estate. See Idaho Code§ 56218(4)(b).
About May 28, 2008, the personal representative filed "Personal Representative's
Inventory." At the same time, the personal representative filed her Objection to Petition to
Require Payment of Claim, stating its position relating to the life estate.

1

Since health care providers have up to one year after the service to present claims to Medicaid, it is not
uncommon for the initial claim to increase somewhat.
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After a hearing, the Court entered its "Order on Petition to Require Payment of Claim" on
June 12, 2008. This order established the life estate as an asset of the estate for purposes of
Medicaid recovery and ordered the personal representative to amend the Inventory and assign an
appropriate value to the life estate.
About August 5, 2008, the personal representative filed her Motion to Hire Appraiser.
The Department objected, in part, by its "Objection to Motion to Hire Appraiser" filed August
11, 2008.
After a hearing, the Court entered its "Order Approving Hiring of Appraiser" on
September 23, 2008, approving an appraisal determining the fee simple value of the real
property.
On May 14, 2009, the Department filed its "Motion to Compel Short Form Appraisal"
contending the appraisal approved by the court in September, 2008, had never been performed.
On July 15, 2009, the Department filed its "Petition to Compel Sale of Home and
Payment to Department," together with a ''Notice of Filing Appraisal Report and Addendum."
After a hearing on July 28, 2009, the court entered its "Order Granting Petition to
Compel" on August 11, 2009.
The personal representative appealed from this order, filing a ''Notice of Appeal" about
August 19, 2009.
A "Decision on Appeal" was issued by the District Court on May 25, 2010, vacating the
"Order Granting Petition to Compel" and remanding "so that findings of facts and conclusions of
law can be established."
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About June 22, 2010, the personal representative filed a "Petition for Authority to Sell,"
together with a "Petition for Approval of and Partial Payment of Attorney Fees and Costs,"
seeking to liquidate an escrow account and pay the attorney for the personal representative. On
the same day, the personal representative filed an "Amended Personal Representative's
Inventory" for the first time listing the life estate in the inventory, but assigning the life estate a
value of$0.
On June 30, 2010, the Department filed its "Petition for Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law." A status conference was held on July 27, 2010, during which Judge Julian indicated an
evidentiary hearing would be held on October 21, 2010 to detennine all remaining factual issues.
On July 28, 2010, the Department submitted its "First Requests for Admission" to the
personal representative.
After a hearing on August 10, 2010, the Court, on August 17, 2010, entered its "Order for
Partial Payment of Attorney Fees and Payment of Costs" approving a partial payment of attorney
fees in an amount to be stipulated by the parties. At the same time, the Court deferred the
Department's Petition for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law to follow the trial scheduled
for October 21, 2010.
The parties' "Stipulation Regarding Partial Payment of Attorney Fees" was filed about
August 24, 2010, with the parties agreeing to reserve objections to the final settlement of the
estate.
About ~ugust 27, 2010, the personal representative submitted her Responses to First
Requests for Admission and thereafter, on September 7, 2010, the Department filed its ''Notice
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of Deposition" to take the oral testimony of the personal representative. An "Amended Notice of
Deposition" was filed on September 15, 2010.
Two days later, on September 17, 2010, Attorney Brent Featherston filed a "Demand for
Notice and Special Appearance" on behalf of"Cathie Peterson, individually." Said notice also
stated: "The undersigned moves to vacate and dismiss all orders entered with regard to her real
property pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)." At the same time, attorney Brent Featherston, on
behalf of"Cathie Peterson, individually'' filed a "Motion for Automatic Disqualification of Judge
l.R.C.P. 40(d)(l)."
On September 22, 2010, the personal representative (through attorney John Finney) filed
"Personal Representative's Final Accounting and Petition for Decree of Distribution." On the
same day, the Department filed its "Petition for Removal of Personal Representative for Cause"
and its "Motion to Strike." Also on the same day, attorney Brent Featherston, on behalf of
"Cathie Peterson, individually" filed an "Amended Motion for Automatic Disqualification of
Judge l.R.C.P. 40(d)(l)."
On September 27, 2010, the Court entered its "Order Denying Amended Motion for
Automatic Disqualification - IRCP 40(d)(l)."
Also on September 27, 2010, the Department filed a ''Notice to Vacate Deposition."
On September 28, 2010, the personal representative filed "Objections" to the
Department's petitions.
On October 7, 2010, hearing was held on the Department's "Petition for Removal of
Personal Representative for Cause" and its "Motion to Strike." On the same day, the court
entered its "Order Removing Personal Representative."
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This appeal followed.
Statement of the Facts
Melvin Peterson ("Melvin") was bor

nd died at the age of 83 on March

3, 2007. Petition to Require Payment of Claim, if 1. Prior to his death, but after reaching the age
of 55, Melvin applied for and received state medical assistance (Medicaid) benefits in the amount
of$171,386.94. Petition to Require Payment of Claim,~ 2. Melvin owned real property in
Moyie Springs which, on December 6, 2001, he conveyed to his daughter Cathie Peterson,
retaining a life estate. Exhibit "A" to Petition to Require Payment of Claim. Melvin possessed
this life estate interest at the time of his death.

ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL
Whether the Department should be awarded its attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho
Code§ 12-117.
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ARGUMENT

I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Removal of a personal representative for cause, as provided in the Uniform Probate Code,
is within the discretion of the probate court. In re Estate ofAnderson-Feeley, 340 Mont. 352,
355, 174 P.3d 512, 513-4 (Mont. 2007); In re Estate ofHass, 643 N.W.2d 713, 717 (N.D. 2002);
Matter ofEstate ofPeterson, 265 Mont. 104, 108, 874 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Mont. 1994). In

examining a magistrate court's exercise of discretion, the appellate court considers: (1) whether
the court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) whether the court acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards; and (3)
whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Stewart v. Stewart, 143 Idaho 673, 678,
152 p .3d 544, 549 (2007).
The personal representative, in her Notice of Appeal, contends there are issues of fact. In
Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 196 P.3d 341 (2008) the Idaho Supreme Court

explained:
Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a). A
court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by
substantial and competent, though conflicting, evidence.
Johannsen, 146 Idaho at 431, 196 P.3d at 349.
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II.

A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE MAY BE REMOVED
WHEN IT IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE ESTATE.
Idaho Code§ 15-3-611, part of the Uniform Probate Code, provides, in part, as follows:

15-3-611. Termination of appointment by removal- Cause Procedure
(a)
A person interested in the estate may petition for removal of a
personal representative for cause at any time. * * *
(b)
Cause for removal exists when removal would be in the best
interests of the estate, or if it is shown that a personal representative or the person
seeking his appointment intentionally misrepresented material facts in the
proceedings leading to his appointment, or that the personal re.presentative has
disregarded an order of the court, has become incapable of discharging the duties
of his office, or has mismanaged the estate or failed to perform any duty
pertaining to the office. * * *
Idaho Code § 15-3-611 (emphasis added). Therefore, "cause" for removal of a personal
representative may arise from many circumstances, at least two of which are applicable here: (1)
Where removal is "in the best interest of the estate," and (2) Where the personal representative
has disregarded an order of the court.
The personal representative argues, at page 6 of her brief, that "for removal of a personal
representative to be in the best interest of the estate, there must be actual evidence presented of
financial mismanagement." There is simply no basis in law for that contention. First, it clearly
conflicts with the plain language ofldaho Code§ 15-3-611. Moreover, the case cited by the
personal representative, Kolouch v. First Sec. Bank ofIdaho, 128 Idaho 186, 911 P.2d 779 (App.
1996), says no such thing. While the Court in Kolouch upheld removal for mismanagement of
the estate, the Court nowhere suggests that is the exclusive grounds for removal.
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III.
THE BEST INTEREST OF THE ESTATE REQUIRES
REMOVAL OF A PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE WITH A
CONFLICT OF INTEREST LIKE THAT HERE.
In her Appellant's Brief, the personal representative failed to cite a single case, statute, or

other authority for her contention that removal "in the best interest of the estate" requires proof of
financial mismanagement. To the contrary, the case law uniformly supports removal for the type
of conflict of interest present here. The issues in this case are quite similar to those in the case of
In re Estate ofAnderson-Feeley, 340 Mont. 352, 174 P.3d 512 (2007). In that case, the

appointed personal representative, Feeley, was the surviving spouse of the decedent. The will
left one fourth of the estate to each of the decedent's three children (who were not children of
Feeley) and the final fourth to Feeley. The decedent's son learned that the decedent's estate,
estimated at more than $4 million when the will was executed, had been reduced to only $30,000
at the time of decedent's death. The decedent's adult children filed an action in the district court
alleging various causes of action against Feeley. Feeley defended on the grounds that such court
actions could only be brought by a personal representative. The children then moved to remove
Feeley as personal representative. The court ordered Feeley's removal and Feeley appealed. The
Montana Supreme Court affirmed the removal. The court first explained:
We review a district court's decision regarding the removal of an estate's
personal representative to determine whether the court abused its discretion.

***

In his petition for removal of Feeley as personal representative of Jan's

estate, Hadachek [decedent's son] argued that Feeley has a conflict of interest in
that Feeley will not pursue claims against himself, contrary to the best interests of
the estate. After a hearing on May 31, 2006, to determine whether Feeley should
be removed as personal representative of Jan's estate, the District Court

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 9

Z:\MRCases\Estate\WCC\WCC Open Cases\PetersonMelvin\DCourt\Respondents Brief2.wpd

300

determined that Feeley had a conflict of interest which would not serve the best
interests of the estate.

In re Estate ofAnderson-Feeley, 340 Mont. at 354, 174 P.3d at 513 (underline added). After
discussing a previous Montana case, In re Estate ofPeterson, 265 Mont. 104, 874 P.2d 1230
(1994) (discussed below), the Court held as follows:
Based on our review of the record and the findings of the District Court, it
is clear that sufficient evidence of a conflict of interest existed to justify removal
of Feeley as personal representative of Jan's estate, pursuant to§ 72-3-526, MCA.
The existence of a potential claim against Feeley is sufficient to create a conflict
of interest, and such conflict of interest is sufficient for removal of Feeley as
personal representative of Jan's estate. Peterson, 265 Mont. at 109, 874 P.2d at
1233. Like the District Court, we are making no determination as to the merit of
Hadachek's underlying claims against Feeley. Rather, we simply agree with the
District Court that Hadachek has presented sufficient evidence that a claim or
claims against Feeley may exist. Applying the standard set forth in Peterson, we
conclude the District Court did not abuse its discretion in removing Feeley as
personal representative of Jan's estate.

In re Estate ofAnderson-Feeley, 340 Mont. at 356, 174 P.3d at 514 (underline added).
The case of In re Estate ofPeterson, 265 Mont. 104, 874 P.2d 1230 (1994), discussed in
the Anderson-Feeley case, also presents issues similar to those here. In that case, the decedent's
brother sought to remove a personal representative who was nominated and appointed pursuant
to the decedent's will. The appointed personal representative was a lawyer who had represented
the decedent in a personal injury action. The decedent's brother contended that the estate had a
claim for reimbursement of excessive attorney fees charged by the lawyer/personal representative
in a prior personal injury matter, and that the lawyer would not sue himself. The District Court
removed the personal representative after it "determined that a conflict of interest existed
between the Estate and Mr. Whalen [the personal representative/attorney] as Mr. Whalen could
not be expected to pursue a claim against himself on behalf of the Estate." In re Estate of
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Peterson, 265 Mont. at 108, 874 P.2d at 1232. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district
court:
Removal of a personal representative for cause pursuant to § 72-3-526,
MCA, is within the sound discretion of the district court and this Court will not
overturn such a termination unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. A district
court can remove a personal representative or refuse to appoint a person as
personal representative for cause if there is a conflict of interest between that
person's interests and those of the estate.
The District Court expressly relied on Estate of Obstarczyk, which
affirmed a removal of an executrix on the grounds that her interests were adverse
to the estate and held as follows:
... The duty of an executor is to examine strictly all claims against
an estate ... seeking judicial interpretation if necessary.... It is clear that
[the executrix's] own interests are antagonistic to the estate...
In the Tice case, supra, we quoted with approval from In re Rinio 's Estate
as follows:
* * * The law does not look with favor upon the administration of
estates by a person where conflicts in the performance of his duty are
likely to arise.
We conclude that the potential claim against Michael J. Whalen for
excessive attorney fees is sufficient to create a conflict of interest in this case. A
conflict of interest is sufficient for removal of the personal representative for
cause under § 72-3-526, MCA.
We hold the District Court properly exercised its discretion in determining
that it was in the best interests of the Estate to remove Michael J. Whalen as
personal representative.

In re Estate ofPeterson, 265 Mont. at 108-9, 874 P.2d at 1232-3 (citations omitted; underline
added); see also Matter ofEstate ofUnke, 583 N.W.2d 145, 1998 S.D. 94 (1998) (Removal of
personal representative nominated by the will and initially appointed by the court was in the best
interest of the estate where the court found that hatred between the personal representative and
other heirs was likely to give rise to "much future litigation.")
Another case raising issues very similar to those here is a case from the state of Nebraska
reported only in Westlaw: In re Estate of Crawford, 2010 WL 3137525 (Neb.App. 2010) (copy
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attached). In the Estate of Crawford case the decedent had executed a series of wills. The last
will, referred to as the 2001 will, nominated Alta Empkey to be personal representative. Empkey
was also the trustee of the decedent's family trust. The 2001 will left all of the probate estate to
Empkey as trustee for the trust. Empkey was appointed personal representative and pursuant to
the terms of the will, she transferred the assets of the probate estate to the trust. Empkey then
sought an order for final settlement of the probate estate which was opposed by other heirs. The
other heirs challenged the 2001 will as the product of undue influence. The will was eventually
declared invalid. The heirs petitioned the court to remove Empkey as personal representative and
also sought an order requiring Empkey to return the assets she had transferred to the trust to the
probate estate. The court ordered the return of the assets but refused to remove Empkey as
personal representative. Both parties appealed.
The Nebraska Court of Appeals found no merit in Empkey's appeal, but was struck by the
oddity of a personal representative opposing the return of the probate property from the trust to
the probate estate:
On direct appeal, Empkey has challenged the county court's ordering of
the transfer of assets back to the estate and the court's awarding of attorney fees
and costs. Putting aside the somewhat unusual notion of the personal
representative of an estate challenging an order for the return of property to the
estate for proper distribution. we find no merit to either assertion.

Estate of Crawford, p. 3 (underline added). The Court went on to reverse the District Court's
refusal to remove Empkey as personal representative. The Court's explanation is helpful here:
The court found that there was no evidence of malfeasance on the part of Empkey
or her counsel and that there was no evidence to establish a conflict of interest.
We disagree.
In this case. Empkey is serving in two capacities. First. she is the personal
representative representing the best interests of the estate and its heirs. Second.
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she is the trustee representing the best interests of the trust. Pursuant to the 2001
will, Empkey, as personal representative of the estate, transferred all assets of the
estate to the trust. The 2001 will, and transfer of assets pursuant to it, have been
declared invalid. As a result, Empkey is now serving in two roles that have
directly conflicting interests.
As personal representative, Empkey' s obligation should be to accumulate
and preserve the estate for proper distribution to the parties entitled to
distribution. As trustee, Empkey's obligation should be to attempt to preserve the
trust for proper distribution to the parties entitled to distribution. Inasmuch as all
assets of the estate have been transferred to the trust, this means that Empkey now
has one role that requires her to seek the return of improperly distributed assets
and another role that requires her to simultaneously resist the return of the same
assets.

Estate of Crawford, p. 5 (underline added). Finally, the Court explained that Empkey's conflict
of interest required a finding that her removal was in the best interest of the estate:
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2454 (Reissue 2008) provides that cause for removal
of a personal representative exists when, among other factors, removal of the
personal representative would be in the best interests of the estate or it is shown
that the personal representative has become incapable of discharging the duties of
her office. In this case, it is apparent that the best interests of the estate would be
served by not having the personal representative simultaneously serving as trustee
of the trust and resisting the return of assets to the estate for proper distribution.
Similarly, it is apparent that Empkey's dual capacities make her incapable of
discharging her duties as both personal representative and trustee.

Estate of Crawford, p. 6 (underline added); see also Estate ofReinek, 1997 WL 618740
(Neb.App. 1997) (copy attached) (Personal representative should have been removed where she
would be required to both evaluate claims against herself and, if necessary, sue herself).
It cannot be disputed that under the Uniform Probate Code, removal of a personal

representative is in the best interest of the estate where the personal representative has a conflict
of interest that prevents her from pursuing assets belonging to the estate.
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IV.

JUDGE JULIAN CORRECTLY FOUND REMOVAL OF
CATHIE PETERSON AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
WAS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE ESTATE.
A.
The Personal Representative Fails to Identify Any Findings or Conclusions She Claims
Are Not Supported in the Record.
The personal representative, ignoring the record of the proceedings and the arguments
and admissions of counsel, contends that, "[t]he Magistrate failed to take any evidence and failed
to even set forth findings and conclusion as to the applicability of the requirements to meet the
statute for removal proffered by the Department." Appellant's Brief, p. 5 (underline added). Of
course, the Judge Julian did make findings and conclusions on the record. Tr. p. 33, 1. 20 to p.
35, 1. 6 (discussed and quoted below). The personal representative, however, completely ignores
these findings and conclusions and fails to identify any of these findings and conclusions with
which she takes issue.
The burden is on the appellant to come forward and identify what findings and
conclusions she contends are unsupported. As stated in Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 229 P .3d
1146 (2010):
Where an appellant fails to assert his assignments of error with
particularity and to support his position with sufficient authority, those
assignments of error are too indefinite to be heard by the Court. Randall v. Ganz,
96 Idaho 785, 788, 537 P.2d 65, 68 (1975). A general attack on the findings and
conclusions of the district court, without specific reference to evidentiary or legal
errors, is insufficient to preserve an issue. Michael v. Zehm, 74 Idaho 442, 445,
263 P.2d 990, 993 (1953). This Court will not search the record on appeal for
error. Suits v. Jdaho Bd. ofProf'! Discipline, 138 Idaho 397, 400, 64 P.3d 323,
326 (2003). Consequently, to the extent that an assignment of error is not argued
and supported in compliance with the I.A.R., it is deemed to be waived. Suitts v.
Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005).
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Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho at 790, 229 P.3d at 1152. The personal representative's general claim

that the Court's action removing the personal representative is not supported is not sufficient to
identify any error on appeal.
The Long Record of this Case. Including the Positions Taken by the Personal
Representative in Opposition to the Interests of the Estate Were Before Judge Julian When He
Made His Decision.
B.

The Department's "Petition for Removal of Personal Representative for Cause" did not
arise in a vacuum. The Department has provided a detailed "Course of Proceedings," beginning
on page 1 of this brief, to demonstrate the long series oflegal actions leading up to the
Department's Petition. The personal representative was appointed in July, 2007, more than three
and a half years ago. A personal representative has an obligation to proceed "proceed
expeditiously with the settlement and distribution of a decedent's estate." Idaho Code§ 15-3704. She is to "do so without adjudication, order, or direction of the court," but "may invoke the
jurisdiction of the court ... to resolve questions concerning the estate or its administration." Id.
And yet nothing at all has yet been done to administer this estate. All that the personal
representative has done is to attempt to thwart the administration of this estate.
Twice the personal representative filed a disallowance of the Department's claim without
stating any reason. (November 28, 2007 and December 11, 2007). After a hearing the
Department's claim was allowed. Note that this had nothing to do with the current dispute about
the life estate, since the validity of the Department's claim has nothing to do with whether there
are assets of the estate to pay the claim.
Another petition and hearing was required to force the personal representative to include
the life estate in decedent's real property as an asset of the estate. See "Order on Petition to
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Require Payment of Claim" (June 12, 2008). This order also required the personal representative
to "assign an appropriate value to decedent's life estate interest held in real property at the time
of death."
The transcript of the hearing that resulted in this June 12, 2008 Order is in the record of
this case. See Clerk's Transcript of Petition to Require Payment of Claim of June 3rd, 2008.
The position of the personal representative in that proceeding is telling and significant. The issue
involved whether the life estate retained by the decedent when he gifted the real property to
Cathie Peterson was an asset of the estate under Idaho Code§ 56-218(4)(b). The attorney for the
personal representative, throughout that hearing, sought to minimize the estate by arguing that
the life estate was not an asset of the estate. This was, of course, in the interest of Cathie
Peterson, individually, but was not in the best interest of the estate.
Even after the June 12, 2008 Order, which should have been enough to clarify the duty
and responsibility of the personal representative, Cathie Peterson still drug her feet. After
securing an "Order Approving Hiring of Appraiser" on September 23, 2008, it was necessary for
the Department to file a "Motion to Compel Short Form Appraisal" on May 14, 2009, to move
this matter forward. After additional delay, the Department acted again on July 15, 2009, filing
its "Petition to Compel Sale of Home and Payment to Department." In the course of this hearing,
the conflict of interest became obvious to Judge Julian. The attorney for the personal
representative, apparently representing Cathie Peterson's individual interests, rather than the
interests of the estate, argued as follows:
Um, as to the specifics of the assertions here that the Court somehow has the
authority to compel Cathy Peterson, in her individual capacity, who is the vested
titleholder of the real estate, to somehow sell her interest in the property, I submit
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that it is not properly before the Court in an estate proceeding and - and this Court
would not have jurisdiction to do so under the relevant statutory provisions, um,
as would apply to partition as cited by the Department. The .....
Clerk's Transcript of Petition to Compel of July 28th 2009, p. 3, I. 22 top. 4, I. 2. Judge Julian
immediately recognized the conflict of interest:
The law is very clear that the taxpayers need to be reimbursed. That there is not,
basically, a, uh, a windfall to somebody simply because, uh, a person on their
deathbed hands over a, uh, some sort oflife estate or any other gift deed. So the
bottom line is the money needs to be found in this estate and if we don't have it in
liquid funds to payoff this debt the property is going to be sold. And if your client
is not going to cooperate with that then I am going to remove her as the personal
representative and appoint somebody who will.

***

The personal representative basically has the option of coming up with the money
to, uh, in terms of taking out a loan personally or something, uh, or finding an
investor to payoff the State's interest in the house and release that claim or sell it.

***

... Mr. Finney, I've certainly been around long enough to know that a seller of
property - they don't cooperate in good faith can frustrate, uh, any potential sale.
Ifl see evidence of that and upon motion of the State your client will be deemed
to be in breach of fiduciary duties as personal representative and would be,
following a hearing of course and the opportunity to be heard, if that evidence, uh,
was brought forth, would be removed by the Court and somebody more suitable
would be appointed.
Clerk's Transcript of Petition to Compel of July 28th 2009, p. 4, I. 23 top. 5, I. 4; p. 11, 11. 4-7,
17-23 (underline added).
After a hearing on July 28, 2009, the court entered its "Order Granting Petition to
Compel" on August 11, 2009. The personal representative appealed this order and this Court, on
May 25, 2010, remanded the matter for entry of findings of fact and conclusions oflaw.
About June 22, 2010, the personal representative filed an "Amended Personal
Representative's Inventory," for the first time listing the life estate in the inventory. This was
required by the Court's order of June 12, 2008. However, whereas the court had ordered her to
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"assign an appropriate value to decedent's life estate interest held in real property at the time of
death," the personal representative flaunted the court's order by assigning a value of $0.
On June 30, 2010, the Department filed its "Petition for Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law." A status conference was held on July 27, 2010, during which Judge Julian indicated an
evidentiary hearing would be held on October 21, 2010 to determine all remaining factual issues.
The Department immediately (on July 28, 2010) submitted Requests for Admission to the
personal representative to determine what factual issues remained to be tried.
About August 27, 2010, the personal representative submitted her Responses to First
Requests for Admission and thereafter, on September 7, 2010, the Department filed its ''Notice
of Deposition" to take the oral testimony of the personal representative. An "Amended Notice of
Deposition" was filed on September 15, 2010.
Two days later, on September 17, 2010, Attorney Brent Featherston filed a "Demand for
Notice and Special Appearance" on behalf of"Cathie Peterson, individually." The "Demand for
Notice and Special Appearance," signed by Cathie Peterson and Mr. Featherston, stated:

1.

2.

Demandant, Cathie Peterson, individually, has a financial or property
interest in the above estate proceedings, in which decedent died on March
3, 2007.
The nature of Demandant's interest is fee title holder in certain real
property against which the State ofldaho, Department of Health and
Welfare. asserts a claim as creditor of the above entitled estate and which
Property has been the subject of Motions, Petitions and Court Orders all
without notice, service of process or jurisdiction over the Demandant,
Cathie Peterson.

Demand for Notice and Special Appearance (Sept. 17, 2010) (underline added). The "Demand
for Notice and Special Appearance" also stated: "The undersigned moves to vacate and dismiss
all orders entered with regard to her real property pursuant to l.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)." At the same
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time, attorney Brent Featherston, on behalf of"Cathie Peterson, individually'' filed a "Motion for
Automatic Disqualification of Judge I.R.C.P. 40(d)(l)."
On September 22, 2010, the personal representative (through attorney John Finney) filed
"Personal Representative's Final Accounting and Petition for Decree of Distribution."
This was the posture ofthis case when the Department finally filed its "Petition for
Removal of Personal Representative for Cause."
During the hearing on the Department's petition, held on October 7, 2010, Mr. Finney, by
this time supposedly representing Cathie Peterson only as the personal representative of the
estate, again sought to minimize the value of the estate. Tr. p. 10, 1. 12 top. 11, 1. 2. Also again,
he challenged the jurisdiction of the court over the real property held by Cathie Peterson. Tr. p.
11, 11. 20-25. Again, Mr. Finney challenged the court's jurisdiction over Cathie Peterson as
owner of the real property. Tr. p. 12, 11. 12-17. All of these positions are in favor of Cathie
Peterson individually, but are adverse to the interests of the estate. So, even when Cathie
Peterson had separate counsel, in her capacity as personal representative, she was still unable to
seek the interests of the estate and instead sought only her own personal interests.
Likewise, Attorney Featherston, arguing on behalf of Cathie Peterson said his role was
"to make the Court aware that, um, Ms. Peterson has a separate interest from her role as, um,
Personal Representative here." Tr. p. 16, 11. 22-23. Mr. Featherston joined Mr. Finney in arguing
that the court lacked jurisdiction over the property of the estate held by Cathie Peterson. Tr. p.
17, 11. 8-10. He further joined Mr. Finney in challenging the personal jurisdiction of the court
over Cathie Peterson. Tr. p. 17, 1. 23 top. 21, 1. 3. IfMr. Featherston was, as he said, arguing a
separate interest from Cathie Peterson's role as personal representative, it was not apparent from
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the argument since all of the arguments were in favor of Cathie Peterson personally and no-one
spoke for the interests of the estate.
Perhaps the most telling discussion relating to the conflict of interest between Cathie
Peterson as personal representative and in her individual capacity is found in Mr. Featherston's
argument relating to his "special appearance" to challenge jurisdiction over Cathie Peterson. Mr.
Featherston argued that the Department should have taken some action to obtain personal
jurisdiction over Cathie Peterson:
The State hasn't done what they should do if they want to make me a party
individually but I don't want to be left away from the table, have a decision be
made adverse to my individual interest and have that decision, um, if you will, be
issued and have an effect where there hasn't been a proper service upon her. The
solution to that is for a -- for her to have separate counsel to appear specially as
we have here. We're doing it specially, uh, because quite honestly as we've said

we don't believe the State has appropriately brought jurisdiction against her
or her individual assets. She didn't take benefits from the State ofldaho. It
wasn't her individually that did that. So there is nothing scandalous about this
appearance. It is a routine civil procedure matter that happens all the time in civil
cases where there has not been an appropriate, uh, service of process or process
has not been effectuated correctly.
Tr. p. 20, I. 16 top. 21, 1. 2 (emphasis added). Apparently, Mr. Featherston forgot that the
Department is merely a creditor and a claimant in this estate. It is the personal representative
alone who has the authority to bring an action against a third party. Idaho Code§§ 15-3-703(c);
15-3-715(22). It is for an estate administrator to quiet title or remove a cloud from title to
property belonging to an estate. Cleland v. McLaurin, 40 Idaho 371, 232 P. 571 (1925). Judge
Julian recognized this contradiction:
COURT: Well let me- let me ask you this. Does not this very argument
that you're making tend to militate strongly in favor of the State's petition to
remove Ms. Peterson as Personal Representative because maybe there's a way to
do it but it certainly seems that if third parties need to be brought into the
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litigation that's what the Personal Representative would do representing the
estate, not a creditor who's representing a debt that they're claiming.

***

COURT: I understand that part but my question was more the nature of
you seem to be barking, on behalf of your client individually, seem to be barking
up the tree of she should have been officially joined with a summons as a third
party defendant, something of that nature, and my point was more like well, um,
you know can a creditor in an estate, which is the State ofldaho at this point. even
do that? That was-that's something a personal representative, it seems to me at
least at first blush. would have to do and the problem we have is Cathie Peterson
is the Personal Representative and she don't wanna do that. to put it in the
vernacular. So doesn't that tend to really militate in favor of the State's position
that hey, to satisfy your complaints that you haven't been properly joined, that
can't be done until the State is the Personal Representative. And again if you
want to just demur as not being your issue I will understand ...

***

MR. FEATHERSTON: I don't know ifit can done within the probate so I
will demur on that point because I'm speaking in ig - in ignorance of that issue. I
haven't researched it but certainly within a District Court matter they could a quiet
title partition, whatever you choose to, declaratory judgment they certainly have
that ability. And I think the -- the Court has the ability here to require the P.R. to
go forward in District Court identifying claims and identifying the parties.
COURT: So would have I have the ability to order the Personal
Representative to properly serve herself with process to bring herself as a third
party defendant into this case? Which is almost what you are ...
MR. FEATHERSTON: Perhaps.
Tr. p. 22, I. 9 top. 24, I. 10 (underline added).
The very fact that the personal representative found it necessary to appear individually by
one attorney and as personal representative by another, reveals a fundamental conflict in her roles
in this case. Clearly, there was more than sufficient evidence in the record for Judge Julian to
find a conflict of interest between Cathie Peterson as personal representative and in her
individual interests.
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C.
Judge Julian Correctly Exercised His Discretion in Removing the Personal
Representative.
Judge Julian stated his findings and conclusions on the record beginning on page 33 of
the transcript:
Uh, regarding the primary, uh, issue that brings us here today, the removal of the
Personal Representative, I do find, uh, looking at all sides and weighing all of this,
that it is in fact in the best interest of the estate- the estate that, uh, Ms Peterson
be removed as the Personal Representative and that the, uh, the State ofldaho,
Department of Health and Welfare as, uh, the sole creditor, um, be, uh, appointed
to that capacity, um, the, uh, Department, uh, being basically the next in line, uh,
statutorily under the circumstances of this case in terms of preference for Personal
Representative. Um, in noting that I - I do believe that there is a conflict of
interest between Cathie Peterson's interest personally and that of, uh, the interest
of the estate, uh, with her acting as the Personal Representative. there being a
statutory obligation for the Personal Representative to maximize the reach of the
estate under any reasonable interpretation of the statute versus, uh. Ms. Peterson's
personal interest to see that those statutes be, uh, intei:preted such that the estate's
reach is minimized and doesn't touch the property that's in her name. Uh,
previously the Court did, uh, order her to include the, um, value - include and
evaluate the life estate. Uh, that order has been somewhat flaunted to the extent
that the life estate is listed but with a zero value and that really doesn't, uh, serve
the, uh, the intent of the Court's prior ruling. And I would-I would note too
prior to Mr. Cartwright and Mr. Featherston's involvement in this, uh, case, that,
uh, Ms. Peterson was warned that if she didn't comply with the Court's rulings on
that, though they were clearly against her personal interest, that, uh, removal as
Personal Representative was a potential consequence. So it's not like this motion
to remove, uh, can be seen as being, you know, unexpected under the
circumstances. It also seems to the Court that there is a self dealing issue here
with Ms. Peterson acting as her - in her own capacity as a - a limited, uh, party
now, uh, being represented by Mr. Featherston, and acting as the Personal
Representative, some of that, uh, self dealing or conflict of interest I think became
rather apparent in the Court's conversation with Mr. Featherston that, as he's
representing Ms. Peterson personally the crux of her - of her obiection is that she
hasn't been made a third party defendant and hasn't been served a summons in
this case and that's typically what the Personal Representative would do and yet
she's also the Personal Representative. So she's almost claiming that she didn'tdidn't do things against herself that she should have to give the Court jurisdiction
over her personally. It gets to be rather circular and I only bring that up because I
think it does illustrate, uh, one of the reasons why it is in the best interest of the
estate to grant the Petition for Removal.
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Tr. p. 33, 1. 20 top. 35, 1. 6 (underline added).
Judge Julian's decision is well supported in both fact and law. A personal representative
is a fiduciary who holds the assets of the estate for the benefit of creditors and others interested in
the estate. Idaho Code§§ 15-3-703 and 711. A personal representative has a duty to maximize
the value of the estate. In the case of Matter ofEstate of Thomas, 532 N.W.2d 676 (N.D. 1995),
the court addressed the personal representative's attempt, to the detriment of creditors, to convey
estate property to a devisee for less than the actual value of the property:
A personal representative is a fiduciary who must observe the standards of care
applicable to trustees. The personal representative's fiduciary obligation requires
that he act reasonably for the benefit of the heirs, creditors, and other parties
interested in the estate. Section 30.1-18-12, N.D.C.C., provides that the personal
representative is liable to interested persons for damage or loss resulting from a
breach of his fiduciary duty.
The personal representative must settle and distribute the estate.as
expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent with the best interests of the estate.
The personal representative must inventory and determine fair market value of the
decedent's property. If the personal representative sells estate property, he must
obtain the best possible price:
If, in the administration of the estate. the personal rwresentative
undertakes to sell property of the estate. his fiduciary obligation requires
him to secure the best price obtainable under the circumstances. He may
not merely sit dormant and accept such offers as are tendered to him, but
must make diligent, impartial effort to obtain the best offer possible.
Thus, an executor's trust is not discharged by selling at the appraised price
unless there is evidence to show that was the best price that could be
obtained in the exercise of reasonable diligence.
31 Am.Jur.2d Executors and Administrators§ 768 (1989) (footnotes omitted)

Estate of Thomas, 532 N.W.2d at 686 (citations omitted; underline added).
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A personal representative is not permitted to take sides in a dispute between one heir or
claimant and another. Matter ofEstate of Wise, 20 Kan.App.2d 624, 627, 890 P.2d 744, 746
(1995) (executor may not take sides in a dispute regarding distribution of an estate); Matter of
Estate ofPence, 511 N.W.2d 651, 652 (Iowa App. 1993) ("An executor or an administrator must

be concerned with the preservation of the estate for both the creditors and the beneficiaries and
cannot act to protect one group with complete disregard to the other"); Estate ofDenman, 94
Cal.App.3d 289, 156 Cal.Rptr. 341 (Cal.App. 4 Dist. 1979) ("The executor serves as a neutral
stakeholder with a fiduciary obligation"); In re Miller's Estate, 259 Cal.App.2d 536, 544, 66
Cal.Rptr. 756, 762 (Cal.App. 5 Dist. 1968) ("It is unquestionably true that, generally speaking, an
executor or administrator of an estate should remain neutral in the estate proceedings as between
parties such as heirs and devisees with conflicting claims to portions of the estate"); In re
Jacobson's Estate, 387 A.2d 590, 591 (D.C. 1978) ("Rather than champion particular claims

against the estate, an executor is expected to remain neutral as to all creditors"); In re Morine 's
Estate, 363 A.2d 700, 703 (Me. 1976) ([T]he executor may not take sides in the adjudication of

the individual claims of beneficiaries one against another").
Cathie Peterson's conflict of interest is greater than where a personal representative may
also be an heir, or where the estate assets are separate from the assets of the personal
representative. Ordinarily, a personal representative who is also an heir has an interest in
maximizing the value of the estate, since doing so will benefit not only creditors, but the heirs as
well. But, in this case, Cathie Peterson holds title to the real property which is subject to the life
estate which is the primary asset of this estate. In other words, she has a personal claim, not as
an heir, but as an owner of property which the estate must also claim.
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In this case, if the estate is maximized, Cathie Peterson loses a portion of her property
interest. If the estate is maximized, her interest in her property is minimized. If the asset is
partitioned Cathie Peterson may lose the property entirely. Because Cathie Peterson is living on
the real property, it is in her best interest to delay the administration of the estate.
With the appearance of Mr. Featherston, Cathie Peterson was clearly in direct opposition
to the estate she was charged to represent. In her Demand for Notice and Special Appearance she
sought "to vacate and dismiss all orders entered with regard to her real property." Clearly, Cathie
Peterson put herself in a role where she could no longer both serve as personal representative and
litigate her own personal interests in the estate property. These conflicting roles are
demonstrated by the following table:
Personal R~resentative

Cathie Peterson

Duty to maximize the estate

Interest in minimizing estate value

Duty first to creditors

Interest first to her personal interest

Duty to proceed expeditiously

Interest in delaying distribution

Cannot take sides

Has taken sides

It was clear to Judge Julian that the conflict of interest had become an impediment to the

administration of the estate. He was correct to find that it was in the best interest of the estate for
Cathie Peterson to be removed as personal representative.
Judge Julian also found that the personal representative had disregarded an order of the
court. This is also correct and is further grounds for removal under Idaho Code § 15-3-611 (b).
The entire argument between the parties leading up to the June 12, 2008, "Order on Petition to
Require Payment of Claim" was whether the life estate interest was lost upon the death of the
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decedent or its value retained as contemplated by Idaho Code§ 56-218(4)(b). See e.g. Brief in
Support of Petition to Require Payment of Claim (filed May 5, 2008). When the court ordered
the personal representative to include the life estate in the inventory and to "assign an appropriate
value to decedent's life estate interest held in real property at the time of death," this was a
substantive ruling and required the personal representative to determine what the life estate was
worth immediately prior to death and to list that value in the inventory. It was bad enough that it
took the personal representative more than two years to file an amended inventory listing the life
estate as an asset. However, when she didn't even give it a nominal value, but valued it at $0, it
was clearly flaunting the order of the court and, despite the court's ruling, going back to her
defeated claim that the life estate no longer existed.
The failure to comply with the June 12, 2008, order also goes to the conflict of interest.
The Court had considered the arguments of the parties and had ordered the personal
representative to do something that was entirely consistent with her duty as personal
representative, but was contrary to her own personal interest. She chose to disregard the order of
the court and seek her own personal interest instead of doing what the Court had determined was
in the best interest of the estate. This is the type of conduct that§ 15-3-61 l(b) is clearly designed
to reach, and removal would have been appropriate for that reason alone.
D.

The Priorities for Initial Appointment Clearly Don't Apply Here.
The personal representative points out that under Idaho Code§ 15-3-203, Cathie

Peterson, as an heir, had priority for appointment as personal representative. This is true and
Cathie Peterson, indeed, was appointed personal representative without objection by the
Department. That is not what is in issue here. What is in issue here is § 15-3-611 and removal
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for cause. Cathie Peterson has had three and a half years to administer this estate. However,
rather than do so she has chosen to pursue her own personal interests. The conflict of interest
which became apparent following her appointment and her disregard of the Court's order
demonstrate that removal under Idaho Code§ 15-3-611 is appropriate. The priorities for
appointment in the first instance do not prevent her from being removed in accordance with § 153-611.
E.
Action by the Department as Personal Representative of this Estate Will Shorten These
Proceedings Without Limiting Cathie Peterson's Rights to Protect Her Own Interests.
The June 12, 2008, "Order on Petition to Require Payment of Claim" determined that the
life estate held by the decedent at the time of his death was an asset of the estate for purposes of
Medicaid recovery. The determination of its value should have been a mechanical calculation.
The only remaining question was how the Department would receive payment. The personal
representative had authority to seek partition of the real property in order to pay the Department's
claim. Idaho Code§ 15-3-715(6). If the personal representative had been acting in the interest of
the estate, rather than her own personal interest, this is what she would have done. After the
Court ordered this very thing by ordering the real property sold to pay the Department, the
personal representative appealed to this court. This is something Cathie Peterson had the right to
do in her individual capacity, but it was not something the personal representative, acting in the
best interest of the estate would have done.
By removing Cathie Peterson as the personal representative, she continues to have every
right to act in her own personal interest, but she is relieved of her conflicting responsibility of
acting in the best interests of the estate as personal representative. The successor personal
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representative, acting in the best interest of the estate, may now bring an action in the District
Court to partition the real property so that the estate creditors may be paid. In that action, Cathie
Peterson may assert any defense available to her. This will allow this estate to be fully
administered without further delay or legal wrangling over claims that she cannot be forced to act
as personal representative in contravention of her personal interests.
There is no prejudice to Cathie Peterson except to remove her ability to further delay
these proceedings. At the removal hearing the court asked Mr. Finney how the estate would be
prejudiced by removing Cathie Peterson as personal representative. Mr. Finney was unable to
articulate any prejudice to the estate, and in fact, his answer supports replacement of Cathie
Peterson with a personal representative who has authority to bring an action against her
personally for partition of the real property:
COURT: I'll pose the same question to you Mr. Finney. How would the
estate be prejudiced ifthe Court did remove Ms. Peterson, let her focus all of her
time and energy on her personal, uh, claims or interests in this estate and allow the
State of Idaho basically to take the reins as the Personal Representative and go
forth? How would - how would that injure the estate?

MR. FINNEY: I guess I- well I'll see it- say it, uh, as in this regard.
Whoever's Personal Representative, I don't think has the authority in this action
to adjudicate, in this probate, to adjudicate with a third party. Whether it's the
Department as a P.R., Cathie Peterson as a P.R., an independent person who has,
you know, isn't a creditor, and isn't uh - uh, third party, uh, title holder. Uh, I just
- I just don't. That's the only prejudice I see to estate is a proceeding that really
doesn't give a result that can be granted. Uh, now, so that's the only prejudice I
see as to who is the Personal Representative.
Tr. p. 12, 11. 7-19.
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As in the cases previously cited, since Cathie Peterson is unable to evaluate and bring an
action against her own personal interests, it is in the best interest of the estate to remove her and
appoint another capable of bringing such an action.

v.
THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY
FEES ON APPEAL
Idaho Code§ 12-117 provides as follows:

(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative proceeding
or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or political
subdivision and a person, the state agency or political subdivision or the court, as
the case may be, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees,
witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
Idaho Code§ 12-117 (underline added). Similarly, Idaho Code§ 12-121 provides as follows:
12-121. ATTORNEY'S FEES. -In any civil action, the judge may award
reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party or parties, provided that this
section shall not alter, repeal or amend any statute which otherwise provides for
the award of attorney's fees. The term ''party" or ''parties" is defined to include
any person, partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the state of
Idaho or political subdivision thereo£
Idaho Code§ 12-121. Pursuant to Rule 54(e)(l), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, attorney fees
may be awarded under this section where "the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation." Cathie Peterson's appeal of the order removing her meets
the requirements for both of these provisions. She presented four issues on appeal:
a.
Did the Magistrate err in removing Cathie Peterson as Personal
Representative pursuant to the statutory provisions?
b.
Did the Magistrate err in asserting jurisdiction over real property
not vested in the estate?
c.
Did the Magistrate err in its purported assertion of jurisdiction over
real property vested in a person not a party to the proceeding?
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d.
Upon remand, should the Magistrate be removed from further
proceedings in the matter?
Appellant's Brief, p. 4. For three of these issues, "b," "c," and "d," she presented no cogent
argument or authority. The issue presented in "a" was the actual issue before the court and the
personal representative has presented no authority that actually supports her appeal. The
I

personal representative cited a single case that related to removal of a personal representative,
Kolouch v. First Sec. Bank ofIdaho, 128 Idaho 186, 911 P.2d 779 (App. 1996), and stated:
As set forth in Kolouch v. First Sec. Bank ofldaho, 128 Idaho 186, 192,
911 P.2d 779, 785 (Idaho App., 1996) for removal of a personal representative to
be in the best interest of the estate, there must be actual evidence presented of
financial mismanagement. It is not sufficient to remove a Personal Representative
with priority for appointment as an heir and to appoint a creditor, without some
sort of actual evidence on the record of mismanagement.
Appellant's Brief, p. 6. This is a blatant misrepresentation of what Kolouch held. Moreover, as
discussed earlier, while the personal representative argued there was a lack of evidence to
support the findings of the Court, he failed to identify any finding that was unsupported. The one
reference to the transcript made by the personal representative, on page 7 of Appellant's Brief,
refers not to the removal of the personal representative, but rather to the choice of the
Department as successor. Likewise, at page 8 of Appellant's Brief, the personal representative
argues that "the Department is not a propert Successor Personal Representative." However, the
personal representative did not appeal the separate "Order for Appointment of Successor
Personal Representative" entered October 19, 2010. Therefore, the question of the choice of a
successor personal representative isn't even before the court. The personal representative has
failed to show any reasonable basis in fact or law for her appeal of her removal.
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The issues on appeal cited by the personal representative are also without merit. Issues
"b" and "c" seem to suggest Judge Julian asserted jurisdiction "over real property not vested in
the estate" and "over real property vested in a person not a party to the proceeding." However,
the Order appealed from, the Order Removing Personal Representative, merely removes the
personal representative and orders her to take no action to the detriment of the estate. There is
nothing in the Order having anything to do with the issues presented. Further, there is nothing in
Appellant's Brief which elucidates this question.
Similarly, issue "d" asks whether the Magistrate should "be removed from further
proceedings in the matter." While Mr. Featherston sought automatic disqualification upon his
initial appearance, that disqualification was denied by the Court's "Order Denying Amended
Motion for Automatic Disqualification - IRCP 40(d)(I)." No appeal was taken from that Order,
and it cannot, therefore, be the basis for this issue. The personal representative argues in
Appellant's Brief that Judge Julian should be disqualified, but cites to no authority and refers to
no legal principle at all that would support the action he seeks. This is clearly without any basis
in fact or law.

In the case of Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 229 P.3d 1146 (2010), the Idaho Supreme
Court recently dealt with a case where the appellant failed to support his issues on appeal with
any reasonable authority or argument:
The bulk of Bach's claims on appeal will not be considered by the Court
because Bach has failed to support them with relevant argument and authority. We
will not consider an issue not "supported by argument and authority in the
opening brief." Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 145 Idaho 524, 528, 181P.3d450, 454
(2008); see also Idaho App. R. 35(a)(6) ("The argument shall contain the
contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the
reasons therefor, with citations to authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 31

Z:\MRCases\Estate\Wee\wee Open Cases\PetersonMelvin\DCourt\Respondents Brief2.wpd

and the record relied upon."). Regardless of whether an issue is explicitly set
forth in the party's brief as one of the issues on appeal, if the issue is only
mentioned in passing and not supported by any cogent argument or authority. it
cannot be considered by this Court. Inama v. Boise County ex rel. Bd. of
Comm 'rs, 138 Idaho 324, 330, 63 P.3d 450, 456 (2003) (refusing to address a
constitutional takings issue when the issue was not supported by legal authority
and was only mentioned in passing).

Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho at 790, 229 P.3d at 1152 (underline added). The court went on to
award attorney fees against Bach, at least in part because of his failure to present argument or
authority upon which reversal could be based:
Idaho Code section 12-121 allows the award of attorney fees in a civil action if the
appeal merely invites the Court to second guess the findings of the lower court.
Crowley v. Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509, 514, 181P.3d435, 440 (2007). Attorney
fees may also be awarded under section 12-121 "ifthe appeal was brought or
defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Id. The award of fees
under section 12-121 is within this Court's discretion. Id.
Attorney fees will be awarded against Bach. Despite the fact that he
presented three lengthy briefs, Bach has done nothing more than ask the Court to
second guess the findings of the district court and he has provided no argument or
authority on which reversal of the district court could be based. Other than Bach's
abiding belief that he has been the subject of a conspiracy and is entitled to
millions of dollars in damages as a result, there does not appear to have been any
basis for this appeal. Because the appeal was brought unreasonably, we award fees
to the above-named respondents under Idaho Code section 12-121.

Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho at 797, 229 P.3d at 1159 (underline added).
The actions of the personal representative in this appeal are consistent with her actions
from the time of appointment: they have been aimed at protecting her personal interest and not
the estate. Through this meritless appeal she has extended her possession of the life estate
interest in the real property and increased the recovery cost to the Department.
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VI.
CONCLUSION
The appellant has failed to identify any error or abuse of discretion by the court below in
removing her as personal representative of this estate. Moreover, she has wholly failed to
support her other issues on appeal by any cogent legal argument or reference to legal authority.
The Order Removing Personal Representative should be affirmed and the Department should be
awarded its attorney fees on appeal.
DATED this 18 day of February, 2011,
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In re ESTATE OF Henry Herbert REINEK, Jr., deceased.
Eva REINEK, appellant,

v.
Shirley K. SCHAFER, Personal Representative of
the Estate of Henry Herbert Reinek, Jr., deceased,
appellee.

which an appellate court has an obligation to reach
an independent, correct conclusion, irrespective of
the determination made by the court below.
6. Decedents' Estates: Property. The homestead
allowance, the exempt property, and the family allowance shall vest in the surviving spouse as of the
date of decedent's death, as a vested indefeasible
right of property.
7. Appeal and Error. An appellate court is not
obligated to engage in an analysis which is not
needed to adjudicate the case and controversy before it.

No. A-95-1195.
Sept. 30, 1997.

8. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law in connection
with which an appellate court has an obligation to
reach an independent conclusion.

Syllabus by the Court
*1 1. Decedents' Estates: Appeal and Error. In
the absence of an equity question, an appellate
court, reviewing probate matters, examines for error appearing on the record made in the county
court.

9. Statutes: Legislature: Intent: Appeal and Error. When settling upon the meaning of a statute, an
appellate court must determine and give effect to
the purpose and intent of the Legislature as ascertained from the entire language of the statute considered in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense.

2. Trial: Witnesses. In a bench trial of a law action, the court, as the trier of fact, is the sole judge
of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be
given to their testimony.

10. Statutes: Legislature: Intent. The components of a series or collection of statutes pertaining
to a certain subject matter may be conjunctively
considered and construed to determine the intent of
the Legislature so that different provisions of the
act are perceived as consistent, harmonious, and
sensible.

3. Judgments: Appeal and Error. It is not the
province of an appellate court to weigh or resolve
conflicts in the evidence, the credibility of witnesses, or the weight to be given to their testimony.
4. _ _ : __ . When reviewing a judgment for
errors appearing on the record, the inquiry is
whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.
5. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation is a matter of law in connection with

11. Appeal and Error. Cases are heard in an appellate court on the theory upon which they were
tried.
12. Jurisdiction. A party cannot confer subject
matter jurisdiction on a judicial tribunal by either
acquiescence or consent; neither may subject matter
jurisdiction be created by waiver, estoppel, or conduct of the parties.
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13. Parties: Standing. To have standing, a
plaintiff must have some legal or equitable right,
title, or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.

22. Decedents' Estates: Courts: Jurisdiction:
Equity. In exercising probate jurisdiction, a court
may use equity power and principles to dispose of a
matter within the court's probate jurisdiction.

14. Standing: Jurisdiction. Standing relates to a
court's power, that is, jurisdiction, to address issues
presented and serves to identify the disputes which
are appropriately resolved through the judicial process.

23. Decedents' Estates: Actions: Equity:
Courts: Jurisdiction. In common-law and equity actions relating to decedents' estates, the county
courts have concurrent original jurisdiction with the
district courts.

15. Claims: Parties. A litigant must assert the
litigant's own legal rights and interests and cannot
rest a claim on the legal rights or interests of third
parties.

24. Decedents' Estates: Executors and Administrators. An action to surcharge a personal representative may be brought to recover losses to an estate for an alleged breach of fiduciary duty by the
personal representative.

*2 16. Standing: Courts. A court before which
a case is pending can raise the question of standing
at any time during the proceeding.

17. Parties: Jurisdiction: Waiver. The presence
of necessary parties is jurisdictional and cannot be
waived.
18. Decedents' Estates: Executors and Administrators. A representative sued in his representative
capacity is a distinct person from a representative
sued in his private or individual capacity and within
the eyes of the law is a stranger to any right or liability as an individual.
19. Fraud: Limitations of Actions. One who by
deception conceals material facts and thereby prevents discovery of the wrong should not be permitted to take advantage of his or her own deceit or
concealment by asserting the statute of limitations
or repose.
20. Actions: Pleadings. The essential character
of an action and relief sought, whether legal or
equitable, is determinable from its main object, as
disclosed by the pleadings.
21. Actions: Words and Phrases. A cause of action consists of the fact or facts which give one a
right to relief against another.

25.
· __. A person interested in the estate may petition for removal of a personal representative for cause at any time.
26. __: __. It is not competent for a personal representative acting in his or her representative capacity to sue himself or herself in his or her
individual capacity.
27. Principal and Agent: Gifts: Intent. No gift
may be made by an attorney in fact to himself or
herself unless the power to make such a gift is expressly granted in the instrument itself and there is
shown a clear intent on the part of the principal to
make such a gift.
28. Decedents' Estates: Executors and Administrators. A personal representative is authorized, if
not charged with the duty, to evaluate and pursue
actions for the benefit of the estate.
Appeal from the County Court for Red Willow
County: B. BERT LEFFLER, Judge. Dismissed in
part, affirmed in part, and in part reversed and remanded with directions.
Daylene A. Bennett, of Burger & Bennett, P.C., for
appellant.
R. Kent Radke for appellee.
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SIEVERS, MUES, and INBODY, Judges.
MUES, Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Eva Reinek, surviving spouse of Henry Herbert
Reinek, Jr., appeals from an order of the county
court for Red Willow County dismissing her demand for statutory allowances, dismissing her petition for elective share, denying her petition for removal of the personal representative, and dismissing her motion for an accounting and constructive
trust.
II. STATEMENT OF CASE
*3 Henry and Eva were married on June 15,
1968. Henry had two daughters from a previous
marriage, Shirley K. Schafer and Connie Rogers.
Henry was hospitalized on December 7, 1990. Following quadruple bypass surgery and a stroke,
Henry underwent rehabilitation and eventually went
to a nursing home. On January 12, 1991, a power of
attorney was executed, making Schafer Henry's attorney in fact. On April 18, 1992, an irrevocable
living trust agreement was executed, naming Henry
as trustor, Schafer as trustee, and Schafer and Rogers as beneficiaries. "Schedule A" attached to the
trust lists the assets placed in the trust. They include a Putnam account, three certificates of deposit, and a 1967 Cadillac. The agreement provided
that additional funds and properties could be transferred by the trustor to the trustee.
Henry died September 3, 1992. At the time of
his death, aside from minimal personal property,
Henry's assets existed in right of survivorship accounts (none of which were held with Eva) and in
the irrevocable living trust (of which Eva was not a
beneficiary). Henry also had some life insurance,
but Eva was not a beneficiary of this either.
On December 21, 1993, Eva filed a petition for
formal adjudication of intestacy, determination of
heirs, and appointment of personal representative.
Schafer filed an objection to this motion on January
19, 1994, along with a petition for formal probate

of Henry's will. Attached thereto was Henry's will
dated May 15, 1984, in which he named Rogers and
Schafer as copersonal representatives. Aside from a
$10,000 bequest to Rogers' son Sean, the remainder
of Henry's estate was to go to Rogers and Schafer.
Eva was not mentioned in the will. An order dated
February 10, 1994, admitted the will to probate, determined Henry's heirs to be Eva, Schafer, and Rogers, and formally appointed Schafer as personal
representative.
On February 24, 1994, Eva filed a "Demand for
Cash Satis-faction of Homestead Allowance and
Family Allowance" with the court, in which she
made "demand for immediate payment of the allowances by the Personal Representative." On this
same date, Eva also filed a "demand for exempt
property." On March 24, Eva filed a petition for
elective share.
On April 7, 1994, Schafer, as personal representative, filed a rejection of Eva's demand for cash
satisfaction of homestead allowance and family allowance. On April 8, Schafer likewise filed a rejection of Eva's demand for exempt property. Both rejections were based on the fact that the administrative expenses exceeded the estate. On February 28,
1995, Schafer filed a motion for summary judgment, asking the court to enter judgment in her favor rejecting Eva's demands for statutory allowance
and petition for elective share. This motion was
overruled.
On March 24, 1995, Eva filed a petition for removal of the personal representative for cause. In
this motion, Eva alleged that Schafer had acted as
Henry's attorney in fact and that Schafer had prepared an irrevocable living trust agreement in
which she was the trustee and a cobeneficiary. The
motion further averred that Schafer, acting in these
capacities, had misappropriated, converted, and
wasted Henry's assets by transferring and disposing
of them for her own benefit and the benefit of others.
*4 On August 4, 1995, Eva filed a "Motion for
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Accounting by Personal Representative and to Impose Constructive Trust." This motion alleged that
Schafer had procured the power of attorney from
Henry and in that capacity had converted assets to
her benefit, including certain certificates of deposit
held by Henry, and written checks from Henry's
personal bank accounts to herself and her nephew
Sean. It further alleged that on "her [Schafer's] own
initiative" the trust had been created for Schafer's
and Rogers' benefit and that Schafer then placed
substantial assets of Henry's into that trust. The motion alleged that the actions of Schafer constituted a
fraud upon Eva and other creditors of the estate.
The motion sought an order for an accounting by
the personal representative of her actions since she
was granted the power of attorney on January 12,
1991, and the imposition of a constructive trust on
all assets reflected on the estate inventories filed by
the personal representative.
On August 10, 1995, Schafer filed an amended
answer to the petition for elective share, asking that
the petition be dismissed. Schafer's original answer
is not in our record. On August 14, Schafer filed an
answer and demurrer to Eva's motion for an accounting and to impose a constructive trust.
On August 30 and 31, 1995, a trial was held on
Eva's demand for cash satisfaction of statutory allowances (including exempt property), the petition
for elective share, the petition for removal of the
personal representative for cause, and the motion
for an accounting by the personal representative
and to impose a constructive trust. By order filed
September 29, the court found that costs and expenses of administration exceeded the value of all
property subject to the statutory allowances, that
the petition for elective share was filed more than 2
years after Henry's death, that Schafer had committed no fraudulent acts, and that funeral and administrative expenses exceeded the value of all remaining property subject to the augmented estate computation resulting in the value of the augmented estate being zero. Thus, Eva's demand for statutory
allowances, petition for elective share, petition for

removal, and motion for an accounting and constructive trust were all dismissed. In addition, the
court awarded the personal representative attorney
fees and costs to be determined upon later
"certification." On November 8, that award was
deemed erroneous and such relief was denied. Eva
filed two notices of appeal, one on October 27 and
one on December 1.
III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Summarized and restated, Eva asserts that the
county court erred in (1) dismissing her demand for
statutory allowances, (2) dismissing her petition for
elective share, (3) failing to remove Schafer as personal representative, and (4) failing to find that
Schafer acted fraudulently by making nonprobate
transfers to herself and others and failing to impose
a constructive trust, accounting, or both on those
assets transferred through nonprobate means by
Schafer to herself and others.
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
*5 Eva asserts that since this is an equity action
for an accounting and to impose a constructive
trust, our standard of review is de novo on the record and we are to reach conclusions independent
of the factual findings of the trial court. Schafer
agrees. We do not disagree that such action is equitable with the standard of review stated. See, e.g.,
Hanigan v. Tn1mble, 252 Neb. 376, 562 N.W.2d
526 (1997); Mischke v. Mischke, 247 Neb. 752, 530
N.W.2d 235 (1995).
[l] However, the trial below combined several
separate proceedings, some of which are not equitable. In the absence of an equity question, an appellate court, reviewing probate matters, examines for
error appearing on the record made in the county
court. In re Estate of Stephenson, 243 Neb. 890,
503 N.W.2d 540 (1993); In re Estate of Schenck, 5
Neb.App. 736, 568N.W.2d 567 (1997). See, also, In
re Estate a/Disney, 250 Neb. 703, 550 N.W.2d 919
(1996); In re Estate of Soule, 248 Neb. 878, 540
N.W.2d 118 (1995).
(2,3] In a bench trial of a law action, the court,
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as the trier of fact, is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their
testimony. In re Estate of Disney, supra. It is not
the province of an appellate court to weigh or resolve conflicts in the evidence, the credibility of
witnesses, or the weight to be given to their testimony. Id
[4] When reviewing a judgment for errors appearing on the record, the inquiry is whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious,
nor unreasonable. Klinginsmith v. Wichmann, 252
Neb. 889, 567 N.W.2d 172 (1997).
[5] Statutory interpretation is a matter of law in
connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent, correct conclusion, irrespective of the determination made by the
court below. Bank of Papillion v. Nguyen, 252 Neb.
926, 567 N.W.2d 166 (1997).

no dismissal of Eva's first appeal, either before or
after the second appeal was filed.
*6 Schafer argues that the September 29 order
was a final order and that Eva failed to timely appeal from that order, contending that Eva filed her
notice of appeal on December 6, outside the 30-day
period required by Neb.Rev .Stat. § 25-19 I 2
(Reissue 1995). Schafer's argument totally ignores
Eva's first notice of appeal, filed October 27, and
misstates the date of her second appeal, filed
December 1. Moreover, we disagree with Schafer's
contention that the September 29 order was a final
order.

V. JURISDICTION
We must first address Schafer's claim that we
have no jurisdiction over this appeal. The court's
order overruling Eva's demands, petitions, and motion was filed September 29, 1995. In it, the court
ordered, inter alia, that the personal representative
be awarded attorney fees and costs, to be determined upon certification of said costs and fees within
21 days of September 25, the date of that order.

The September 29 order expressly reserved for
later ruling the assessment of attorney fees and
costs in favor of the personal representative. The
question of whether an order granting attorney fees
in an amount to be determined at some future time
constitutes a final, appealable order has recently
been answered by the Nebraska Supreme Court. In
State ex rel. Fick v. Miller, 252 Neb. 164, 560
N.W.2d 793 (1997), the court held that in order to
be final, a judgment for money must specify the
amount awarded or specify the means for determining the amount. In that case, because the judgment
left the amount of attorney fees to be awarded undetermined, the Supreme Court held that it was not
final and, consequently, that the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the order.

Eva filed a notice of appeal on October 27,
1995, expressly referencing the September 29 order. On November 3, a hearing was held on
Schafer's motion to approve attorney fees, Eva's objections thereto, and Eva's objection to the court's
jurisdiction. The county court entered an order
overruling the jurisdictional objection and finding
that the court's September 29 order was erroneous
insofar as the award of attorney fees and costs. It
denied Schafer's motion for said fees. This order
was filed November 8. Eva filed a second notice of
appeal on December 1, referencing the county
court's order of November 3, filed November 8,
"along with all prior orders." Our record contains

Here, as in State ex rel. Fick, the September 29
judgment left the amount of attorney fees and costs
for later determination. It did not specify the
amount awarded. It merely stated that said costs
and fees would be "determined upon certification."
If one were to construe this order as requiring only
a unilateral certification from the personal representative to determine the amount, it might be argued that the judgment provided a means for determining the amount as required by State ex rel.
Fick. However, such interpretation is not reasonable, as a later hearing was set, and held, to adjudicate the amounts. The September 29 order was
not a final, appealable order, and we lack jurisdic-
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tion over Eva's "first" appeal, filed October 27.
The question now presented is, What effect did
Eva's first appeal, though improper, have on the trial court's November 8 order? If the first appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction, then the
November 8 order is void; there is still no final, appealable order; and we lack jurisdiction over Eva's
second appeal as well.
This court, in Swain Constr. v. Ready Mixed
Concrete Co., 4 Neb.App. 316, 542 N.W.2d 706
( 1996), addressed two pending appeals. The first
was from an order sustaining a demurrer but not
dismissing the case. While that appeal was pending,
and prior to the issuance of the mandate of this
court summarily dismissing that appeal for lack of
jurisdiction, the district court entered another order,
this time dismissing appellant's petition. A second
appeal was then filed from that order. Appellee
moved to dismiss the second appeal based on the
principle that after an appeal is perfected, the trial
court is generally divested of jurisdiction over the
case until an appellate court renders a final determination, which ordinarily occurs when the appellate
court issues its mandate. See Currie v. Chief School
Bus Serv., 250 Neb. 872, 553 N.W.2d 469 (1996).
Appellant argued that appellate jurisdiction existed
over its second appeal because the first was taken
from a nonfinal order which was not appealable,
that is, that "an appeal from an order that is not appealable does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction over the case." Swain Constr., 4 Neb.App. at
319, 542 N.W.2d at 709. This court rejected that argument after an extensive review of Nebraska jurisprudence. We reasoned, inter alia, that while the
appeal of the nonfinal order was pending in this
court, the trial court was without authority to enter
its second order of dismissal, even though the first
appeal was ultimately dismissed for lack of jurisdiction: "This court had jurisdiction of the case to
determine if it had jurisdiction and retained such
jurisdiction until the issuance of the mandate, depriving the trial court of jurisdiction to dispose of
the case during the pendency of the first appeal."

Id. at 323, 542 N.W.2d 706, 542 N.W.2d at 711.
Appellant's second appeal was dismissed as being
from an order which the trial court was not authorized to enter because an appeal from an extrajudicial order does not confer jurisdiction upon this
court.

*7 If the reasoning of Swain Constr. were applied to the case before us, Eva's first appeal would
have divested the lower court of jurisdiction, even
though we now decide it did not confer jurisdiction
on this court because it was from a nonfinal order
under the holding of State ex rel. Fick, supra. Under Swain Constr., Eva's second appeal is from the
extrajudicial order of November 8, 1995, and such
order does not confer jurisdiction upon this court.
In sum, under State ex rel. Fick, Eva's first appeal
must be summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Under Swain Constr., Eva's second appeal
would suffer the same fate.
We now tum to a recent expression of the Supreme Court on this issue. In Jn re Interest of
Joshua M et al., 251 Neb. 614, 558 N.W.2d 548
(1997), the Supreme Court faced several pending
appeals arising out of orders entered in juvenile
proceedings. As is relevant to the present case, it
concluded that one of the pending appeals in one of
the proceedings was improper, as it was from a
nonfinal order, and dismissed it. The appeal found
to be improper was pending at the time of the subsequent order of the juvenile court which was the
subject of a second appeal in the same proceeding.
The Supreme Court stated that since the first appeal
was not properly pending, the juvenile court had
jurisdiction to issue its subsequent order, which was
the subject of the second appeal. The Supreme
Court proceeded to exercise appellate jurisdiction
and render an opinion on the second appeal.
Jn re Interest of Joshua M et al. does not expressly reject, or even discuss, Swain Constr. and
the authority cited in it. Yet it clearly teaches that
in a juvenile context, a pending appeal from a nonfinal order does not divest the lower court of jurisdiction to enter subsequent orders in the same pro-
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ceeding and, accordingly, that appellate jurisdiction
lies over an appeal from the subsequent order. This
seems directly contrary to Swain Constr., and the
Supreme Court authority which it relied on, unless
one attempts to distinguish the latter solely on the
nature of the case, i.e., nonjuvenile. While a rational distinction might be articulated on that basis, in
the absence of clear authority to the contrary, we
conclude In re Interest of Joshua M et al. is controlling here. Thus, Eva's first appeal, though improper as from a nonfinal order, did not divest the
county court of jurisdiction to enter the November
8 order. Therefore, Eva's timely appeal from the final order of November 8 vested jurisdiction in this
court.
VI. DISCUSSION
1. PREFACE
The single trial below consolidated four different matters which, though obviously somewhat interrelated, are separate and independent proceedings. Thus, while they are combined, we essentially
address four distinct appeals.
2. STATUTORY ALLOWANCES
*8 [6] A surviving spouse of a decedent domiciled in this state is entitled to a homestead allowance in the amount of $7,500, Neb.Rev.Stat. §
30-2322 (Reissue 1995); to value, not exceeding
$5,000, in excess of any security interests therein,
in household furniture, automobiles, furnishings,
appliances, and personal effects, Neb.Rev.Stat. §
30-2323 (Reissue 1995); and to a family allowance,
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2324 (Reissue 1995). These
statutory allowances have priority over all claims
except for costs and expenses of administration. §§
30-2322 to 30-2324. The homestead allowance, the
exempt property, and the family allowance shall
vest in the surviving spouse as of the date of decedent's death, as a vested indefeasible right of
property. See, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2325 (Reissue
1995); In re Estate of Carman, 213 Neb. 98, 327
N.W.2d 611 (1982).

On February 24, 1994, Eva directed a written
demand for payment of these statutory allowances
on the personal representative. Schafer rejected
Eva's demands, asserting that when certain nonprobate transfers were excluded, the costs and expenses of administration exceeded the assets of the
estate, leaving no money to pay said allowances.
According to the second amended inventory contained in our record, Henry's estate consisted of approximately $4,100 in personal property; there was
$6,188.32 in life insurance proceeds payable to
Schafer and Rogers; $50,028.79 in property was
held with right of survivorship with his daughters,
Rogers and Schafer; and approximately $123,511 in
assets was titled in Henry's trust, with Rogers and
Schafer as beneficiaries. Eva's demands and
Schafer's rejections were filed in the probate proceedings. Eva did not separately petition the county
court for relief following Schafer's rejection.
Rather, Eva's demands simply came on for trial. In
its order, as relevant to dismissing Eva's demands
for statutory allowances, the county court found
generally that "(c ]osts and expenses of administration exceeded the value of all property subject to
homestead allowance, exempt property allowance
and family allowance." On appeal, Eva generally
assigns as error this finding of the county court.
The court made no specific finding on what the
costs and expenses of administration were, what the
value of Henry's probate estate was, or what other
property, if any, had been considered to be "subject
to" these allowances.
We do not understand Eva to seriously contend
that Henry's probate estate was sufficient to fund
her statutory allowances, that is to say, that his estate at his death had funds left over, after payment
of costs and expenses of administration, to pay
those allowances. Rather, Eva contends that certain
nonprobate transfers should have been declared ineffective by the court under Neb.Rev.Stat. §
30-2726 (Reissue 1995) to the extent necessary to
pay her statutory allowances. Eva devotes the entirety of her argument on this subject to the proposition that she timely commenced a proceeding un-
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der § 30-2726 for purposes of asserting the liability
for her statutory allowances against surviving
parties or beneficiaries of survivorship or "POD"
accounts, thus presuming that the county court rejected her allowances because it found that she did
not timely proceed. We find nothing in the court's
order to suggest that this was or was not the court's
reasoning.
*9 Schafer argues that the county court properly dismissed Eva's demands for statutory allowances because the probate estate was insufficient to
pay them; that no proceeding was ever commenced
under§ 30-2726; and that, even ifit was, due to the
lateness of Eva's request for these allowances, beneficiaries of these nonprobate transfers, i.e., right
of survivorship accounts and POD accounts, could
not be required to account to the estate under that
section.
[7] We do not frame the "lateness" issue because it is unnecessary for us to decide it. We conclude that the proceedings below were improperly
initiated under § 30-2726. An appellate court is not
obligated to engage in an analysis which is not
needed to adjudicate the case and controversy before it. Motor Club Ins. Assn. v. Fillman, 5
Neb.App. 931, 568 N.W.2d 259 (1997).
(8] The county court, in its interlocutory order
denying Schafer's motion for summary judgment,
reasoned that Eva had timely commenced a proceeding under § 30-2726. Why it ultimately dismissed Eva's claims for allowance altogether is indecipherable from its order, although Schafer requested written findings of fact. However, statutory
interpretation presents a question of law in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation
to reach an independent conclusion. Kerrigan &
Line v. Foote, 5 Neb.App. 397, 558 N.W.2d 837
(1997) (citing Payne v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr.
Servs., 249 Neb. 150, 542 N.W.2d 694 (1996)).
[9,10] When settling upon the meaning of a
statute, an appellate court must determine and give
effect to the purpose and intent of the Legislature as

ascertained from the entire language of the statute
considered in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense,
it being the court's duty to discover, if possible, the
Legislature's intent from the language of the statute
itself. Id. The components of a series or collection
of statutes pertaining to a certain subject matter
may be conjunctively considered and construed to
determine the intent of the Legislature so that different provisions of the act are perceived as consistent, harmonious, and sensible. Id.
We believe much confusion occurred below by
failing to honor the distinction between the process
of generally asserting rights to statutory allowances
and a proceeding under § 30-2726.
(a) Statutory Allowances Generally
As noted, a surviving spouse's entitlements to
the homestead allowance, exempt property, and
family allowance are statutorily defined. See §§
30-2322, 30-2323, and 30-2324. The statutes creating those entitlements do not define the procedure
by which they are to be asserted. Neb.Rev.Stat. §
30-2209(4) (Reissue 1995) defines "claim" to include "liabilities of the estate which arise at or after
the death of the decedent," expressly excluding certain matters irrelevant here. Statutory allowances
are obviously payable from estate assets. Section
30-2325 provides in pertinent part: "The homestead
allowance, the exempt property, and the family allowance as finally determined by the personal representative or by the court, shall vest in the surviving spouse as of the date of decedent's death, as a
vested indefeasible right of property .... " (Emphasis
supplied.) See In re Estate of Stephenson, 243 Neb.
890, 503 N.W.2d 540 (1993). Thus, these rights accrue to the recipient statutorily upon the decedent's
death. In re Estate of Carman, 213 Neb. 98, 327
N.W.2d 611 (1982). Statutory allowances generically fall within the definition of a claim found in §
30-2209(4).
*10 Eva's demands for statutory allowances
were filed in the probate proceeding and were directed to Schafer as personal representative of
Henry's estate. They reference only the statutory
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sections of the Nebraska Probate Code which create
these entitlements. Arguably, they were presented
as a "written statement of the claim" as required by
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2486 (Reissue 1995) (claims
against decedent's estate may be presented by filing
written statement of claims with clerk of court). In
any event, it is clear that Eva did not file a petition
for allowance in the probate proceedings or otherwise commence a proceeding on the claims after
Schafer rejected the demands. See Neb.Rev.Stat. §
30-2488 (Reissue 1995). Neither did Eva petition
the court for relief under § 30-2325, which, addressing determinations of statutory allowances,
provides that "any interested person aggrieved by
any selection, determination, payment, proposed
payment, or failure to act under this section may
petition the court for appropriate relief.... "
While the issue is troubling, for our purposes,
we will accept that Eva's demands and the personal
representative's rejections sufficiently presented the
county court with a proceeding to adjudicate Eva's
entitlement to statutory allowances. It is only the
"proceeding" under § 30-2726 which Schafer questions and which is the focus of Eva's assigned error.
That proceeding is separate and distinct, as we now
discuss.
(b) § 30-2726
By necessity, statutory allowances can be paid
only if there are sufficient estate assets to pay them.
If not,§ 30-2726 offers special relief through an adjunct proceeding. Section 30-2726 provides, in pertinent part:

the amount received to which the decedent, immediately before death, was beneficially entitled under
section 30-2722, to the extent necessary to discharge the amounts described in subsection (a) of
this section remaining unpaid after application of
the decedent's estate. A proceeding to assert the liability for ... statutory allowances may not be commenced unless the personal representative has received a written demand by the surviving spouse ....
The proceeding must be commenced within one
year after the death of the decedent.
(Emphasis supplied.) (A predecessor statute,
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2707 (Reissue 1989) (repealed
by 1993 Neb. Laws, L.B. 250, § 34), allowed the
proceeding to assert this liability to be commenced
within 2 years after death.)
*11 The purpose of this proceeding is seen in
the comment to § 30-2707, the predecessor statute,
which comment, in pertinent part, states:
Under this section a surviving spouse is automatically assured of some protection against a multiple-party account if the probate estate is insolvent;
rights are limited, however, to sums needed for statutory allowances. The phrase "statutory allowances" includes the homestead allowance under
section 30-2322, the family allowance under section 30-2324, and any allowance needed to make up
the deficiency in exempt property under section
30-2323.

(a) If other assets of the estate are insufficient,
a transfer resulting from a right of survivorship or
POD designation under sections 30-2716 to
30-2733 is not effective against the estate of a deceased party to the extent needed to pay ... statutory
allowances to the surviving spouse and children ....

Section 30-2726(c) provides that surviving
parties or beneficiaries against whom a proceeding
to account is brought may join as a party to the proceeding other surviving parties or beneficiaries of
any other accounts of the decedent, and subsection
( d) provides in part: "Sums recovered by the personal representative must be administered as part
of the decedent's estate." (Emphasis supplied.)

(b) A surviving party or beneficiary who receives payment from an account after death of a
party is liable to account to the personal representative of the decedent for a proportionate share of

In sum, § 30-2726 creates a separate and independent proceeding from that merely asserting a
general claim or demand for statutory allowances.
The statute is clear. It creates the right to com-
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mence a separate proceeding to fund statutory allowances found due and owing by the estate. ( 1) Its
provisions are triggered by a surviving spouse's demand on the personal representative, and (2) the
proceeding is brought to enhance assets of the estate (3) against surviving parties or beneficiaries of
survivorship and POD accounts (4) with sums recovered by the personal representative to be administered as part of a decedent's estate.
( c) Proceeding Below
[11] Did the proceeding in this case, even in
substance, conform to that anticipated by §
30-2726(b )? First, whether such a proceeding was
ever commenced is questionable.
Section
30-2209(35) defines "proceeding" as including actions at law or in equity. An action at the most fundamental level involves pleadings seeking relief
from a court and defining issues. Neb.Rev.Stat. §
30-2405 (Reissue 1995), for example, provides that
interested parties may petition the county court for
orders within the court's probate jurisdiction.
"Petition" is defined as a written request to the
court for an order after notice. § 30-2209(34). Eva's
demands on the personal representative seek no relief from the county court and certainly none under
§ 30-2726. But our decision does not rest on this
flaw in form. The parties below apparently chose to
overlook procedural niceties and, from all we can
determine, treated Eva's demands as sufficient to
present both a claim for statutory allowances generally and a proceeding seeking relief under §
30-2726. Indeed, it was Schafer, not Eva, who first
injected § 30-2726 into the matter by reference in
her rejection of the demands. Schafer, in conjunction with her summary judgment motion, argued
that no proceeding had been commenced under §
30-2726, but at no point prior to the court's overruling that motion, or afterward, did Schafer file any
pleading raising the issue, by demurrer or otherwise; she simply proceeded to trial. Cases are heard
in an appellate court on the theory upon which they
were tried. Sunrise Country Manor v. Neb. Dept. of
Soc. Servs., 246 Neb. 726, 523 N.W.2d 499 (1994);
Donahoo v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm., 229

Neb. 197, 426 N.W.2d 250 (1988). The parties obviously tried this case under the view that it involved a proceeding under § 30-2726. Schafer cannot now successfully contend otherwise. But see
Hynes v. Hogan, 251 Neb. 404, 558 N.W.2d 35
( 1997) (in nonprobate context, objection that cause
of action has not been stated can be raised at any
time).
*12 Second, § 30-2726(b) requires that the personal representative receive a written demand as a
condition to commencing a proceeding under that
section. Arguably, that occurred here, although as
stated, Eva's demand made no reference to pursuing
third parties, but the statute also requires surviving
parties or beneficiaries to account "to the personal
representative" and addresses sums recovered "by
the personal representative. While it is not expressly stated, we believe a reasonable interpretation of this statute is that bringing this proceeding,
and most others involving collection of estate assets, is the duty of the personal representative, unless the court orders otherwise. See, e.g.,
Neb.Rev.Stat.
§§
30-2470,
30-2471,
and
30-2476(2) (Reissue 1995).
[12] Parties may waive pleading defects.
However, they cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on a judicial tribunal by either acquiescence
or consent; neither may subject matter jurisdiction
be created by waiver, estoppel, or conduct of the
parties. Scherbak v. Kissler, 245 Neb. 10, 510
N.W.2d 318 (1994); State v. Baltimore, 242 Neb.
562, 495 N.W.2d 921 (1993).
[13-16] We believe § 30-2726 gives the personal representative, not the surviving spouse,
standing to bring such proceedings. To have standing, a plaintiff must have some legal or equitable
right, title, or interest in the subject matter of the
controversy. Marten v. Staab, 249 Neb. 299, 543
N.W.2d 436 (1996). Standing relates to a court's
power, that is, jurisdiction, to address issues
presented and serves to identify the disputes which
are appropriately resolved through the judicial process. State v. Baltimore, supra. Standing relates to
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jurisdiction and prudential considerations regarding
exercise of jurisdiction. Id. Generally, a litigant
must assert the litigant's own legal rights and interests and cannot rest a claim on the legal rights or
interests of third parties. Id. A court before which a
case is pending can raise the question of standing at
any time during the proceeding. Id. "[S]tanding is
not a mere pleading requirement, but is an indispensable component of a party's case because only
a party who has standing may invoke the jurisdiction of the court." Forrest v. Eilenstine, 5 Neb.App.
77, 82, 554 N.W.2d 802, 807 (1996).
Eva is clearly an interested person under the
Nebraska Probate Code, see § 30-2209(21), and
could seek an order to secure proper performance
of the personal representative's duties. See
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2450 (Reissue 1995) and §
30-2405. However, she did not do so, instead proceeding forward on her own. The estate is liable to
Eva for any statutory allowances due. Of course,
Eva would benefit from a successful accounting under § 30-2726, because it might enable the estate to
pay her claim. However, any proceeds of such an
accounting belong to the estate, to be administered
by the personal representative. It is the estate's legal
right, not Eva's, that § 30-2726 addresses.
*13 [17,18] But Eva's proceeding was deficient
for another reason. Section 30-2726 addresses an
accounting of proceeds from surviving parties or
beneficiaries of described accounts. Although the
absence of a petition alleging grounds for relief under § 30-2726 and naming the persons against
whom it was sought is a fundamental defect infecting this entire matter, at most, Eva's demands or
"petition" was against Schafer as personal representative. Schafer's appearance below was carefully
limited to that capacity. Indeed, no person was involved below other than Eva and the personal representative. The presence of necessary parties is
jurisdictional and cannot be waived. Robertson v.
School Dist. No. 17, 252 Neb. 103, 560 N.W.2d 469
( 1997). A person acting in two different capacities
is, in fact, two distinct entities and must be made a

party in the capacity or capacities in which it is desired to bind him or her. State on behalf of Dunn v.
Wiegand, 2 Neb.App. 580, 512 N.W.2d 419 (1994)
. "[A] representative sued in his representative capacity is a distinct person from a representative
sued in his private or individual capacity, and within the eyes of the law is a stranger to any right or liability as an individual." 34 C.J.S. Executors and
Administrators § 713 at 699 (1942). See, also, 67A
C.J.S. Parties § 117 (1978); Burton v. Williams, 63
Neb. 431, 88 N.W. 765 (1902) (where administrator
is sued only in his official capacity, judgment cannot be rendered against him personally). That
Schafer, individually, may have been the target of
Eva's proceeding under § 30-2726 does not change
the legal reality that she was not made a party to the
proceeding in that capacity.
(d) Conclusion
Because Eva lacked standing to bring a proceeding under§ 30-2726 and because parties indispensable to such action were not present, the county
court lacked jurisdiction to determine the merits of
such proceeding, and to the extent its order may be
so construed, it is void. We, too, lack jurisdiction to
address the merits. The evidence at trial shows that
Schafer and her sister were clearly beneficiaries of
certain survivorship accounts, but whether the evidence required an accounting under § 30-2726 is an
issue we cannot decide.
Schafer, as personal representative, obviously
did not bring such a proceeding, and whether this
constituted a breach of her fiduciary duty in the absence of a request or court order we also do not decide, as it is not before us on appeal. Eva made no
such request and sought no such order. In any
event, Schafer's failure to act did not empower Eva
to unilaterally take over as the estate's personal representative.
As to Eva's claims for statutory allowances,
generally, the court's finding of insufficient assets
to fund them has support in the record. However,
the court erred in dismissing those claims, and that
part of its order is reversed. Eva's right to such al-
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lowances is separate from the estate's ability to pay
them. On remand, the amounts thereof should be
determined so that in the event estate funds become
available, they can be paid as provided by law.
3. ELECTIVE SHARE
*14 Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2313 (Reissue 1995)
entitles a surviving spouse to an elective share in
any fraction not in excess of one-half of the augmented estate. The surviving spouse must assert
this right to elect by filing a petition in probate
court within 6 months after probate of the will, or 9
months after death, whichever is later.
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2317(a) (Reissue 1995). Henry
died on September 3, 1992, but the will was not admitted to probate until February 10, 1994. Eva's petition for elective share was timely filed on March
24, 1994, within 6 months after probate of the will.
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2314 (Reissue 1995) sets
forth guidelines for the determination of the augmented estate. That determination provides the
basis for the court's calculation of the spouse's
elective share, payment of which it then orders
from the assets of the augmented estate or by contribution from distributees and recipients of portions of the augmented estate. See § 30-2317 and
Neb.Rev.Stat.§ 30-2319 (Reissue 1995). See, also,
In re Estate of Ziegenbein, 2 Neb.App. 923, 519
N.W.2d 5 (1994). Briefly digressing, the elective
share/augmented estate procedure does not increase
probate estate assets for purposes of paying statutory allowances which are otherwise unpayable
because of the insufficiency of such estate. Indeed,
the augmented estate by definition includes an initial reduction from the estate for such allowances,
see§ 30-2314(a), and a surviving spouse is entitled
to statutory allowances whether or not he or she
opts to take an elective share. Neb.Rev.Stat. §
30-2318 (Reissue 1995).
The augmented estate consists of the decedent's
estate first reduced by the amount of funeral and
administration expenses, statutory allowances, and
enforceable claims. § 30-2314(a). It is then increased by those items set forth in§ 30-2314(a)(l).

However, "[n]onprobate transfers described in section 30-2314(a)(l) shall not be included within the
augmented estate for the purpose of computing the
elective share if the petition is filed later than one
year after death." § 30-23 l 7(a). Further, §
30-2314(c)(3) excludes from the augmented estate
"[p]roperty transferred by or from the decedent to
any person by any means other than intestate succession or testamentary disposition if a petition is
not filed or delivered under section 30-2317 within
nine months of the death of the decedent." Eva acknowledges that she did not file her petition for
elective share within either 9 months or 1 year after
Henry's death.
Eva specifically takes issue with the county
court's finding that she failed to file her petition for
elective share within 2 years of Henry's death. The
court's finding in this regard was clearly erroneous.
However, this error is inconsequential. While Eva's
petition was timely filed under § 30-2317, it was
not filed in time to increase the augmented estate
by the nonprobate transfers described in §
30-2314(a)(l) and those transfers described in §
30-2314(c)(3). From what we can gather, these are
the only types of transfers by which Eva seeks to
increase the augmented estate.
*15 On appeal, Eva asserts error in the county
court's not stopping Schafer from asserting these
time limitations due to her fraudulent conduct. Eva
argues that a fiduciary cannot use a statute of limitations as a shield to protect her from fraudulent
acts. Schafer's amended answer to Eva's petition for
elective share specifically pleads §§ 30-23 l 7(a) and
30-2314(c)(3), alleging that Eva's failure to file her
petition within 1 year and within 9 months, respectively, results in the exclusion of certain transfers
from the augmented estate. Our record contains no
reply of Eva alleging facts in avoidance of these
time limits. It is only by reference to Eva's separate
petition to remove Schafer as personal representative that we fmd allegations ofrepeated inquiries regarding the existence of a will and Schafer's alleged
failure to acknowledge the existence of any such
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will. In that petition, Eva also alleges that Schafer's
petition for determination of inheritance tax concealed Henry's will.
While unorthodox to rely on pleadings in separate proceedings, we will assume for our purposes
that Eva presented this issue below, although the
county court made no express ruling thereon. We
gather that Eva's argument is that Schafer fraudulently concealed the existence of Henry's will until
January 19, 1994, when she objected to Eva's petition for adjudication of intestacy and that this concealment somehow induced Eva not to file her petition for elective share in time to include the subject
transfers in the augmented estate.
(19] The doctrine of equitable estoppel may be
applied to prevent a fraudulent or inequitable result
of the statute of limitations. Schendt v. Dewey, 246
Neb. 573, 520 N.W.2d 541 (1994). Equitable estoppel may be applied to bar a defendant's use of a
statute of repose. Id. One who by deception conceals material facts and thereby prevents discovery
of the wrong should not be permitted to take advantage of his or her own deceit or concealment by
asserting the statute of limitations or repose. Id.
Our review of the evidence leads to several inescapable conclusions. First, the only evidence that
Schafer affirmatively denied the existence of
Henry's will exists by inference from the petition
for determination of inheritance tax filed October 1,
1993. Schafer, individually, is the petitioner, but
the pleading is signed only by her attorney. The petition alleges that Henry died intestate and that he
did not, during his lifetime, convey any property in
trust. Both of those statements are obviously untrue. However, whether Eva was privy to these allegations and, if so, relied on them to her detriment
is another issue. The order determining inheritance
tax reflects that notice to interested parties was dispensed with because Schafer agreed to pay the full
inheritance tax due. Moreover, these allegations
were not made until October 1, 1993, more than a
year after Henry's September 3, 1992, demise. The
time limits of§§ 30-2317(a) and 30-2314(c)(3) are

l year and 9 months, respectively, from date of
death. We fail to see how reliance on these misstatements, not made until after the time limits had
already passed, could be deemed the cause of Eva's
failure to file her petition at an earlier date and
within the periods necessary to include the subject
transfers in the augmented estate. While these untruths might be probative of Schafer's concealing
the will during an earlier time, there is no other
evidence that she did so or that Eva ever inquired
about it. Eva did not testify. Indeed, the only person
testifying, other than the attorney who prepared the
trust documents, was Schafer.
*16 Next, the concealment of which Eva complains necessarily occurred before Schafer was appointed as the estate's personal representative. Eva
cites us to no authority that the actions of a third
person, Schafer in her non-personal-representative
capacity, estop an estate, through its duly appointed
personal representative, from asserting such time
limits on behalf of the estate. Again, a person acting in two different capacities is really two separate
and distinct entities. State on behalf of Dunn v.
Wiegand, 2 Neb.App. 580, 512 N.W.2d 419 (1994).
Henry died September 3, 1992. There is no
evidence that Eva was not made aware of his
passing. Eva resided in McCook until after Henry's
funeral. The elective share procedure protects a surviving spouse against donative inter vivos transfers
which would deprive her of her "fair share." In re
Estate of Ziegenbein, 2 Neb.App. 923, 519 N.W.2d
5 (1994). It exists whether a will is involved or not.
No formal action was taken by Eva until December
21, 1993, over a year after Henry's death, when she
filed her petition for formal adjudication of intestacy. She did not file her petition for elective share
until March 24, 1994. The time provisions of §§
30-2314 and 30-2317 make it incumbent upon a
surviving spouse to act with reasonable dispatch to
determine if a petition for elective share may be appropriate, whether the decedent left a will or not.
The transfers excluded from the augmented estate
due to delayed filing have serious consequences, as
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is apparent here.
The trial court correctly determined that the
augmented estate could not include the transfers described due to the filing date of Eva's petition for
elective share. Without these transfers, the value of
the augmented estate was zero, a fact Eva does not
dispute, and there was nothing for Eva to take an
elective share in. However, as we discuss later, that
is not to say that the augmented estate may not be
increased by other appropriate proceedings for recovery of assets of the estate. Thus, it was error to
dismiss Eva's petition for elective share on the merits.
4. MOTION FOR ACCOUNTING AND TO IMPOSE CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
This phase of the proceedings is no less
troublesome than was the statutory allowances
phase. Eva filed her motion on August 4, 1995.
Schafer, as personal representative, filed her combined answer and demurrer on August 14. Trial
commenced on August 30. Schafer generally denied
all allegations and alleged that the motion failed to
state facts sufficient to allow the court to grant the
relief requested, in other words, that it failed to
state a cause of action. The court's order dismissing
this motion did not specify why it did so. Nonetheless, as part of its general findings, the court stated:
"No fraudulent act has been shown to have been
committed by Shirley K. Schafer with respect to assets in which Eva Reinek held any interest."
(a) Nature of Action
*17 [20,21] The essential character of an action
and relief sought, whether legal or equitable, is determinable from its main object, as disclosed by the
pleadings. Scherbak v. Kissler, 245 Neb. 10, 510
N.W.2d 318 (1994). A cause of action consists of
the fact or facts which give one a right to relief
against another. Hoiengs v. County of Adams, 245
Neb. 877, 516 N.W.2d 223 (1994).
The main objective of the motion was an accounting by Schafer of her actions since being appointed attorney in fact in January 1991 and the im-

position of a constructive trust on all assets reflected on the inventories filed by the personal representative, most of which were nonprobate. We gather that Eva's purpose in seeking this relief was to
increase Henry's estate, which increase would redound to her benefit in two ways-first, it would create a probate estate sufficient to fund her statutory
allowances; second, it would naturally increase
Henry's augmented estate (to the extent that the
augmented estate begins with the decedent's estate,
which is then reduced by certain amounts and increased by others, see § 30-2314 ), thus, potentially
providing something against which her elective
share could be applied. The general nature of the
claim is that after Schafer was appointed attorney in
fact for Henry, she began to convert Henry's assets
to her benefit and that of others, including placing
the assets in Henry's irrevocable trust and in various jointly held certificates of deposit, which
breached her fiduciary duty and worked a fraud
upon Henry. Eva's motion is based on theories and
principles of conversion, breach of fiduciary duty,
and actual or constructive fraud committed by
Schafer, whereby Schafer obtained benefits to
which she was not otherwise entitled. The motion,
by implication, seeks that assets be ordered held in
trust for the benefit of the estate. We conclude that
the essential character of this part of Eva's motion
is equitable. See, Vejraska v. Pumphrey, 241 Neb.
321, 488 N.W.2d 514 (1992); In re Estate of
Widger, 235 Neb. 179, 454 N.W.2d 493 (1990);
Fletcher v. Mathew, 233 Neb. 853, 448 N.W.2d 576
(1989); Ruppert v. Breault, 222 Neb. 432, 384
N.W.2d 284 (1986).
Eva's motion can also be construed as simply
seeking an accounting by Schafer of her actions as
personal representative.
(b) Action to Impose Constructive Trust
Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be
raised sua sponte by a court. Scherbak v. Kissler,
supra. Parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on a court by acquiescence or consent; neither
may subject matter jurisdiction be created by
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waiver, estoppel, or conduct of the parties. Id.
[22,23] In exercising probate jurisdiction, a
court may use equity power and principles to dispose of a matter within the court's probate jurisdiction. Jn re Estate of Stephenson, 243 Neb. 890, 503
N.W.2d 540 (1993). In common-law and equity actions relating to decedents' estates, the county
courts have concurrent original jurisdiction with the
district courts. Marten v. Staab, 249 Neb. 299, 543
N.W.2d 436 (1996) (citing Jodence v. Potmesil, 239
Neb. 387, 476 N.W.2d 554 (1991), and Jn re Estate
ofSteppuhn, 221 Neb. 329, 377 N.W.2d 83 (1985)).
*18 As stated, Eva's motion seeks equitable relief. It seeks to impose a trust in favor of the estate
on moneys held by third persons. It sounds in fraud,
conversion, and constructive trust principles. In
Miller v. Janecek, 210 Neb. 316, 314 N.W.2d 250
( 1982), the Supreme Court was faced with an
equity action based on constructive trust or, in the
alternative, conversion. It held, inter alia, that such
action must be brought in district court and that
county courts have no equity jurisdiction over this
type of action. In Jn re Estate of Steppuhn, supra,
the Supreme Court determined that a county court
did have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a case
involving the determination of title to bearer bonds
as between the personal representatives of the deceased owners. In so doing, the court stated:
The grant of jurisdiction to the district court,
however, while original, is not exclusive. That each
of two courts may possess the same original jurisdiction is clear, but that two separate courts may
not exercise exclusive jurisdiction is also clear. Our
previous opinions have not always addressed this
point. In considering the difference between exclusive and original, the apparent conflict between the
jurisdiction of the county court and the district
court vanishes.
Id. at 332, 377 N.W.2d at 85.
Jn re Estate of Steppuhn, while arguably modifying Miller, made no reference to it. Some 6 years

later, the Supreme Court in Jodence, supra, held
that a county judge's jurisdiction regarding injunctions is limited to issuing a temporary restraining
order when there is no district judge in the county.
Jodence cited both Jn re Estate of Steppuhn and
Miller, the latter as an example of a determination
of the limits of the county court's equity jurisdiction. Jodence, quoting from Miller, again repeated
that county courts have no equity jurisdiction over
equity actions of a type based on constructive trusts
or conversion. Miller has never been expressly
overruled.
Here, the county court was not asked to administer or determine title to or ownership of assets
which belonged to Henry at the time of his death
and were thus clearly included in his estate. See In
re Estate of Severns, 217 Neb. 803, 352 N.W.2d
865 (1984); In re Estate of Layton, 207 Neb. 646,
300 N.W.2d 802 (1981). Rather, Eva's motion attempts to establish title in the estate to property in
the possession of others. We think that it is more
than a coincidence that the cases cited by Eva for
substantive principles regarding fraud, an accounting, and the imposition of a constructive trust were
appeals from matters initially tried in district court
and not in county court. In reliance on Miller, we
conclude that the county court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to entertain Eva's equitable action
based on principles of fraud, conversion, and constructive trust. Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to
address the merits of the appeal as it pertains to that
part of this motion. In addition, as was the case
with the proceeding under § 30-2726, we have serious doubts whether Eva was the proper party to
bring such action, even had it been in district court,
and whether bringing it against Schafer solely in
her capacity as personal representative joined a
proper party. Nevertheless, we need not, and we do
not, decide those issues here.
(c) Accounting by Personal Representative
*19 [24] An action to surcharge a personal representative may be brought to recover losses to an
estate for an alleged breach of fiduciary duty by the
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personal representative. See, Line v. Rouse, 241
Neb. 779, 491 N.W.2d 316 (1992); Neb.Rev.Stat.§
30-2490(d) (Reissue 1995) (issues of liability as
between estate and personal representative individually may be determined in proceeding for accounting, surcharge, or indemnification or other appropriate proceeding). The powers and duties of a
personal representative commence upon his or her
appointment. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2462 (Reissue
1995).
To the extent that Eva's motion can be construed as limited to seeking an accounting for the
estate from the personal representative, it was within the county court's probate jurisdiction. Assuming, without deciding, that Eva was a proper party
to assert these matters, it is apparent from the allegations of Eva's motion and even more so from her
proof at trial that it was not Schafer's activities as
personal representative, but, rather, her actions before Henry's death and before her appointment as
personal representative, as attorney in fact and as
trustee of Henry's trust, that supported the claims of
conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, and constructive fraud in the transfer of assets.

deed, little was done by Schafer as personal representative in administering the small probate estate
other than defending Eva's motions. To the extent
that Eva's motion is construed as seeking a simple
accounting from the personal representative, the
court's dismissal of it was not erroneous.
(d) Conclusion
The county court had no jurisdiction over Eva's
motion construed as an equitable action to impose a
constructive trust based on principles of conversion
and fraud. The county court properly denied the
motion construed as one which sought only an accounting against Schafer for her acts as personal
representative.
5. REMOVAL OF PERSONAL REPRESENTAT-

IVE
Finally, we come to Eva's appeal from the
county court's denial of her petition to remove
Schafer as personal representative. We believe it is
clear from our resolutions of the appeals in the other proceedings that a more timely and separate removal proceeding below may have avoided some
procedural pitfalls.

A representative sued in his representative capacity is a distinct person from a representative
sued in his private or individual capacity and within
the eyes of the law is a stranger to any right or liability as an individual. 34 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 713 (1942); 67 A C.J.S. Parties§ 117
(1978). What Schafer may have done individually,
as attorney in fact or as trustee during Henry's lifetime before becoming personal representative, is
beyond the scope of Eva's motion for an accounting
from Schafer as personal representative.

*20 Eva filed a petition for removal on March
24, 1995. In it, she alleged that in addition to acting
as personal representative of Henry's estate, Schafer
also acted as attorney in fact to Henry and as trustee
of Henry's inter vivos trust and was the beneficiary
of Henry's inter vivos trust; that Schafer had concealed the existence of a will from Eva; that
Schafer, acting as attorney in fact, had made various improper transfers to benefit herself and others
and had "misappropriated, converted, and wasted"
estate assets; and, finally, that Schafer had filed an
improper claim against the estate.

It is true that upon Henry's death Schafer received and distributed proceeds of certain joint accounts, as beneficiary and survivor, and distributed
assets of the trust, as trustee, both to herself and
others. Even if some of these acts took place after
her appointment as personal representative, they
were not done as personal representative and the assets involved were not part of the probate estate. In-

[25] "A person interested in the estate may petition for removal of a personal representative for
cause at any time." Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2454(a)
(Reissue 1995). Once the petition is filed, §
30-2454(a) requires that the court fix a time and
place for hearing. Once notice is given to the personal representative of the removal proceedings, he
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or she "shall not act except to account, to correct
maladministration or preserve the estate." Id.
"Given the scope of the personal representative's
power over the interests of the beneficiaries and
other interested parties in an estate, the right conferred by § 30-2454 to petition the county court to
remove the personal representative for cause is a
substantial right." In re Estate of Snover, 233 Neb.
198, 203, 443 N.W.2d 894, 898 (1989).

in the administration of an estate and in the disposition of the property which is to be distributed under
the terms of a will, and which is then presently in
the course of litigation, and the circumstances disclose that the interests of the executor are clearly
such as to prevent his performing the duties connected therewith in an impartial manner, such executor should be removed and another appointed in
his stead.

Section 30-2454(b) sets forth the bases for the
removal of a personal representative:

Where an executor's personal interests conflict
with or are antagonistic to his duties as executor, he
is not a proper person to act as such, and on proper
application should be removed ....

Cause for removal exists when removal would
be in the best interests of the estate, or if it is shown
that a personal representative or the person seeking
his appointment intentionally misrepresented material facts in the proceedings leading to his appointment, or that the personal representative has
disregarded an order of the court, has become incapable of discharging the duties of his office, or
has mismanaged the estate or failed to perform any
duty pertaining to the office.
See, e.g., In re Estate of Seidler, 241 Neb. 402,
490 N.W.2d 453 (1992) (cause for removal exists
where personal representative fails to follow court's
progression order, fails to pay federal taxes, and
fails to provide proposed distribution plan); In re
Estate of Snover, supra ( cause for removal exists
where personal representative fails to file federal
tax return and violates court's progression order).
[26] The issue is whether the evidence disclosed a sufficient conflict of interest to warrant removal of Schafer as personal representative. Our
review is for error appearing on the record. In re
Estate of Snover, supra. The decision to remove is
within the discretion of the county court. See Moss
v. Eaton, 183 Neb. 71, 157 N.W.2d 883 (1968). It is
not competent for a personal representative acting
in his or her representative capacity to sue himself
or herself in his or her individual capacity. 34
C.J.S. Executors and Administrators§ 689 (1942).
*21 Where an executor is personally interested

"An administrator is a quasi trustee, and should
be a person who is not interested adversely to the
estate in property which is the subject of administration, and who will, while carefully guarding the
interests of the estate, stand at least indifferent
between it and claimants of the property."
In re Estate of Marconnit, 119 Neb. 73, 75-76,
227 N.W. 147, 148 (1929). See, also, Moss, supra
(affirming refusal to appoint person against whom
claim for accounting was subsequently filed by special administrator as executor); Jn re Estate of
McLean, 138 Neb. 757, 295 N.W. 273 (1940)
(removal proper where personal representative's
conduct antagonistic to other interested persons).
Other courts have noted that "[a]n important aspect
of an executor's fiduciary responsibility is the duty
to maintain an undivided loyalty to the estate."
Ramsdell v. Union Trust Co., 202 Conn. 57, 65, 519
A.2d 1185, 1189 (1987). In Ramsdell, the executor's potential conflict arose from its dual capacity
as executor under the will and trustee of an inter
vivos trust. As in this case, had the estate in Ramsdell had a valid claim against the trustee, it would
have been the executor's responsibility to sue itself
as trustee. Concluding that the potential cause of
action was sufficient to warrant consideration by a
successor personal representative, the Ramsdell
court held that the lower court abused its discretion
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by refusing to order removal.
[27] We reach a similar conclusion here. The
law is clear that no gift may be made by an attorney
in fact to himself or herself unless the power to
make such a gift is expressly granted in the instrument itself and there is shown a clear intent on the
part of the principal to make such a gift. Mischke v.
Mischke, 247 Neb. 752, 530 N.W.2d 235 (1995);
Vejraska v. Pumphrey, 241 Neb. 321, 488 N.W.2d
514 ( 1992). Absent express intent, an agent may
not exercise his or her power so as to make substantially gratuitous transfers for the agent's or a third
party's benefit. Mischke, supra. The power to make
such transfers must be expressly granted in the instrument creating the relationship. Vejraska, supra.
Any purported oral authorization is ineffective. Id.
*22 In Vejraska, the defendant, attorney in fact,
deposited a $5,000 check received by the decedent
into a certificate of deposit held in joint tenancy
with rights of survivorship by the defendant and the
decedent. Following the decedent's death, the defendant took sole possession of the certificate. According to defendant, the decedent told her he
wanted her to have the check. The Supreme Court
held that the personal representative of the estate
had shown a prima facie case of fraud by proving
that, using her power of attorney, the defendant had
made a gift to herself. It then became the defendant's burden of proof to show that she had acted
pursuant to power expressly granted in the power of
attorney document and pursuant to the clear intent
of the donor. Id. See, also, Mischke, supra.

[28] Considering the evidence below solely as
it pertains to removing Schafer, it certainly presents
the potential of causes of action existing against
Schafer, and perhaps others, and in favor of Henry's
estate. The evidence is that Schafer, as attorney in
fact, made numerous transfers of Henry's moneys to
and from several joint accounts, some of which ultimately benefited her when Henry died. Some of
these came from Henry's solely owned accounts
and went into survivorship accounts. She also made
payments to third persons from certain of these ac-

counts which could be found as gratuitous. A personal representative is authorized, if not charged
with the duty, to evaluate and pursue actions for the
benefit of the estate. See §§ 30-2470 and
30-2476(2). See, also, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2464(c)
(Reissue 1995) (personal representative of decedent
has same standing to sue and be sued as his decedent had prior to his death); § 30-2464(a)
(personal representative shall observe standards of
care applicable to trustees under Neb.Rev.Stat. §
30-2813 (Reissue 1995) and must use his authority
for best interests of successors to estate).
Moreover, as we have already determined, it is
the personal representative who has standing to
bring proceedings against third parties under §
30-2726. Here, the individual against whom such
actions and proceedings potentially lie is the same
person who must evaluate and initiate them.
Schafer's conflict is obvious. For removal purposes,
the likely success or failure of the proceedings or
actions is only one of several considerations.
Thus, had the county court been presented with
a timely petition to remove, or even one to appoint
a special administrator, see Neb.Rev.Stat. §
30-2457(2) (Reissue 1995), separate from the other
matters, and denied it on the evidence presented
here, we would have no hesitation in finding such
denial an abuse of discretion. But the issue is less
clear here because the removal petition was filed
over a year after Eva's demands for statutory allowances and only a few months before she filed the
motion seeking to impose a constructive trust.
There is nothing in our record to suggest that Eva
earlier sought a court order to compel the personal
representative to bring any such proceedings or to
allow Eva to do so. Moreover, rather than holding
an immediate hearing on the removal petition, it
was combined with a trial of all the matters then
pending, including the very proceedings that created the conflict. Of course, if those matters had
been properly decided in favor of Schafer, it would
have been superfluous for the trial court to then remove Schafer.
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*23 The answer to this quandary lies in our prior determination that there have been no binding
determinations of any proceedings under § 30-2726
or on the constructive trust actions because the
county court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate those
matters. Since the potential actions which create the
conflict have never been properly determined, the
conflict remains viable to the extent those actions
remain viable. Thus, we reverse the dismissal of
Eva's petition to remove and order that on remand
Schafer be removed and a new personal representative be appointed. This decision is in no way to be
construed as a comment on the likelihood of success of any actions or on the effect time passage has
had on them.
VII. CONCLUSION
Eva's first appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The county court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of a proceeding under§ 30-2726
and the equitable action to impose a constructive
trust. Accordingly, its orders in that regard are a
nullity. The motion for an accounting by the personal representative was properly denied. The
county court properly excluded the subject transfers
from the augmented estate, but erred in dismissing
Eva's petition for elective share. The county court
correctly found that current estate assets were insufficient to pay statutory allowances, but erred in
summarily dismissing Eva's claims for the same.
Finally, the failure to remove the personal representative was erroneous. We remand this matter to
the county court with directions for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
DISMISSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN
PART, AND IN PART REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
Neb.App.,1997.
Estate of Reinek
Not Reported in N.W.2d,
(Neb.App.)

1997 WL 618740
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IRWIN, SIEVERS, and CARLSON, Judges.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT
ON APPEAL
IRWIN, Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
*l Alta Empkey, personal representative of the
estate of Esther Zoe Crawford, deceased, and trustee of the Crawford Trust, appeals an order of the
county court which, among other things, ordered
the return of improperly distributed assets to the estate from the trust and awarded attorney fees and
costs to an heir who successfully challenged a will.
Michael Blair Pierce and Amy Jo Pierce (the
Pierces), heirs of Esther, cross-appeal an order of
the county court which, among other things, granted Empkey a protective order concerning discovery requested by the Pierces and refused to remove
Empkey as personal representative and disqualify
her counsel. We find no merit to Empkey's appeal,
but we reverse the county court's grant of the protective order to Empkey and the county court's refusal to remove Empkey as personal representative.
We conclude that the record establishes that
Empkey's dual roles as personal representative and
trustee have become directly at odds with each other.
II. BACKGROUND
This case concerns the estate of Esther. Esther
executed a series of wills during the course of her
life, including wills executed in 1973, 1977, 1982,
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1988, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1997, 1999, and 2001. In
December 2001, Esther's husband, Henry Crawford,
established the Crawford Trust, and Empkey was
named trustee of the trust. In the 2001 will, Esther
named Empkey as personal representative and bequeathed all her assets to Henry, if he survived her,
or to Empkey, as trustee of the Crawford Trust, if
Henry predeceased her.
Henry predeceased Esther. Esther died on or
about November 7, 2003. In January 2004, Empkey
filed an application seeking informal probate of the
2001 will. Empkey was informally appointed personal representative on January 6, 2004.
Pursuant to the terms of the 2001 will, Empkey
transferred assets of Esther to the Crawford Trust.
On or about November 14, 2005, Empkey filed a
petition seeking complete settlement of the estate.
On December 6, 2005, Sandra Lassley, Michael,
Tara Pierce, and Zane Pierce (the objectors) filed
an objection to the petition for complete settlement.
The objectors alleged that the 2001 will was invalid
due to lack of competency and/or fraud and undue
influence.
The will contest proceedings were transferred
from the county court for Douglas County, Nebraska, to the district court for Douglas County. On
June 27, 2008, a jury returned a verdict finding that
the 2001 will was invalid.
On November 6, 2008, Margaret Schiffbauer
filed a petition for formal probate of Esther's 1999
will. In December 2008, Empkey, as personal representative of the estate, filed a motion to dismiss
Schiffbauer's petition and alleged that her request to
probate the 1999 will was time barred. In addition,
beneficiaries of the Crawford Trust, including Dundee Presbyterian Church and the Pierces, filed an
objection to Schiffbauer's petition.
On March 2, 2009, Lassley filed a motion for
attorney fees, seeking fees for her successful challenge to the 2001 will. On March 11, the Pierces
filed a notice of intent to serve records subpoenas

on various parties, including Empkey. On March
25, Empkey filed a motion for protective order concerning the Pierces' discovery request. On March
30, the Pierces filed motions seeking to remove
Empkey as personal representative and to disqualify Empkey's counsel from representing her as personal representative; both were based, in part, on
assertions that Empkey and her counsel had a conflict of interest while Empkey was serving as both
trustee of the Crawford Trust and as personal representative of the estate.
*2 The county court held hearings on January
27 and April 1, 2009. On June 30, the county court
entered an order disposing of the following issues:
Empkey's challenge to Schiffbauer's petition to probate the 1999 will, Lassley's motion for attorney
fees and costs, and the Pierces' motions to remove
Empkey and disqualify her counsel.
The county court found that Schiffbauer's attempt to seek probate of Esther's 1999 will was
time barred. The court found that Esther had died
on November 7, 2003, and that Neb.Rev.Stat. §
30-2408 (Reissue 2008) required an action seeking
probate be commenced within 3 years after decedent's death. Because Schiffbauer did not file her
request to probate the 1999 will until November
2008, approximately 5 years after Esther's death,
the court found Schiffbauer's request was time
barred. The court held that Esther's estate should
proceed as an intestate proceeding and directed that
any assets transferred to the Crawford Trust under
the invalid 2001 will should be returned as wholly
as possible to the estate.
The county court then found that Lassley's actions in successfully challenging the 2001 will resulted in a benefit to the estate by "[t]hwarting distribution under an invalid will." The court found
that under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2203 (Reissue 2008),
an attorney fee is awardable to a party who brings
legal proceedings that result in a benefit to the estate. As such, the court awarded Lassley attorney
fees and costs in the amount of $17,719.69 and
ordered the fees to be paid out of Esther's assets, or
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out of the Crawford Trust inasmuch as Empkey had
transferred all assets of the estate to the Crawford
Trust.
Finally, the county court denied the motions to
remove Empkey and disqualify Empkey's counsel.
The court ordered that Empkey was to continue
serving as both personal representative of the estate
and as trustee of the Crawford Trust. These appeals
followed.
III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Empkey filed a notice of appeal as "Personal
Representative of the Estate of Esther Zoe Crawford and Trustee of the [Crawford Trust]." Empkey
assigned two errors on appeal: First, Empkey asserts that the county court erred in ordering the
transfer of assets from the Crawford Trust back to
the estate. Second, Empkey asserts that the court
erred in granting Lassley's motion for attorney fees
and costs and ordering them to be paid by the
Crawford Trust.
The Pierces, as heirs of the estate, filed a crossappeal. The Pierces assigned four errors, which we
have consolidated for discussion to two: First, the
Pierces assert that the county court erred in granting
Empkey's motion for protection order concerning
discovery requested by the Pierces. Second, the
Pierces assert that the court erred in denying the
motions to remove Empkey and to disqualify
Empkey's counsel.
IV. ANALYSIS
1. EMPK.EY'S DIRECT APPEAL
On direct appeal, Empkey has challenged the
county court's ordering of the transfer of assets
back to the estate and the court's awarding of attorney fees and costs. Putting aside the somewhat unusual notion of the personal representative of an estate challenging an order for the return of property
to the estate for proper distribution, we find no merit to either assertion.
(a) Return of Property
*3 Empkey first challenges the county court's

ordering of the transfer of assets back to the estate.
Empkey argues that there was not a timely request
for transfer of assets back to the estate, that the
parties had agreed to limited issues being addressed
and the transfer of assets back to the estate was not
one of the issues, and that the transfer of assets
back to the estate will result in a windfall to the
Pierces. We find no merit to any of these assertions.
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-24,120 (Reissue 2008)
provides that the right "to recover property improperly distributed or the value thereof from any distributee is forever barred at the later of (1) three
years after the decedent's death; or (2) one year
after the time of distribution thereof." Thus, the
right to recover assets improperly distributed from
the estate to the trust was forever barred at the later
of 3 years after Esther's death or 1 year after
Empkey distributed assets to the trust.
As noted, Esther died on or about November 7,
2003. Three years after her death would have been
on or about November 7, 2006. Empkey filed a
schedule of distribution and filed the formal petition for complete settlement of Esther's estate on
November 4, 2005, indicating that all assets had
been distributed from the estate prior to that date.
As a result, it appears that the right to recover assets improperly distributed from the estate would
have been forever barred on or about November 7,
2006. Although it is accurate to note that a formal
motion for the return of property was filed on June
6, 2009, which was well outside the statutory period for seeking recovery of assets improperly distributed from the estate, the record indicates that
such formal motion was not the first filing which
arguably impacted the recovery of the assets.
On November 4, 2005, Empkey filed a petition
seeking settlement of the estate and seeking approval of prior distributions. In that petition, Empkey
requested "such other orders as the law may require
and as the Court may deem applicable and proper."
On December 6, objections were filed to Empkey's
petition seeking settlement of the estate and seeking
approval of prior distributions. In those objections,
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Lassley and the Pierces specifically alleged that assets should be distributed according to a prior will,
that the probate of the estate would need to be redone in its entirety, and that the court needed to
conduct a hearing on the validity of prior wills, and
they requested that the court award "such other and
further relief as may be warranted by the facts and
the evidence ." Inasmuch as Empkey had affirmatively represented that all assets had already been
distributed pursuant to the 200 I will and sought approval of those distributions, inasmuch as Lassley
and the Pierces challenged those distributions and
requested distribution under a different instrument,
and inasmuch as all parties had requested the court
to take appropriate action to achieve those requests,
the issue of whether assets would need to be returned to the estate was raised from the outset, prior
to the expiration of the statutory period. We find no
merit to Empkey's assertion that the issue was time
barred.
*4 We similarly find no merit to Empkey's assertions that the parties had agreed to limit the issues by way of scheduling orders or that the return
of assets results in a windfall to the Pierces. Although Empkey represents on appeal that the court
entered "a scheduling order on February 2, 2009,
indicating that it would only address Lassley's request to probate the 1999 will" and that the court
entered "a scheduling order on April 10, 2009, indicating that it would only address Lassley's request
for attorney fees and the Pierces' request to remove
Empkey and disqualify [Empkey's counsel]," our
review of the record does not support those assertions. The only orders presented to this court
entered on those dates appear to be orders summarizing what was previously presented to the court at
hearings predating those orders, and our review of
the orders does not support Empkey's assertion on
appeal. We also find no merit to the assertion that
ordering that assets improperly distributed from the
estate be returned to the estate so that they can be
distributed properly results in a "windfall."

(b) Attorney Fees and Costs

Empkey also challenges the county court's order awarding attorney fees to Lassley. Empkey argues that there is no statutory authority nor is there
an accepted course of practice authorizing attorney
fees in a case such as this one. We disagree.
Attorney fees and expenses may generally be
recovered in a civil action only where provided for
by statute or when a recognized and accepted uniform course of procedure has been to allow recovery of attorney fees. In re Estate of Chrisp, 276
Neb. 966, 759 N.W.2d 87 (2009). Under
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2481 (Reissue 2008), attorney
fees are awarded to the personal representative as
part of the administration expenses. In re Estate of
Chrisp, supra. It has long been the rule in Nebraska
that no allowance is authorized to be made out of
an estate for the services of an attorney not employed by the personal representative. See In re Estate of Love, 136 Neb. 458, 286 N.W. 381 (1939).
Such an allowance is permitted, however, when the
services provided were in the interest of all persons
interested in the estate and were beneficial to the
estate. Id.

In this case, Empkey initially distributed all assets of the estate to the trust pursuant to the 2001
will. Lassley objected to Empkey's petition for final
settlement and challenged the 2001 will as being invalid. Following litigation, a jury returned a verdict
finding that the 200 I will was, indeed, invalid. As a
result, prior to Lassley's actions, the assets of the
estate were entirely distributed to the trust; subsequent to Lassley's actions, the authority for that
distribution to the trust was invalidated. Now, the
court has ordered the assets of the estate be restored. Clearly Lassley's action provided benefit to
the entire estate, and we find no merit to Empkey's
assignment of error on appeal.
2. THE PIERCES' CROSS-APPEAL
*5 On cross-appeal, the Pierces have asserted
that the county court erred in granting Empkey's
motion for protective order concerning discovery
and erred in denying the motion to remove Empkey
and disqualify Empkey's counsel. We find merit to
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both assignments of error.
(a) Discovery
First, the Pierces assert that the county court
erred in granting Empkey's motion for protective
order concerning discovery. Upon our review of the
record and the court's order, we find that the court
erred in granting the protective order.
On March 11, 2009, the Pierces filed a notice
of intention to serve a records subpoena on, among
other entities, Empkey. The subpoena requested recorded information concerning Empkey's receipts
and disbursements from the trust. As noted above,
Empkey had previously transferred all assets of the
estate to the trust pursuant to the 200 I will, which
was later found to be an invalid will. As such, the
Pierce's request for discovery concerned whether
assets transferred to the trust from the estate were
still in the trust or had been disbursed to other
parties.
In the county court, Empkey argued to the
court that the protection order should be granted
and discovery denied because any claim to recover
improperly distributed assets was time barred under
§ 30-24,120. In open court, the court concluded that
"based on the wording of § 30-24,120, the Court
will grant-or sustain the motion for protective order."
We initially note that the court's conclusion
with respect to the prospective order appears to include a conclusion that any claim for return of
property improperly distributed from the estate under the invalid 2001 will was time barred. At the
same time, the court's final order in this case specifically ordered the return of assets improperly distributed from the estate under the 200 I will, as
thoroughly discussed above. Above, we concluded
that the issue of whether assets needed to be returned to the estate was timely raised by the pleadings of the parties. In light of that conclusion, we
similarly conclude that § 30-24,120 does not support a conclusion that Empkey should be protected
from discovery requests concerning receipts and

disbursements by the trust. As such, we reverse the
court's order granting a protective order to Empkey
on the basis of§ 30-24, 120.
(b) Removal of Empkey
The Pierces also appeal the county court's order
that Empkey should not be removed and that her
counsel should not be disqualified. The court found
that there was no evidence of malfeasance on the
part of Empkey or her counsel and that there was
no evidence to establish a conflict of interest. We
disagree.
In this case, Empkey is serving in two capacities. First, she is the personal representative representing the best interests of the estate and its heirs.
Second, she is the trustee representing the best interests of the trust. Pursuant to the 200 l will,
Empkey, as personal representative of the estate,
transferred all assets of the estate to the trust. The
200 I will, and transfer of assets pursuant to it, have
been declared invalid. As a result, Empkey is now
serving in two roles that have directly conflicting
interests.
*6 As personal representative, Empkey's obligation should be to accumulate and preserve the estate for proper distribution to the parties entitled to
distribution. As trustee, Empkey's obligation should
be to attempt to preserve the trust for proper distribution to the parties entitled to distribution. Inasmuch as all assets of the estate have been transferred to the trust, this means that Empkey now has
one role that requires her to seek the return of improperly distributed assets and another role that requires her to simultaneously resist the return of the
same assets.
In its order, the county court cited
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-3862 (Reissue 2008), concerning statutory grounds for removal of a trustee, in
concluding that Empkey should not be removed.
Part of the confusion in the record in this case appears to arise from the court's simultaneously conducting proceedings related to the estate and proceedings related to the trust, but the appeal to this
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court is from the estate proceeding. As such, we are
concerned with whether Empkey should have been
removed from her role as personal representative.

(Neb.App.)
END OF DOCUMENT

Neb.Rev.Stat. § 30-2454 (Reissue 2008)
provides that cause for removal of a personal representative exists when, among other factors, removal of the personal representative would be in
the best interests of the estate or it is shown that the
personal representative has become incapable of
discharging the duties of her office. In this case, it
is apparent that the best interests of the estate
would be served by not having the personal representative simultaneously serving as trustee of the
trust and resisting the return of assets to the estate
for proper distribution. Similarly, it is apparent that
Empkey's dual capacities make her incapable of
discharging her duties as both personal representative and trustee.
As such, we conclude that the county court
erred in not ordering Empkey's removal as personal
representative. We reverse the county court's order
failing to remove Empkey as personal representative. We find no need to further address the propriety of Empkey's counsel continuing to represent her
as trustee.
V. CONCLUSION
We affirm the county court's order that assets
improperly distributed from the estate to the trust
be returned and the court's order that Lassley was
entitled to a reasonable attorney fee and costs for
successfully challenging the 2001 will. We find that
Empkey's dual roles as personal representative and
trustee have become directly at odds with each other, and we reverse the court's order granting
Empkey's request for protective order and refusing
to remove Empkey as personal representative.
AFFIRMED IN PART, AND IN PART REVERSED.
N eb.App.,2010.

In re Estate of Crawford
Not Reported in N.W.2d, 2010 WL 3137525
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Deceased.
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Case No. CV-2007-266
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S
REQUESTED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I.
REQUESTED FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Decedent, Melvin Peterson, was born

and died March 3, 2007,

at the age of 83.
2.

On December 5, 2001, Melvin Peterson, conveyed real property in Moyie Springs,

Idaho, theretofore owned by him, to Cathie Peterson, by Gift Deed, retaining a life estate. A true

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S REQUESTED FINDINGS
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and correct copy of said Gift Deed is attached hereto as Exhibit "A," and incorporated herein by
reference.
3.

Melvin Peterson remained seised of the life estate until the time of his death.

4.

The State ofldaho, Department of Health and Welfare, has an allowed claim for

Medicaid recovery pursuant to Idaho Code§ 56-218, against the estate of Melvin Peterson, in the
sum of$171,386.94.
5.

Cathie Peterson remains in possession of the real property described in Exhibit

"A."

II.
REQUESTED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
6.

This is a probate proceeding governed by the Idaho Probate Code and Idaho Code

§ 56-218, and the court has in rem jurisdiction over the property of the estate and, pursuant to
Idaho Code § 15-3-105, has exclusive jurisdiction of formal proceedings to determine how
decedents' estates subject to the laws of this state are to be administered, expended and
distributed.
7.

The life estate, as it existed the moment before the death of Melvin Peterson, is an

asset of the estate, for purposes of the Department's Medicaid recovery claim, pursuant to Idaho
Code§ 56-218(4).
8.

Had Melvin Peterson transferred the life estate to Cathie Peterson the moment

before his death, the value of the transferred asset would have been determined pursuant to
IDAPA 16.03.05.837, which is .38642 of the fair market value. The life estate factor of .38642
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of the fair market value of the real property is the appropriate valuation of the estate's interest in
the real property gifted to Cathie Peterson by the Gift Deed of December 5, 2001.
9.

Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 56-218(4), the estate is the owner of a 38.642%

undivided interest in the real property described in Exhibit "A."
10.

The personal representative has authority to bring an action to partition real

property in which the estate has an interest, including the undivided interest in the real property
described in Exhibit "A," pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 15-3-703 and 15-3-715(6) and (8).
DATED this 26th day of September, 2011,

it/~ ><t::
W~OCARiWRrGHT
Deputy Attorney General
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GIFT DEED

I

IN CONSIDERATION oflove and affection, and in addition, in consideration ofthe aid
and assistance grantee bas give grantor in the care and maintenance of grantor and the property
hereinafter descnbed without thought or request for remuneration of any type or kind
whatsoever, MELVIN PETERSON, a single person, grantor, does hereby give, grant, alien,
convey and confinn unto CATHIE PETERSON, a single person, grantee, whose address is

p.o. r2ax y.401, 7 motl\.L ·~r.in~4)

~~~45-theproperlydescribedasfollows:

Tax #5, being pait of LOt Five (5), Block Two (2), Moyie Springs Townsite and descn"bed as
:tbllows:
·

I

r

'

I

.l

t

·

I

· 1

Commencing at the Northeast Corner of Lot Five (5), Block Two (2). Moyie Springs Townsite;
thence West along the North Line of Lot Five (5), a distance of 40 feet to a point; thence
Southwesterly along Moyie Street a distance of 140 feet to a point; thence South 63 feet to a
point; thence East 95 feet at a point on the East line of Lot 5; thence North 125 k to the

I
;

POINT OF BEGINNING.
RESERVING UNTO GRANTOR A LIFE ESTATE IN SAID PROPERTY.

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the said premises with the appurtenances unto the grantee,
its heirs and assigns forever. And the grantor does hereby covenant to and with the said grantee
that it is the owner in fee simple of said premises and that they are free from all encwnbrances
and that it will WARRANT and DEFEND the same from all lawful claims whatsoever.
D,ATEDthis

5~ dayof~,2001.
f

~
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Melvin Peterson
STATE OF IDAHO

)

County ofBotmdary

)

I
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· 1

. On. th.is 5_ day of D.ece1'711u.r. 2001, before me, the undersigned Notary Public, personally
appeared MELVIN PETERSON, known or identified to me to be the person whose name is subscn"bed to the
~
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S. KAY CHRISTENSEN, ISB No. 3101
CHIEF, CONTRACTS AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DIVISION
W.COREYCARTWRIGHT
Deputy Attorney General
3276 Elder, Ste. B
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOUNDARY
In the Matter of the Estate of
MELVIN PETERSON,
Deceased.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2007-266
CLOSING BRIEF

COMES NOW the State ofldaho, Department of Health and Welfare, a claimant and
successor personal representative herein (hereinafter, the "Department"), and submits the
following written closing argument:
I.
GOVERNING LAW
Medicaid is a means tested public welfare program. It has always been intended to be the
payer oflast resort. Arkansas Dept. ofHealth and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268,
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291, 126 S.Ct. 1752, 1767 (2006). Where long term care services for the elderly are concerned,
federal law requires the states to recover the assets of deceased Medicaid recipients, from their
estates, to help defray the cost of the Medicaid program. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l)(B). The assets
to be recovered include the Medicaid recipient's probate estate, plus, at the option of the state,
"any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title
or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a
survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common,
survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement." 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B). Idaho
has adopted this so-called "expanded definition of estate" almost verbatim in Idaho Code§ 56218(4)(b). The court has previously determined that the life estate retained by Melvin Peterson is
an asset of his estate by virtue of these sections. Order on Petition to Require Payment of Claim
( 6/12/2008).
The value of the life estate is calculated by tables found in the Department's Rules
governing Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled ("AABD") codified at IDAPA 16.03.05.837.
The most current version of these rules can be found online at:
http://adm.idaho.gov/adminrules/rules/idapa16/0305.pdf. A complete set of all changes made to
these rules from January, 2001, to the present, is attached to this brief as Appendix "A." While
the language has changed from time to time, the values given in the tables themselves have not
changed. The purpose of the rules, to value life estates and remainder interests of Medicaid
recipients, has also remained unchanged. 1 The Department's rules have the same force and effect

1

At times, only the life estate table is given, and at other times, such as more recently, there are two tables, one
for life estates and the other for the remainder interests. The remainder table is simply the inverse (1-x) of the life estate
table and so can easily be calculated from the life estate table when that is all that is given.
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as law. Mallonee v. State, 139 Idaho 615, 619, 84 P.3d 551, 555 (2004). The Department's life
estate tables were adopted from, and contain the same values, as are in the Social Security
Program Operations Manual. The most up-to-date version of this manual is found online at:
https://secure.ssa.gov/appslO/poms.nsf/lnx/0501140120. These tables are used, just as the
Department's tables are used, to value life estates and remainder interests of Social Security
recipients. The Life Estate Remainder Table is also attached to Cathie Peterson's Exhibit 5,
offered by Cathie Peterson and accepted into evidence without qualification in this matter.
The value of the life estate interest, therefore, is the ratio given in the life estate tables.
For a person 83 years of age at death, the ratio is .38642 of the fair market value of the real
property. 2
II.
REQUESTED FINDINGS OF FACT

The Department has requested the following findings of fact:
1.

The Decedent, Melvin Peterson, was bor

and died March 3, 2007,

at the age of 83.
2.

On December 5, 2001, Melvin Peterson, conveyed real property in Moyie Springs,

Idaho, theretofore owned by him, to Cathie Peterson, by Gift Deed, retaining a life estate.
3.

Melvin Peterson remained seised of the life estate until the time of his death.

2

While this matter has been pending, the real estate market has both risen and fallen. While property should be
inventoried at its value at the time of death (Idaho Code§ 15-3-706), that value may change for various reasons during
administration which can either increase or decrease the value of the estate. In this case, it is sufficient to establish the
value of the life estate as a proportion of the fair market value of the whole, similar to an undivided interest in real
property. This provides for an appropriate allocation of both the costs of sale - or of maintaining the property - and the
rents and profits payable from the property.
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4.

The State ofldaho, Department of Health and Welfare, has an allowed claim for

Medicaid recovery pursuant to Idaho Code§ 56-218, against the estate of Melvin Peterson, in the
sum of$171,386.94.
5.

Cathie Peterson remains in possession of the real property.

To the best of the notes and recollection of the undersigned, Cathie Peterson testified to
numbers 1, 2, 3, and 5, during her testimony at the hearing. Requested Finding of Fact number 4
is provided by the court record: Order Granting Petition for Allowance of Amended Claim, April
4, 2008.

III.
REQUESTED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Department has requested the following conclusions of law. Each of these requested
conclusions is discussed, in turn, below:

1.
This is a probate proceeding governed by the Idaho Probate Code
and Idaho Code§ 56-218, and the court has in rem jurisdiction over the property
of the estate and, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 15-3-105, has exclusive jurisdiction of
formal proceedings to determine how decedents ' estates are to be administered,
expended and distributed
Idaho Code§ 15-3-105 provides as follows:
Persons interested in decedents' estates may apply to the registrar for
determination in the informal proceedings provided in this chapter, and may
petition the court for orders in formal proceedings within the court's jurisdiction
including but not limited to those described in this chapter. The court has
exclusive jurisdiction of formal proceedings to determine how decedents' estates
subject to the laws of this state are to be administered. expended and distributed.
Idaho Code§ 15-3-105 (underline added). In Connolly v. Probate Court in and/or Kootenai

County, 25 Idaho 35, 136 P. 205 (1913) the court explained:
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It is elementary that probate proceeding by which jurisdiction of a probate court is
asserted over the estate of a decedent for the purpose of administering the same is
in the nature of a proceeding in rem, and is therefore one as to which all the world
is charged with notice.
Connolly, 25 Idaho at_, 136 P. at 207, quoting Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U.S. 71, 29 S.Ct. 580
(1909). Therefore, the court has jurisdiction over the assets of this estate, including those assets
in the possession of Cathie Peterson, and over the controversy in determining how the assets of
the estate are to be administered.
2.
The life estate, as it existed the moment before the death ofMelvin
Peterson, is an asset ofthe estate, for purposes ofthe Department's Medicaid
recovery claim, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 56-218(4).
The value of the life estate is determined the moment before death. As stated in the case
of In re Estate ofLaughead, 696 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa 2005):
Whether Ruby, "at the time of her death," had an interest in the real property at
issue here is determined as of a point in time immediately before her death. See In
re Barkema Trust, 690 N.W.2d 50, 56 (Iowa 2004) (holding "the phrase 'at the
time of death' means the time immediately before the Medicaid recipient's
death"). Immediately prior to her death, Ruby held a life estate in 338 acres of
land. For reasons that follow, we hold her life estate constituted an interest in real
property within the meaning of section 249A.5(2)(c ).
In re Estate ofLaughead, 696 N. W.2d at 316. Any other interpretation would make the life
estate language in Idaho Code § 56-218(4 )(b) a nullity. The court, of course, will not give a
statute an interpretation which would render it a nullity. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22
P.3d 116, 121 (App. 2001). This court previously determined that the life estate is an asset of
this estate by its Order on Petition to Require Payment of Claim (06/12/2008). In doing so, the
court approved the decisions of the 2nd Judicial District Magistrate Gaskill in the case of Jn re
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Estate of Grothe, Nez Perce County No. CV 02-02163 (copy attached to Brief in Support of
Petition to Require Payment of Claim, filed May 5, 2008).

3.
Had Melvin Peterson transferred the life estate to Cathie Peterson
the moment before his death, the value ofthe transferred asset would have been
determined pursuant to IDAPA 16.03.05.837, which is .38642 of the fair market
value. The life estate factor of.38642 of the fair market value of the real property
is the appropriate valuation ofthe estate 's interest in the real property gifted to
Cathie Peterson by the Gift Deed ofDecember 5, 2001.
See Life Estate Tables found at IDAPA 16.03.05.837. Cathie Peterson, herself, offered
the life estate tables into evidence as part of her Exhibit 5, and did not offer any other method of
calculating the life estate value.

4.
Pursuant to Idaho Code§ 56-218(4), the estate is the owner ofa
38.642% undivided interest in the real property.
Since, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 56-218(4)(b), the life estate retained by Melvin Peterson
did not terminate at the time of his death for purposes of Medicaid recovery, the estate is
effectively the owner of 38.642% undivided interest in the real property.

5.
The personal representative has authority to bring an action to
partition real property in which the estate has an interest, including the undivided
interest that was the life estate interest in the subject real property pursuant to
Idaho Code§§ 15-3-703 and 15-3-715(6) and (8).
Idaho Code § 15-3-703 establishes the general duties of the personal representative,
including the ability to sue on behalf of the estate:
(a)
* * *A personal representative is under a duty to settle and
distribute the estate of the decedent ... as expeditiously and efficiently as is
consistent with the best interests of the estate. He shall use the authority conferred
upon him by this code, the terms of the will, if any, and any order in proceedings
to which he is party for the best interests of successors to the estate.
***
( c)
Except as to proceedings which do not survive the death of the
decedent, a personal representative of a decedent domiciled in this state at his
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death has the same standing to sue and be sued in the courts of this state and the
courts of any other jurisdiction as his decedent had immediately prior to death.
Idaho Code§ 15-3-703. This authority specifically includes the authority to partition real
property of the estate:
Except as restricted or otherwise provided by the will or by an order in a
formal proceeding and subject to the priorities stated in section 15-3-902 of this
code, a personal representative, acting reasonably for the benefit of the interested
persons, may properly:

***

( 6)
Acquire or dispose of an asset, including land in this or another
state, for cash or on credit, at public or private sale; and manage, develop,
improve, exchange, partition, change the character of, or abandon an estate asset;

***

(8)
Subdivide, develop or dedicate land to public use; make or obtain
the vacation of plats and adjust boundaries; or adjust differences in valuation on
exchange or partition by giving or receiving considerations; or dedicate easements
to public use without consideration;
Idaho Code§ 15-3-715 (underline added).

IV.
THERE IS NO BASIS FOR GRANTING CATHIE
PETERSON A CREDIT FOR THE EXPENSES OF
MAINTAINING THE REAL PROPERTY.
At the hearing of this matter, Cathie Peterson testified of the expenses she incurred while
maintaining the real property. These expenses were mostly in the nature of ordinary maintenance
and upkeep and included replacing the front door and garage door, repairing the furnace and
replacing the windows. Presumably, she believes she may be entitled to an equitable offset for
the expenses she has incurred. At the same time, she agreed that she has never paid rent for her
occupying the real property. She testified that Melvin Peterson went into the nursing home
shortly after the gift deed was executed in 2001. Therefore, she occupied the home alone until
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his death in 2007. Cathie Peterson has not demonstrated that she would be entitled to any sort of
equitable offset in this case.

It is hornbook law that the holder of a life estate is entitled to the rents and profits of the
real property during his life:
The rents received from real estate during the existence of a life estate
belong to a legal life tenant or constitute income to which an equitable life
beneficiary of a trust is entitled. The rents from real property are the very interest
which a life tenant acquires in the property. and in them a remainderman has no
interest during the existence or duration of the life tenancy.
AmJur Life§ 147 (Thomson Reuters, 2011) (underline added). In this case, Melvin Peterson
was the life tenant and entitled to receive rent from Cathie Peterson while she occupied the real
property during his life. After his death, the estate succeeded to his life estate interest and was
entitled to receive rent from Cathie Peterson for its proportion of interest in the real property. No
such rent was ever paid, nor has Cathie Peterson showed that the amounts she paid to maintain
the property were in excess of what that rent should have been.
Moreover, Cathie Peterson would not be entitled to repayment of her expenses. The
measure of her reimbursement right in equity (if it existed at all under the circumstances) would
be the increase in value of the real property that resulted from her "improvements." See e.g.
Nielson v. Davis, 96 Idaho 314, 528 P.2d 196 (1974) (measure of damages under the equitable
doctrine of quasi-contract was not the value of the money and materials supplied, but the
increased value of the property due to the contribution). Cathie Peterson could not testify that
her maintenance expenditures had increased the value of the real property.
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v.
CONCLUSION
The court should enter the findings of facts and conclusions of law requested by the
Department. The estate should be found to be owner of an undivided 38.642% interest in the real
property, without any offset for maintenance by Cathie Peterson.
DATED this 1st day of November, 2011,

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed,
postage pre-paid, to the following:
Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm, Chtd.
Attorneys at Law
113 South Second A venue
Sandpoint, ID 83864

John A. Finney
Finney Finney & Finney, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
Old Power House Building
120 East Lake Street, Suite 317
Sandpoint ID 83864
DATED this

J_ day of November, 2011.
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04.
Income. Monthly income must not exceed two hundred percent (200%) of the one (1) person
official poverty line defined by the OMB.
(7-1-99)
05.

Resources . The resource limit is four thousand dollars ($4,000).

(7-1-99)

(BREAK IN CONTINUITY OF SECTIONS)
831.
ASSET TRANSFER FOR LESS THAN FAIR MARKET VALUE.
Starting August 11, 1993, the participant is subject to a penalty if he transfers his income or resources for less than
fair market value. The asset transfer penalty applies to Medicaid services received October 1, 1993 and later.
Excluded resources, other than the home and associated property, are not subject to the asset transfer penalty. The
asset transfer penalty applies to a Medicaid participant in long-term care or HCBS. A participant in long-term care is
a patient in a nursing facility or a patient in a medical institution, requiring and receiving the level of care provided in
a nursing facility.
(4-5-00)

!U..
Rebuttab!e Presumption. Unless a transfer meets the requirements of Section 840. there is a
rebuttable presumption that the transfer was made for the purpose of qualizying for Medicaid. The asset transfer
penalty applies unless the participant shows that the asset transfer would not have affected his eligibility for
Medicaid.
( 11-1-00)T
.!l.2..
Contract for Services Provided by a Re!atjye. A contract for personal services to be furnished to
the participant by a relative is presumed to be made for the purpose of QJJalifying for Medicaid. The asset transfer
{11-1-00)T
penalty applies unless the participant shows that:
.ili
A written contract for personal services was signed before services were delivered. The contract
must require that payment be made after services are rendered. The contract must be dated and the signatures
notarized. Either party must be able to terminate the contract: and
(11-1-00)T

Q,
The contract must be signed by the participant or a legally authorized representative through a
power of attorney. legal guardianship or conservatorship. A representative who signs the contract must not be the
provider of the personal care services under the contract: and
(11-1-00)T
~

Compensation for services rendered must be comparable to rates paid in the open market.
(11-J-OO)T

O+l.
Transfer Of Income Or Resources. Transfer of income or resources includes reducing or
eliminating the participant's ownership or control of the asset.
(4-5-00)
O~.
Transfer Of Income Or Resources By A Spouse. A transfer by the participant's spouse of either
spouse's income or resources, before eligibility is established, subjects the participant to the asset transfer penalty.
After the participant's eligibility is established, a transfer by the spouse of the spouse's own income or resources does
not subject the participant to the asset transfer penalty.
(4-5-00)

(BREAK IN CONTINUITY OF SECTIONS)
837.
LIFE ESTATES AND ANNUITIES AS ASSET TRANSFERS.
Conditions for determining if a life estate m· tm amiuity a1-e lli an asset transfer for less than fair market value are
listed in Subsectioll9 837.01 thlBtiigh 837.05. The purchase of an annuity is an asset transfer that is presumed to be
made for the purpose of qualizying for Medicaid. The asset transfer penalty applies unless the participant shows the
purchase of the annuity would not have affected his eligibility for Medicaid or. the payment from the annuity is not
greater than necessary to meet the reasonable and ordinary monthly needs of the beneficiary. He must also show that
(7 1 9$9(11-1-00)T
the annuity meets the conditions in Subsections 837.03 and 837.04.
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01.
Life Estate . A life estate worth less than the value of the transferred real property is subject to the
asset transfer penalty. To compute the value of the life estate, multiply the fair market value of the real property at the
time of transfer by the remainder factor for the participant' s age at the time of transfei: The 1emaimiet· fiolet<31 J<o1· the
pttt·tieiptmt's age is listed in Table 837. {)}. the followin& table :
Y,f;?,

~~"~
;

Age
0

TABLE 837.01 • LIFE ESTATE REMAINDER TABLE

.Life Ea tat•
~me!Qder

.02812

~

Age

Ufe Estate
Remainder

1

.01012

2

.00983

.

Afle

.U.Eatad•
Remalnder

'

~i~;-:;::;~

.
I~

.. ~ ~~~

Age

Llfi.Eatate
Remelnder

3

.00922

4

.01019

5

.01062

6

.01116

7

.01178

8

.01252

9

.01337

10

.01435

11

.01547

12

.01671

13

.01802

14

.01934

15

.02063

16

.02185

17

.02300

18

.024!0

19

.02520

20

.02635

21

.02755

22

.02880

23

.03014

24

.03159

25

.03322

26

.03505

27

.03710

28

.03938

29

.04187

30

.04457

31

.04746

32

.05.058

33

.05.392

34

.05.750

35

.06132

36

.06540

37

.06974

38

.07433

39

.07917

40

.08429

41

.08970

42

.09543

43

.10145

44

.10779

45

.11442

46

.12137

47

.12863

48

.13626

49

.14422

50

.15257

51

.16126

52

.17031

53

.17972

54

.18946

55

.19954

56

.20994

57

.22069

58

.23178

59

.24325

.27998

60

.25509

61

.26733

62

63

.29304

64

.30648

65

.32030

66

.33449

67

.34902

68

.36390

69

.37914

70

.39478

71

.41086

72

.42739

73

.44429

74

.46138

75

.47851

76

.49559

77

.51258

78

.52951

79

.54643

80

.56341

81

.58033

82

.59705

83

.61358

84

.63002

85

.64641

86

.66236

87

.67738

88

.69141

89

.70474

90

.71779

91

.73045

92

.74229

93

.75308

94

.76272

95

.77113

96

.77819

97

.78450

98

.79000

99

.79514

100

.80025

101

.80468

102

.80946

103

.81563

104

.82144

105

.83038

106

.84512

107

.86591

108

.89932

109

.95455
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(7 I 9>'.)(11-1-00)T

02.
Irrevocable Annuity. An irrevocable annuity is an asset transfer if it does not provide fair market
value. To provide fair market value, an irrevocable annuity must meet life expectancy and annual interest tests listed
in Subsections 837.03 and 837.04. The value for calculating the asset transfer penalty is the difference between the
actual rate produced by the annuity and five percent (5%) per year. The sixty (60) month look-back applies. (7-1-99)
03.
Irrevocable Annuity Life Expectancy Test. The participant's life expectancy, shown in the
following table. must equal or exceed the term of the annuity. Using Table 837.03 compare the face value of the
annuity to the participant's life expectancy at the purchase time. The annuity meets the life expectancy test if the
participant's life expectancy equals or exceeds the term of the annuity. If the exact age is not in the Table. use the next
loweraiw
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04.
Irrevocable Annuity Annual Interest Test. The annuity must produce annual interest of at least
five percent (5%). A variable rate annuity meets the interest rate test ifthe average yearly rate for the most recent five
(5) year period is five percent (5%) or more. The participant can rebut the five percent (5%) interest test. He must
show single premium annuities are not offered by insurers now, or when the annuity was purchased. Insurers must be
rated excellent or superior by an insurance rating firm such as A.M. Best Co.
(4-5-00)
05.
Revocable Annuity. The surrender amount of a revocable annuity is a resource. Early surrender of
a revocable annuity is not an asset transfer for less than fair market value.
(7-1-99)
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833.
ASSET TRANSFER LOOK-BACK.
The asset transfer penalty applies to transfers in a thirty-six (36) month look-back period. The look-back period is
sixty (60) months for transfers to or from a trust.
(7- 1-99)
01.
Look-Back For A Person Entitled To Medicaid . The look-back period begins the month longterm care or HCBS starts for a person entitled to Medicaid. A person "entitled to Medicaid" is receiving or applying
for Medicaid when long-term care or HCBS starts. The person would be eligible for the month of application or any
of the three (3) calendar months before it, if not for the asset transfer penalty.
(7-1-99)
Look-Back For A Person Not Entitled To Medicaid . The look-back period begins the month
02.
before the application month for a person not entitled to Medicaid when long-term care starts.
(7-1-99)
PERIOD OF RESTRICTED COVERAGE FOR ASSET TRANSFERS.
834.
The period of restricted coverage is the number of months computed by dividing the unpaid asset value by the
statewide average cost ofnursing facility services to a private patient of nursing facility services or HCBS. The cost is
computed for the time of the participant's most recent request for Medicaid. If the spouse becomes eligible for longterm care Medicaid, the rest of the period of restricted coverage is divided between the participant and spouse.
(7-1-99)
835.
CALCULATING THE PENALTY PERIOD.
If the amount transferred is less than the cost of one (1) month's care, there is no penalty. The penalty period begins
running the month the transfer took place. The month the transfer took place is counted as one (1) of the penalty
months . Restricted coverage continues until the participant or spouse gets all the assets back, gets adequate
consideration for all of the assets, or the period of restricted coverage ends. The penalty continues whether or not the
participant is in long-term care.
(7-1-99)
01.
Single Penalty Period . A period of restricted coverage ends the last day of the last full month of
the penalty period. A partial month at the end of a single penalty period is dropped.
(7-1-99)
02.
Consecutive Penalty Periods. Each partial month before the end of consecutive penalty periods is
(7-1-99)
a penalty month. A partial month at the end of consecutive penalty periods is dropped.
836.
MULTIPLE PENALTY PERIODS APPLIED CONSECUTIVELY.
A penalty period is computed for each transfer. One penalty period must expire before the next begins.

(7-1-99)

837.
LIFE ESTATES AND ANNUITIES AS ASSET TRANSFERS.
Conditions for determining if a life estate is an asset transfer for less than fair market value are listed in Subsection
837.01 . The purchase of an annuity is an asset transfer that is presumed to be made for the purpose of qualifying for
Medicaid. The asset transfer penalty applies unless the participant shows the purchase of the annuity would not have
affected his eligibility for Medicaid or, the payment from the annuity is not greater than necessary to meet the
reasonable and ordinary monthly needs of the beneficiary. He must also show that the annuity meets the conditions in
Subsections 837.03 and 837.04.
(11-1-00)T
Life Estate. A life estate worth less than the value of the transferred real property is subject to the
01.
asset transfer penalty. To compute the value of the life estate, multiply the fair market value of the real property at the
time of transfer by the remainder factor for the participant's age at the time of transfer listed in the following table:

TABLE 837.01 - LIFE ESTATE REMAINDER TABL.fi
Age

0

.02812

4

.01019

8

.01252

Ufe&tilM
Remainder

Ufe &i.te
Rern1l.ndtr
.01012

2

.00983

3

.00922

5

.01062

6

.01116

7

.01178

9

.01337

10

.01435

11

.01547
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12

.01671

13

.01802

14

.01934

15

.02063

16

.02185

17

.02300

18

.02410

19

.02520

20

.02635

21

.02755

22

.02880

23

.03014

24

.03159

25

.03322

26

.03505

27

.03710

28

.03938

29

.04187

30

.04457

31

.04746

32

.05.058

33

.05.392

34

.05.750

35

.06132

36

.06540

37

.06974

38

.07433

39

.07917

40

.08429

41

.08970

42

.09543

43

.10145

44

.! 0779

45

.11442

46

.12137

47

.12863

48

.13626

49

.14422

50

.15257

51

.16126

52

.17031

53

.17972

54

.18946

55

.19954

56

.20994

57

.22069

58

.23178

59

.24325

.27998

63

.29304

60

.25509

61

.26733

62

64

.30648

65

.32030

66

.33449

67

.34902

68

.36390

69

.37914

70

.39478

71

.41086

72

.42739

73

.44429

74

.46138

75

.47851

76

.49559

77

.51258

78

.52951

79

.54643

80

.56341

81

.58033

82

.59705

83

.61358

84

.63002

85

.64641

86

.66236

87

.67738

88

.69141

89

.70474

90

.71779

91

.73045

92

.74229

93

.75308

94

.76272

95

.77113

96

.77819

97

.78450

98

.79000

99

.79514

100

.80025

101

.80468

102

.80946

103

.81563

104

.82144

105

.83038

106

.84512

107

.86591

108

.89932

109

.95455

l 1 l-l-00)

02.
Irrevocable Annuity. An irrevocable annuity is an asset transfer if it does not provide fair market
value. To provide fair market value, an irrevocable annuity must meet life expectancy and annual interest tests listed
in Subsections 837.03 and 837.04. The value for calculating the asset transfer penalty is the difference between the
actual rate produced by the annuity and five percent (5%) per year. The sixty (60) month look-back applies. (7-1-99)
03.
Irrevocable Annuity Life Expectancy Test. The participant's life expectancy, shown in the
following table, must equal or exceed the term of the annuity. Using Table 837.03 compare the face value of the
annuity to the participant's life expectancy at the purchase time. The annuity meets the life expectancy test if the
participant's life expectancy equals or exceeds the term of the annuity. If the exact age is not in the Table, use the next
lower age.
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orure

hie

Yeano(Ufe
.Remalniag
Fema

0

73 .26

79.26

74

10.12

12.74

10

64.03

69.93

75

9.58

12.09

20

54.41

60.13

76

9.06

11.46

~

ae

eanof

Rrmalnb1g

:~
I•

""

Reuu.laJnt

e

Female

t

~

eanofUfe

R mat11Jn1

30

45.14

50.43

77

8.56

10.85

40

35.94

40.86

78

8.07

10.25

50

27.13

31.61

79

7.61

9.67

60

19.07

22.99

80

7.16

9.11

61

18.33

22.18

81

6.72

8.57

62

17.60

21.38

82

6.31

8.04

63

16.89

20 .60

83

5.92

7.54

64

16.19

19.82

84

5.55

7.05

65

15.52

19.06

85

5.20

6.59

66

14.86

18.31

86

4.86

6.15

67

14.23

17.58

87

4.55

5.74

68

13 .61

16.85

88

4.26

5.34

69

13.00

16.14

89

3.98

4.97

70

12.41

15.44

90

3.73

4.63

71

11.82

14.75

95

2.71

3.26

72

11.24

14.06

100

2.05

2.39

73

10.67

13.40

llO

1.14

1.22

(11-1-00)T
Irrevocable Annuity Annual Interest Test. The annuity must produce annual interest of at least
04.
five percent (5%). A variable rate annuity meets the interest rate test ifthe average yearly rate for the most recent five
(5) year period is five percent (5%) or more. The participant can rebut the five percent (5%) interest test. He must
show single premium annuities are not offered by insurers now, or when the annuity was purchased. Insurers must be
(4-5-00)
rated excellent or superior by an insurance rating firm such as A.M. Best Co.
05.
Revocable Annuity. The surrender amount of a revocable annuity is a resource. Early surrender of
a revocable annuity is not an asset transfer for less than fair market value.
(7-1-99)
838.
TRUSTS AS ASSET TRANSFERS.
A trust established wholly or partly from the participant's assets is an asset transfer. Assets transferred to a trust on or
after August 11 , 1993 are subject to the asset transfer penalty, regardless of when the trust was established. If the trust
includes assets of another person, the asset transfer penalty applies to the participant's share of the trust.
(7-1-99)
839.
TRANSFER OF JOINTLY-OWNED ASSET.
Transfer of an asset owned jointly by the participant and another person is considered a transfer by the participant.
The participant's share of the asset is used to compute the penalty. If the participant and his spouse are joint owners of
the transferred asset, the couple's combined ownership is used to compute the penalty. If the spouse becomes eligible
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832.
MEDICAID PENALTY FOR ASSET TRANSFERS.
The asset transfer penalty is restricted Medicaid coverage.

(7-1-99)

01.
Restricted Coverage. Restricted coverage means Medicaid will not participate in the cost of
nursing facility services. Medicaid will not participate in a level of care in a medical institution equal to nursing
facility services. The penalty for a person receiving PCS or community services under the HCBS waiver is
ineligibility.
(7-1-99)
02.
Notice And Exemption. The participant must be notified, in writing, at least ten (10) days before
an asset transfer penalty is imposed.
(7-1-99)
833.
ASSET TRANSFER LOOK-BACK.
The asset transfer penalty applies to transfers in a thirty-six (36) month look-back period. The look-back period is
sixty (60) months for transfers to or from a trust.
(7-1-99)
01.
Look-Back For A Person Entitled To Medicaid. The look-back period begins the month longterm care or HCBS starts for a person entitled to Medicaid. A person "entitled to Medicaid" is receiving or applying
for Medicaid when long-term care or HCBS starts. The person would be eligible for the month of application or any
of the three (3) calendar months before it, ifnot for the asset transfer penalty.
(7-1-99)
02.
Look-Back For A Person Not Entitled To Medicaid. The look-back period begins the month
(7-1-99)
before the application month for a person not entitled to Medicaid when long-term care starts.
834.
PERIOD OF RESTRICTED COVERAGE FOR ASSET TRANSFERS.
The period of restricted coverage is the number of months computed by dividing the unpaid asset value by the
statewide average cost of nursing facility services to a private patient of nursing facility services or HCBS. The cost is
computed for the time of the participant's most recent request for Medicaid. If the spouse becomes eligible for longterm care Medicaid, the rest of the period of restricted coverage is divided between the participant and spouse.
(7-1-99)
835.

CALCULATING THE PENALTY PERIOD.

If the amount transferred is less than the cost of one (1) month's care, there is no penalty. The penalty period begins
running the month the transfer took place. The month the transfer took place is counted as one (I) of the penalty

months. Restricted coverage continues until the participant or spouse gets all the assets back, gets adequate
consideration for all of the assets, or the period of restricted coverage ends. The penalty continues whether or not the
participant is in long-term care.
(7-1-99)
01.
Single Penalty Period. A period of restricted coverage ends the last day of the last full month of
the penalty period. A partial month at the end of a single penalty period is dropped.
(7-1-99)
02.
Consecutive Penalty Periods. Each partial month before the end of consecutive penalty periods is
a penalty month. A partial month at the end of consecutive penalty periods is dropped.
(7-1-99)
836.
MULTIPLE PENALTY PERIODS APPLIED CONSECUTIVELY.
A penalty period is computed for each transfer. One penalty period must expire before the next begins.

(7-1-99)

837.
LIFE ESTATES AND ANNUITIES AS ASSET TRANSFERS.
Conditions for determining if a life estate is an asset transfer for less than fair market value are listed in Subsection
837.01. The purchase of an annuity is an asset transfer that is presumed to be made for the purpose of qualifying for
Medicaid. The asset transfer penalty applies unless the participant shows the purchase of the annuity would not have
affected his eligibility for Medicaid or, the payment from the annuity is not greater than necessary to meet the
reasonable and ordinary monthly needs of the beneficiary. He must also show that the annuity meets the conditions in
Subsections 837.03 and 837.04.
(3-15-02)
01.
Life Estate. A life estate worth less than the value of the transferred real property is subject to the
asset transfer penalty. To compute the value of the life estate, multiply the fair market value of the real property at the
time of transfer by the remainder factor for the participant's age at the time of transfer listed in the following table:
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I

-

I

Age

Life Estate
Remainder

0

.02812

1

.01012

4

.01019

5

8

.01252

12

.01671

-

-

TABLE 837.01 - LIFE ESTATE._REMAINDER TABLE

~-

I

I

Life Estate
Remainder

2

.00983

3

.00922

.01062

6

.01116

7

.01178

9

.01337

10

.01435

11

.01547

13

.01 802

14

.01934

15

.02063

Remainder

"

:;x:•.'

Life Estate
Remainder

Age

Age

Life Estate

lh~~~'!.!c'.'i~~

-~

I

~

Age

l

16

.02185

17

.02300

18

.02410

19

.02520

20

.02635

21

.02755

22

.02880

23

.03014

24

.03159

25

.03322

26

.03505

27

.03710

28

.03938

29

.04187

30

.04457

31

.04746

32

.05.058

33

.05.392

34

.05.750

35

.06132

36

.06540

37

.06974

38

.07433

39

.07917

40

.08429

41

.08970

42

.09543

43

.10145

44

.10779

45

.11442

46

.12137

47

.12863

48

.13626

49

.14422

50

.15257

51

.16126

52

.17031

53

.17972

54

.18946

55

.19954

56

.20994

57

.22069

58

.23178

59

.24325

60

.25509

61

.26733

62

.27998

63

.29304

64

.30648

65

.32030

66

.33449

67

.34902

68

.36390

69

.37914

70

.39478

71

.41086

72

.42739

73

.44429

74

.46138

75

.47851

76

.49559

77

.51258

78

.52951

79

.54643

80

.56341

81

.58033

82

.59705

83

.61358

84

.63002

85

.64641

86

.66236

87

.67738

88

.69141

89

.70474

90

.7 1779

91

.73045

92

.74229

93

.75308

94

.76272

95

.77113

96

.77819

97

.78450

98

.79000

99

.79514

100

.80025

101

.80468

102

.80946

103

.81563

104

.82144

105

.83038

106

.84512

107

.86591

108

.89932

109

.95455

(3-15-02)
02.
Irrevocable Annuity. An irrevocable annuity is an asset transfer if it does not provide fair market
value. To provide fair market value, an irrevocable annuity must meet life expectancy and annual interest tests listed
in Subsections 837.03 and 837.04. The value for calculating the asset transfer penalty is the difference between the
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actual rate produced by the annuity and five percent (5%) per year. The sixty (60) month look-back applies. (7-1-99)
03.
Irrevocable Annuity Life Expectancy Test. The participant's life expectancy, shown in the
following table, must equal or exceed the term of the annuity. Using Table 837.03 compare the face value of the
annuity to the participant's life expectancy at the purchase time. The annuity meets the life expectancy test if the
participant's life expectancy equals or exceeds the term of the annuity. If the exact age is not in the Table, use the next
lower age.

I1 -·

r

~~
I

Age
0

·''"".

TABLE 837.03 tfl'~ EXPECTANCY l'ABLE

Years of Life
Remaining
Male

Years of life
Remaining
Female

73.26

79.26

-···;,~~~~

'°
I

Age

b

74

, Years at Ute
Remaining
Male
10.12

...

--

~

Years of Life
Remaining

Female
12.74

10

64.03

69.93

75

9.58

12.09

20

54.41

60.13

76

9.06

11.46

30

45.14

50.43

77

8.56

10.85

40

35.94

40.86

78

8.07

10.25

50

27.13

31.61

79

7.61

9.67

60

19.07

22.99

80

7.16

9.11

61

18.33

22.18

81

6.72

8.57

62

17.60

21.38

82

6.31

8.04

63

16.89

20.60

83

5.92

7.54

64

16.19

19.82

84

5.55

7.05

65

15.52

19.06

85

5.20

6.59

66

14.86

18.31

86

4.86

6.15

67

14.23

17.58

87

4.55

5.74

68

13.61

16.85

88

4.26

5.34

69

13.00

16.14

89

3.98

4.97

70

12.41

15.44

90

3.73

4.63

71

11.82

14.75

95

2.71

3.26

72

11.24

14.06

100

2.05

2.39

73

10.67

13.40

110

1.14

1.22

(3-15-02)
04.
Irrevocable Annuity Annual Interest Test. The annuity must produce annual interest of at least
five percent (5%). A variable rate annuity meets the interest rate test ifthe average yearly rate for the most recent five
(5) year period is five percent (5%) or more. The participant can rebut the five percent (5%) interest test. He must
show single premium annuities are not offered by insurers now, or when the annuity was purchased. Insurers must be
rated excellent or superior by an insurance rating firm such as A.M. Best Co.
(4-5-00)
05.

Revocable Annuity. The surrender amount of a revocable annuity is a resource. Early surrender of
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a revocable annuity is not an asset transfer for less than fair market value.

(7-1-99)

838.
TRUSTS AS ASSET TRANSFERS.
A trust established wholly or partly from the participant's assets is an asset transfer. Assets transferred to a trust on or
after August 11, 1993 are subject to the asset transfer penalty, regardless of when the trust was established. If the trust
(7-1-99)
includes assets of another person, the asset transfer penalty applies to the participant's share of the trust.
839.
TRANSFER OF JOINTLY-OWNED ASSET.
Transfer of an asset owned jointly by the participant and another person is considered a transfer by the participant.
The participant's share of the asset is used to compute the penalty. If the participant and his spouse are joint owners of
the transferred asset, the couple's combined ownership is used to compute the penalty. If the spouse becomes eligible
for long-term care Medicaid, the rest of the period of restricted coverage is divided between the participant and
spouse.
(7-1-99)
840.
PENALTY EXCEPTIONS FOR ASSET TRANSFERS.
A participant or spouse who meets a condition in Subsections 840.01 through 840.15 is not subject to the asset
transfer penalty.
(7-1-99)
01.

spouse.

Home To Spouse. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to the
(7-1-99)

02.
Home To Minor Child Or Disabled Adult Child. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the
home was transferred to the child of the participant or spouse. The child must be under age twenty-one (21) or blind
or totally disabled under Social Security and SSI rules in 20 CFR Part 416.
(7-1-99)
03.
Home To Brother Or Sister. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred
to a brother or sister of the participant or spouse. The brother or sister must have an equity interest in the transferred
home. The brother or sister must reside in that home for at least one (1) year immediately before the month the
participant starts long-term care.
(7-1-99)
04.
Home To Adult Child. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to a son
or daughter of the participant or spouse, other than a child under the age of twenty-one (21). The son or daughter must
reside in that home for at least two (2) years immediately before the month the participant started long-term care. The
son or daughter must have provided care to the participant which permitted him to live at home rather than enter longterm care.
(7-1-99)
05.
Benefit Of Spouse. The assets were transferred to the participant's spouse or to another person for
(7-1-99)
the sole benefit of the spouse.
06.
Transfer From Spouse. The assets were transferred from the participant's spouse to another
person for the sole benefit of the participant's spouse.
(7-1-99)
07.
Transfer To Child. The assets were transferred to the participant's child, or to a trust established
solely for the benefit of the participant's child. The child must be blind or totally disabled under Social Security and
SSI rules in 20 CFR Part 416. The child may be any age.
(7-1-99)
08.
Transfer To Trust For Person Under Age Sixty-Five. The assets were transferred to a trust for the
sole benefit of a person under age sixty-five (65). "Sole benefit" means any remainder in the trust after the person's
death must go to his estate, not to another person. The person must be blind or totally disabled under Social Security
and SSI rules in 20 CFR Part 416.
(7-1-99)
09.
Intent To Get Fair Market Value. The participant or spouse proves he intended to dispose of the
assets at fair market value or for other adequate consideration.
(7-1-99)

10.
participant.

Assets Returned. All assets transferred for less than fair market value have been returned to the
(7-1-99)
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asset transfer penalty applies to a Medicaid participant in long-term care or HCBS . A participant in long-term care is
a patient in a nursing facility or a patient in a medical institution, requiring and receiving the level of care provided in
a nursing facility.
(4 5 00)(7- l-02lT
01.

Rebuttable Presumption. Unless a transfer meets the requirements of Section 840 of these rules,

H?c1c is a 1'Ch1>1lahlcp1'C8mwptie11 it is presumed that the transfer was made for the purpose of qualifying for Medicaid.

The asset transfer penalty lli applies.Q unless the participant shows that the asset transfer would not have affected his
eligibility for Medicaid or the transfer was made for another pumose than quali:tying for Medicaid .
(3 15 0:2)(7- l-02)T

02.
Contract for Services Provided by a Relative. A contract for personal services to be furnished to
the participant by a relative is presumed to be made for the purpose of qualifying for Medicaid. The asset transfer
(3-15-02)
penalty applies unless the participant shows that:
a.
A written contract for personal services was signed before services were delivered. The contract
must require that payment be made after services are rendered. The contract must be dated and the signatures
notarized. Either party must be able to terminate the contract; and
(3-15-02)

b.
The contract must be signed by the participant or a legally authorized representative through a
power of attorney, legal guardianship or conservatorship . A representative who signs the contract must not be the
provider of the personal care services under the contract; and
(3-15-02)
c.

Compensation for services rendered must be comparable to rates paid in the open market.
(3-15-02)

Transfer Of Income Or Resources. Transfer of income or resources includes reducing or
03.
(4-5-00)
eliminating the participant's ownership or control of the asset
04.
Transfer Of Income Or Resources By A Spouse. A transfer by the participant's spouse of either
spouse's income or resources, before eligibility is established, subjects the participant to the asset transfer penalty.
After the participant's eligibility is established, a transfer by the spouse of the spouse's own income or resources does
(4-5-00)
not subject the participant to the asset transfer penalty.

(BREAK IN CONTINUITY OF SECTIONS)
837.
LIFE ESTATES AND ANNUITIES AS ASSET TRANSFERS.
Conditions for determining if a life estate is an asset transfer for less than fair market value are listed in Subsection
837.01 of this rule. The purchase of an annuity is an asset transfer that is presumed to be made for the purpose of
qualifying for Medicaid. The asset transfer penalty applies unless the participant shows the purchase of the annuity
would not have affected his eligibility for Medicaid or, the payment from the annuity is not greater than necessary to
meet the reasonable and ordinary monthly needs of the beneficiary. For the purposes of Section 837. the reasonable
and ordinary monthly needs are those defined by the maximum community spouse allowance at Section 725 of these
rules. He The participant must also show that the annuity meets the conditions in Subsections 837.03 and 837.04 of
~.
(3 15 0:2)(7-l-02)T
01.
Life Estate. A life estate worth less than the value of the transferred real property is subject to the
asset transfer penalty. To compute the value of the life estate, multiply the fair market value of the real property at the
time of transfer by the remainder factor for the participant's age at the time of transfer listed in the following table :

Uf• Estate
Remeilnder
0

Age

.02812
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Life Estate
Remainder
2

.01012
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Ute Estate
Remainder

Age

Life Est.ate.
Remainder

.01062

6

9

.01337

.01671

13

.01802

Age

4

.01019

5

8

.01252

12

-·

.1~

TABLE 837.01 - LIFE ESTATE REMAINDER TABLE

Life Estate
Remainder

Age
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..

Age

Ute Estate
Remainder

.01116

7

.Oll78

10

.01435

11

.01547

14

.01934

15

.02063

I

·-·

16

.02185

17

.02300

18

.02410

19

.02520

20

.02635

21

.02755

22

.02880

23

.03014

24

.03159

25

.03322

26

.03505

27

.03710

28

.03938

29

.04187

30

.04457

31

.04746

32

.05.058

33

.05.392

34

.05.750

35

.06132

36

.06540

37

.06974

38

.07433

39

.07917

40

.08429

41

.08970

42

.09543

43

.10145

44

.10779

45

.11442

46

.12137

47

.12863

48

.13626

49

.14422

50

.15257

51

.16126

52

.I 7031

53

.I 7972

54

.18946

55

.19954

56

.20994

57

.22069

58

.23178

59

.24325

60

.25509

61

.26733

62

.27998

63

.29304

64

.30648

65

.32030

66

.33449

67

.34902

68

.36390

69

.37914

70

.39478

71

.41086

72

.42739

73

.44429

74

.46138

75

.47851

76

.49559

77

.51258

78

.52951

79

.54643

80

.56341

81

.58033

82

.59705

83

.61358

84

.63002

85

.64641

86

.66236

87

.67738

89

.70474

90

.71779

91

.73045
.77II3

88

.69141

92

.74229

93

.75308

94

.76272

95

96

.77819

97

.78450

98

.79000

99

.79514

100

.80025

101

.80468

102

.80946

103

.81563

104

.82144

105

.83038

106

.84512

107

.86591

108

.89932

109

.95455

(3-15-02)
Irrevocable Annuity. An irrevocable annuity is an asset transfer if it does not provide fair market
02.
value to the participant. To provide fair market value, an irrevocable annuity must meet life expectancy and annual
interest tests listed in Subsections 837.03 and 837 .04 of this rule. The value for calculating the asset transfer penalty
is the difference between the actual rate produced by the annuity and five percent (5%) per year. The sixty (60) month
(7 1 99)C7- l-02)T
look-back applies.
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03.
Irrevocable Annuity Life Expectancy Test. The participant's life expectancy, shown in the
following table, must equal or exceed the term of the annuity. Using Table 837.03 compare the face value of the
annuity to the participant's life expectancy at the purchase time. The annuity meets the life expectancy test if the
participant's life expectancy equals or exceeds the term of the annuity. If the exact age is not in the Table, use the next
lower age.

I ....·'" "'J~!

!~-

:

-~

TABLE·837.03 - LIFE EXPECTANCY TABU:

•,;,,

-

.;• ,--i:!J"lr j~:

:·

Years of Life

Years of l:Jfe

Remaining
Male

Remalhlng
Female

Yeara of Life
Remaining
Male

Yeara ofUfe

73.26

79 .26

74

10.12

12.74

10

64 .03

69.93

75

9.58

12.09

20

54.41

60.13

76

9.06

11.46

30

45.14

50.43

77

8.56

10.85

40

35.94

40.86

78

8.07

10.25

50

27.13

31.61

79

7.61

9.67

60

19.07

22.99

80

7.16

9.11

61

18.33

22.18

81

6.72

8.57

Age
0

'•

RemalnJng
Female

I

Age

.

~·

···-·

62

17.60

21.38

82

6.31

8.04

63

16.89

20.60

83

5.92

7.54

64

16.19

19.82

84

5.55

7.05

65

15.52

19.06

85

5.20

6.59

66

14.86

18.31

86

4.86

6.15

67

14.23

17.58

87

4.55

5.74

68

13.61

16.85

88

4.26

5.34

69

13.00

16.14

89

3.98

4.97

70

12.41

15.44

90

3.73

4.63

71

11 .82

14.75

95

2.71

3.26

72

11.24

14.06

100

2.05

2.39

73

10.67

13.40

110

1.14

1.22

-

(3-15-02)
04.
Irrevocable Annuity Annual Interest Test. The annuity must produce annual interest of at least
five percent (5%) . A variable rate annuity meets the interest rate test if the average yearly rate for the most recent five
(5) year period is five percent (5%) or more. The participant can rebut the five percent (5%) interest test. He must
show 1bfil single premium annuities tue were not offered by insurers tfflW;-ffl' when the annuity was purchased and it
would not be practical to exchange the annuity for one with a higher interest rate. Insurers must be rated excellent or
(4 5 Oli)C7- I-02)T
superior by an insurance rating firm such as A.M. Best Co.

05.
Revocable Annuity. The surrender amount of a revocable annuity is a resource. Early surrender of
a revocable annuity is not an asset transfer for less than fair market value.
(7-1-99)
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02.
L88li Bae!< fat tt .'1e:rs81r JV·Bt Entitled 18 Metiieaiti. The leek hack pcried begins the menth hcferc
the dpplictttie11 me1ith Jif>r tt pcrse11 11et entitled te },/ediettid when l-e1ig tel'fll care sta1·ts. Transfers On or After
February 8. 2006. Any asset transferred on or after February 8. 2006. regardless of type. is subject to a look-back
period of sixty (60) months. The look-back period is counted from the date of the application for long-term care or
HCBS services or the date of the transfer. whichever is later in time.
(7 l 99)(2-8-06)T
834.

PERIOD OF RESTRICTED COVERAGE FOR ASSET TRANSFERS.

The period of restricted coverage is the number of months computed by dividing the t>rtpttid ttSSet uncompensated
value of the transferred asset by the statewide average cost of nursing facility services to a private patient§. &jnNrsing
fc;cility sen;ices er HCB8. The cost is computed for the time of the participant's most recent request for Medicaid. If
the spouse becomes eligible for long-term care Medicaid, the rest of the period of restricted coverage is divided
(7 l 90(2-8-06)T
between the participant and spouse.

835.

CALCb'l::zATL''l€APPLYING THE PENALTY PERIOD OF RESTRICTED COVERAGE.

lfthe ttme'tt1it trtmsjel'f'Cd is less tha11 the cest efmie (1) me11th s cttt'C, there is ne penalty. The penttllyperied hegi1is
r'ttm1ing the menni nie trtmsfer teek plttce. The menni nic transfer teek plttcc is ceimted as enc (}) ef the pe11ttlty
l'lfffflths..: Restricted coverage continues until the participant or spouse gets recovers all the assets, hack, gets ttdeq'ttttte
emiside1·dtien receives fair market value for all of the assets, or the period of restricted coverage ends. The penalty
continues whether or not the participant is in long-term care. The penalty period for asset transfers is applied as
follows:
(7 1 99)(2-8-06)T

01.
8ingk Penalty Period for Transfer Prior to February 8. 2006. A peried &j 1'Cstrictcd ceve1wge
ends nie last day offfle lastf'ttll menffl ofthepcnttllypcried. For assets transferred prior to February 8. 2006, there is
no penalty ifthe amount transferred is less than the cost of one (1) month's care. The penalty period begins running
the month the transfer took place. The month the transfer took place is counted as one (1) of the penalty months. A
penalty period is computed for each transfer. A penalty period must expire before the next begins. Each partial month
before the end of consecutive penalty periods is a penalty month. A partial month at the end of tt-Sfflglc consecutive
(7 l 90(2-8-06)T
penalty period§. is dropped.
02.
CBnsec1di~e Penalty Periods for Transfers On or After February 8. 2006. Each ptt1'fittl menni
hefere the end e.f censecutive penalty pcrieds is tt penalty menni. A partial l'litmth at nie end of censec'ttti"le pe11alty
paieda is drepped. For assets transferred on or after February 8. 2006. the penalty period begins running the first day
of the month after the month the transfer took place. or the date the individual would have been eligible for long-term
care services. if not for the transfer. whichever date is later in time. The value of all asset transfers made during the
look-back period is accumulated for the purpose of calculating the penalty. If an additional transfer is discovered after
the penalty has been served. a new penalty period begins the month following timely notice of closure of benefits.
When a penalty period ends after the first day of the month, eligibility for long-term care services begins the day after
(7 1 99)(2-8-06)T
the penalty period ends.
836.

MULTIPLE PEIV,iLTYPEIUf)l).8 APPUE» C<JNSECl:!TlVELY <RESERVED).

A penaf.typeried is cemp'tttedfor each tranefa Onepe1ia!typel'ied must expire before the next hcgilis.

(7 l 99)

837.

LIFE EST ATEA' Al·r» ANlV.f:llTlE8 AS ASSET TRANSFER8.
CenditiensJ!f>r detem1it1il1g ifWhen a life estate in real property is retained by an individual. and a remainder interest
in the property is a11 asset transferred during the look-back period for less than the fair market value arc listed in
8'tthsectien 83 7. ()] ef this rule. The purchase crj a1i tt1m'ttit)' is an asset trttnsfe1· #tat is pres1'tmed te he made fer the
p'ttrpese of q'ttttli:fy·i11g fer Medicaid. The asset H'tmsfer penalty C!.fJplies 'ttnless the participant she1tJS n~e p'tt1'Chase ef
the annNity weuld net ha}'e etjfeeted his eligibility Jif>r Medicaid er, n~e pdy11ie11tfrem the amivtity is net greater thtt11
necessary t-e meet the 1easemable a11derdi11ary menf.Wy needs &jthe beneficia1y. 1%1' niepNl'j'Jeses ef&etien 837, the
i'Casenable and erdi-ntt1'' menthly needs are these defined by the maxim'ttffl eermmmity speuse allewance at 8ectien
725 ef these rules. The participant m'ttSt alse shew that nie ammity meets ffle cenditie11s in &thscctiens 83 7. ()3 mid
83 7. ()4 ef this r'ttle of the remainder interest transferred. the value of the uncompensated remainder is subject to the
(5 3 ()3)(2-8-06)T
asset transfer penalty as described in Sections 831 through 835 of these rules.
(J.J.:
Life &tttte. A life estate werth less than the 'r'ttfflC offfie ttwnsferred rcalpF8perty is S'tthject te nie
asset ttwnsfer penalty. To compute the value of the life estate remainder, multiply the fair market value of the real
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property at the time of transfer by the remainder factor for the participant's age at the time of transfer listed in the
following table:
·::-;;.~

<Bl'~'

~

TNBLE 837.Q.#. ·LIFE ESTATE REMAINDER TABLE

.s, '_.... -

-

-~

-

.,;

'

Age

Life Estate
Remainder

Age

Life Estate
Remainder

Age

Ufa Estate
Remafnder

Age

UfeEatate
Remainder

0

.02812

1

.01012

2

.00983

3

.00922

4

.01019

5

.01062

6

.01116

7

.01178

8

.01252

9

.01337

10

.01435

11

.01547

12

.01671

13

.01802

14

.01934

15

.02063

16

.02185

17

.02300

18

.02410

19

.02520

20

.02635

21

.02755

22

.02880

23

.03014

24

.03159

25

.03322

26

.03505

27

.03710

28

.03938

29

.04187

30

.04457

31

.04746

32

.05.058

33

.05.392

34

.05.750

35

.06132

36

.06540

37

.06974

38

.07433

39

.07917

40

.08429

41

.08970

42

.09543

43

.10145

44

.10779

45

.11442

46

.12137

47

.12863

48

.13626

49

.14422

50

.15257

51

.16126

52

.17031

53

.17972

54

.18946

55

.19954

56

.20994

57

.22069

58

.23178

59

.24325

60

.25509

61

.26733

62

.27998

63

.29304

64

.30648

65

.32030

66

.33449

67

.34902

68

.36390

69

.37914

70

.39478

71

.41086

72

.42739

73

.44429

74

.46138

75

.47851

76

.49559

77

.51258

78

.52951

79

.54643

80

.56341

81

.58033

82

.59705

83

.61358

84

.63002

85

.64641

86

.66236

87

.67738

88

.69141

89

.70474

90

.71779

91

.73045

92

.74229

93

.75308

94

.76272

95

.77113

96

.77819

97

.78450

98

.79000

99

.79514

100

.80025

101

.80468

102

.80946

103

.81563

104

.82144

105

.83038

106

.84512

107

.86591

108

.89932

109

.95455

(3 15 02)(2-8-06)T
838.

(RE8ERVEJJ) ANNUITY AS ASSET TRANSFER
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When assets are used to purchase an annuity during the look-back period. it is an asset transfer presumed to be made
for the purpose of gual ify ing for Medicaid. To rebut this presumption, the participant must provide proof that clearly
establishes the annuity was not purchased to make the participant eligible for Medicaid or avoid recove1y {2-8-06)T
01.

Revocable Annuity. The surrender amount of a revocable annuity is a countable resource.
(2-8-06)T

02.
Irrevocable Annuity. An irrevocable annuity is an fiSfiet fl'f:msfer if it decs 11etpfflvidefai1' l'l!t11'ket
'Vt1h1e re the p@ tieipt111t. Ta p1 e; ide fi'Jil' 111(;11</tet 1>'t1ltJe, t111 in e' ecttble tt11n1tity l'l!ltSt meet life cxpecftt11cy t111d tt11111ttt.'
il!tCl'cst tests listed in &bseetie11s 83 7.(}3 tmd 83 7. {) 4 ef this ntle. The wihie fer eale 1tl£tting the t1sset H'd11sferpcnttl-ty
is the diffc1·enee heAvern the t1et1tt1l t'tlte predueed by the t111n1tity t11uljit·e pCl'eent (5 %) pe1 year. The sixty (6{)) men th
leek back 8ppUcs annuity that under no circumstance can be sold or traded for value, including the sale of the stream
of income from the annuity. The purchase of an irrevocable annuity is an asset transfer if it does not provide fair
market value to the participant. The sixty (60) month look-back period applies. The irrevocable annuity provides fair
(5 3 G13)(2-8-06)T
market value to the participant ifit passes all of the following tests.
IM-!.
Irrevocable Annuity Life Expectancy Test. The participant's life expectancy, shown in the
following table, must equal or exceed the term of the annuity. Using Table~ 838.02.a. compare the face value of
the annuity to the participant's life expectancy at the purchase time. The annuity meets the life expectancy test if the
participant's life expectancy equals or exceeds the term of the annuity. If the exact age is not in the Table, use the next
lower age.
·i-:..~'t'ij.

TABLE~ llH,Q211 1 - LIFE EXPECTANCY TABLE

-

c~,,.~

'

~.r.orure
YeartofUfe
Rttrnalnlng
Remaining
Mal•
__.._ Female
[L

Years of Life
Remaining
Male

Years of Life
Remaining
Female

0

73.26

79.26

74

10.12

12.74

10

64.03

69.93

75

9.58

12.09

20

54.41

60.13

76

9.06

11.46

30

45.14

50.43

77

8.56

10.85

Age

1 -

!I

Age

40

35.94

40.86

78

8.07

10.25

50

27.13

31.61

79

7.61

9.67

60

19.07

22.99

80

7.16

9.11

61

18.33

22.18

81

6.72

8.57

62

17.60

21.38

82

6.31

8.04

63

16.89

20.60

83

5.92

7.54

64

16.19

19.82

84

5.55

7.05

65

15.52

19.06

85

5.20

6.59

66

14.86

18.31

86

4.86

6.15

67

14.23

17.58

87

4.55

5.74

68

13.61

16.85

88

4.26

5.34

69

13.00

16.14

89

3.98

4.97

70

12.41

15.44

90

3.73

4.63

71

11 .82

14.75

95

2.71

3.26
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11.24

14.06

73

10.67

13.40

I

I
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100

2.05

2.39

110

1.14

1.22

f3 H lt.2j(2-8-06)T

B4b,.
lnew;e-abk Alfmtity Annual Interest and Insurer Ratim: Test. The annuity must produce annual
interest of at least five percent (5%). A variable rate annuity meets the interest rate test if the average yearly rate for
the most recent five (5) year period is five percent (5%) or more. Thcparticip<Hit can To rebut the five percent (5%)
interest test:-. He the participant must show that single premium annuities were not offered by insurers when the
annuity was purchased and it would not be practical to exchange the annuity for one with a higher interest rate. The
linsurera must be rated excellent or superior by an insurance rating firm sttch as A.U. Bcat CB.
(5 3 03}(2-8-06)T
£:.
Third Party Beneficiary Test. Effective February 8, 2006, the annuity must name the State ofldaho,
Medicaid Estate Recovery. as follows:
(2-8-06)T

L
The remainder beneficiary in the first position for at least the total amount of medical assistance
paid on behalf of the annuitant under this title; or
(2-8-06)T
ii,.
The remainder beneficiary in the second position after the community spouse or minor or disabled
child and is named in the first position if the community spouse or a representative of the minor or disabled child
disposes of any remainder for less than fair market value.
(2-8-06)T

!!.
Equal Payment Test. The annuity must provide for payments in ecaual amounts during the term of
the annuity with no deferral and no balloon payments made.
(2-8-06)T
IJ5-::
ReWJettbk AntrHity. The attrrcmier emiettnt ofa rcveeablc annttity is fl 1'C!iett1'Cc. Em4y 9ttl'l'Cnder &j
a rc'>'ecflble mmuity is net fin fl99Ct trfll'ls-je1· fer le9s thfln fair mfl1·kct "'fllbiC.
(7 1 99}

(BREAK IN CONTINUITY OF SECTIONS)
PENALTY EXCEPTIONS FOR ASSET TRANSFERS.
841.
A participant is not subject to the asset transfer penalty for taking any action described in Subsections 841.01 through
841.14 of these rules.
(3-20-04)
01.

spouse.

Home to Spouse. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to the
(7-1-99)

02.
Home to Minor Child or Disabled Adult Child. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the
home was transferred to the child of the participant or spouse. The child must be under age twenty-one (21) or blind
or totally disabled under Social Security and SSI rules in 20 CFR Part 416.
(7-1-99)
03.
Home to Brother or Sister. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to
a brother or sister of the participant or spouse. The brother or sister must have an equity interest in the transferred
home. The brother or sister must reside in that home for at least one (1) year immediately before the month the
participant starts long-term care.
(7-1-99)
04.
Home to Adult Child. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to a son
or daughter of the participant or spouse, other than a child under the age of twenty-one (21). The son or daughter must
reside in that home for at least two (2) years immediately before the month the participant started long-term care. The
adult child must prove he provided nursing facility level medical care to the participant which permitted him to live at
home rather than enter long-term care. The son or daughter must not have provided services as a paid Medicaid
provider.
(3 20 04)(2-8-06)T
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PERIOD OF RESTRICTED COVERAGE FOR ASSET TRANSFERS.
834.
The period of restricted coverage is the number of months computed by dividing the uncompensated value of the
transferred asset by the statewide average cost of nursing facility services to private patients. The cost is computed for
the time of the participant's most recent request for Medicaid. If the spouse becomes eligible for long-term care
Medicaid, the rest of the period of restricted coverage is divided between the participant and spouse.
(3-30-07)
835.
APPLYING THE PENAL TY PERIOD OF RESTRICTED COVERAGE.
Restricted coverage continues until the participant or spouse recovers all the assets, receives fair market value at the
time of the transfer for all of the assets, or the period of restricted coverage ends. The penalty continues whether or
(3-30-07)
not the participant is in long-term care. The penalty period for asset transfers is applied as follows:
01.
Penalty Period for Transfer Prior to February 8, 2006. For assets transferred prior to February
8, 2006, there is no penalty if the amount transferred is less than the cost of one (I) month's care. The penalty period
begins running the month the transfer took place. The month the transfer took place is counted as one (1) of the
penalty months. A penalty period is computed for each transfer. A penalty period must expire before the next begins.
Each partial month before the end of consecutive penalty periods is a penalty month. A partial month at the end of
consecutive penalty periods is dropped.
(3-30-07)
02.
Penalty Period for Transfers On or After February 8, 2006. For assets transferred on or after
February 8, 2006, the penalty period begins running the first day of the month after the month the transfer took place,
or the date the individual would have been eligible for long-term care services, if not for the transfer, whichever date
is later in time. The value of all asset transfers made during the look-back period is accumulated for the purpose of
calculating the penalty. If an additional transfer is discovered after the penalty has been served, a new penalty period
begins the month following timely notice of closure of benefits. When a penalty period ends after the first day of the
(3-30-07)
month, eligibility for long-term care services begins the day after the penalty period ends.
836.
MULTIPLE PENALTY PERIODS APPLIED CONSECUTIVELY.
A penalty period is computed for each transfer. One (I) penalty period must expire before the next begins. (3-30-07)
837.
LIFE ESTATE AS ASSET TRANSFER
When a life estate in real property is retained by an individual, and a remainder interest in the property is transferred
during the look-back period for less than the fair market value of the remainder interest transferred, the value of the
uncompensated remainder is subject to the asset transfer penalty as described in Sections 831 through 835 of these
rules. To compute the value of the life estate remainder, multiply the fair market value of the real property at the time
of transfer by the remainder factor for the participant's age at the time of transfer listed in the following table:

r~~
Age

,.,. . .- .

-.=-r·.-

~

.

r.7,i-::r

...........

tJt. Estate
Remalncter

"'\ O'I'. ' l •

..

..

"f~~~'""1

Age

Ute Eatat9
Remainder

Age

TABLE 837 - LIFE ESTATE REMAINDER TABLE
Age

LifeEalate

Remainder

,.

,.;t.C~
~

UfeEstate

Remainder

0

.02812

1

.01012

2

.00983

3

.00922

4

.01019

5

.01062

6

.01116

7

.01178

8

.01252

9

.01337

10

.01435

11

.01547

12

.01671

13

.01802

14

.01934

15

.02063

16

.02185

17

.02300

18

.02410

19

.02520

20

.02635

21

.02755

22

.02880

23

.03014

24

.03159

25

.03322

26

.03505

27

.03710

28

.03938

29

.04187

30

.04457

31

.04746

32

.05.058

33

.05.392

34

.05.750

35

.06132
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TABLE 837 • LIFE ESTATE REMAINDER TABLE
Age

~:-1

36

.06540

37

40

.08429

41

·-

UfeEatate

Ufe Estate
Remainder

Age

.06974

38

.07433

.08970

42

Remainder

;ii{~'~
Age

....-.... - Life Estate .,,

39

Remainder
_._,_,
.07917

.09543

43

.10145

-

..

44

.10779

45

.11442

46

.12137

47

.12863

48

.13626

49

.14422

50

.15257

51

.16126

52

.17031

53

.17972

54

.18946

55

.19954

56

.20994

57

.22069

58

.23178

59

.24325

60

.25509

61

.26733

62

.27998

63

.29304

64

.30648

65

.32030

66

.33449

67

.34902

68

.36390

69

.37914

70

.39478

71

.41086

72

.42739

73

.44429

74

.46138

75

.47851

76

.49559

77

.51258

78

.52951

79

.54643

80

.56341

81

.58033

82

.59705

83

.61358

84

.63002

85

.64641

86

.66236

87

.67738

88

.69141

89

.70474

90

.71779

91

.73045

92

.74229

93

.75308

94

.76272

95

.77113

96

.77819

97

.78450

98

.79000

99

.79514

100

.80025

101

.80468

102

.80946

103

.81563

104

.82144

105

.83038

106

.84512

107

.86591

108

.89932

109

.95455
(3-30-07)

838.
ANNUITY AS ASSET TRANSFER.
Except as provided in this rule, when assets are used to purchase an annuity during the look-back period, it is an asset
transfer presumed to be made for the purpose of qualifying for Medicaid. To rebut this presumption, the participant
must provide proof that clearly establishes the annuity was not purchased to make the participant eligible for
Medicaid or avoid recovery from the estate following death. In addition, the participant must show the annuity will be
paid out in the participant's expected life, is irrevocable, earns interest at a reasonable rate of return, and names the
state as the remainder beneficiary as described in Subsections 838.02 through 838.04 of these rules, unless the
(3-30-07)
annuity is permitted under Section 838.05 .
01.

Revocable Annuity. The surrender amount of a revocable annuity is a countable resource.
(3-30-07)

02.
Irrevocable Annuity. An irrevocable annuity is an annuity that under no circumstance can be sold
or traded for value, including the sale of the stream of income from the annuity. The purchase price of an irrevocable
annuity is treated as an asset transfer, unless the requirements of Subsections 838.02.a, 838.02.b., 838.03 and 838.04
of these rules are met.
(3-30-07)
a.
Irrevocable Annuity Life Expectancy Test. The participant's life expectancy, as shown in the
following table, must equal or exceed the term of the annuity. Using Table 838.02.a. compare the face value of the
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annuity to the participant's life expectancy at the purchase time. The annuity meets the life expectancy test if the
participant's life expectancy equals or exceeds the term of the annuity. If the exact age is not in the Table, use the next
lower age.
g

~~~~~TABLE 8l8.02.a. - LIFE EXPECTANCY TABLE

I
~

.

-

Age

Year• of Lite
Remaining ·

Female

!
i

Years of Life

A_ge

Years ofUfe
Remaining
Male

74

10.12

12.74

Remaining
Female

.

;

0

73.26

79.26

10

64.03

69.93

75

9.58

12.09

20

54.41

60.13

76

9.06

11.46

30

45.14

50.43

77

8.56

10.85

40

35.94

40.86

78

8.07

10.25

50

27.13

31.61

79

7.61

9.67

60

19.07

22.99

80

7.16

9.11

61

18.33

22.18

81

6.72

8.57

62

17.60

21.38

82

6.31

8.04

63

16.89

20.60

83

5.92

7.54

64

16.19

19.82

84

5.55

7.05

65

15.52

19.06

85

5.20

6.59

66

14.86

18.31

86

4.86

6.15

67

14.23

17.58

87

4.55

5.74

68

13.61

16.85

88

4.26

5.34

69

13.00

16.14

89

3.98

4.97

12.41

15.44

90

3.73

4.63
3.26

70

-i~

.

~

~

Year• of Ufe
RemaJnlng
Male

-

.·

71

11.82

14.75

95

2.71

72

11.24

14.06

100

2.05

2.39

73

10.67

13.40

110

1.14

1.22

(3-30-07)
b.
Annual Interest and Insurer Rating Test. The annuity must produce annual interest of at least
five percent (5% ). A variable rate annuity meets the interest rate test if the average yearly rate for the most recent five
(5) year period is five percent (5%) or more. To rebut the five percent (5%) interest test, the participant must show
that single premium annuities were not offered by insurers when the annuity was purchased and it would not be
practical to exchange the annuity for one with a higher interest rate. The insurer must be rated excellent or superior by
an insurance rating firm.
(3-30-07)
03.
State Named as Beneficiary. The purchase of an annuity is treated as an asset transfer unless the
(3-30-07)
State ofldaho, Medicaid Estate Recovery is named as:
a.
The remainder beneficiary in the first position for at least the total amount of medical assistance
(3-30-07)
paid on behalf of the annuitant under this title; or
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b.
The remainder beneficiary in the second position after the community spouse or minor or disabled
child and is named in the first position if the community spouse or a representative of the minor or disabled child
disposes of any remainder for less than fair market value.
(3-30-07)

04.
Equal Payment Test. The annuity must provide for payments in equal amounts during the term of
the annuity with no deferral and no balloon payments made.
(3-30-07)
05.
Permitted Annuity. The purchase of an annuity is not treated as an asset transfer if the annuity
meets any of the descriptions in Sections 408(b), or 408(q), Internal Revenue Code; or is purchased with proceeds
from an account or trust described in Sections 408(a), 408(c), or 408(p), Internal Revenue Code, or is a simplified
employee pension as described in Section 408(k), Internal Revenue Code, or is a Roth IRA described in Section
408A, Internal Revenue Code.
(3-30-07)
839.

1RUSTS AS ASSET 1RANSFERS.

A trust established wholly or partly from the participant's assets is an asset transfer. Assets transferred to a trust on or
after August II, 1993 are subject to the asset transfer penalty, regardless of when the trust was established. If the trust
(7-1-99)
includes assets of another person, the asset transfer penalty applies to the participant's share of the trust.
840.

1RANSFER OF JOINTLY-OWNED ASSET.

Transfer of an asset owned jointly by the participant and another person is considered a transfer by the participant.
The participant's share of the asset is used to compute the penalty. If the participant and his spouse are joint owners of
the transferred asset, the couple's combined ownership is used to compute the penalty. If the spouse becomes eligible
for long-term care Medicaid, the rest of the period of restricted coverage is divided between the participant and
spouse.
(7-1-99)
841.

PENALTY EXCEPTIONS FOR ASSET 1RANSFERS.

A participant is not subject to the asset transfer penalty for taking any action described in Subsections 841.01 through
841.14 of these rules.
(3-20-04)
01.

Home to Spouse. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to the

spouse.

(7-1-99)

02.
Home to Minor Child or Disabled Adult Child. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the
home was transferred to the child of the participant or spouse. The child must be under age twenty-one (21) or blind
or totally disabled under Social Security and SSI rules in 20 CFR Part 416.
(7-1-99)

03.
Home to Brother or Sister. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to
a brother or sister of the participant or spouse. The brother or sister must have an equity interest in the transferred
home. The brother or sister must reside in that home for at least one (I) year immediately before the month the
participant starts long-term care.
(7-1-99)
04.
Home to Adult Child. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to a son
or daughter of the participant or spouse, other than a child under the age of twenty-one (21). The son or daughter must
reside in that home for at least two (2) years immediately before the month the participant started long-term care. The
adult child must prove he provided nursing facility level medical care to the participant which permitted him to live at
home rather than enter long-term care. The son or daughter must not have provided services as a paid Medicaid
provider.
(3-30-07)
05.

Benefit of Spouse. The assets were transferred to the participant's spouse or to another person for

the sole benefit of the spouse.

(7-1-99)

06.
Transfer From Spouse. The assets were transferred from the participant's spouse to another
(7-1-99)
person for the sole benefit of the participant's spouse.
07.
Transfer to Child. The assets were transferred to the participant's child, or to a trust established
solely for the benefit of the participant's child. The child must be blind or totally disabled under Social Security and
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b.

A second vehicle as described in Sections 222 of these rules;

(3-30-07)

c.

Life insurance policies;

(3-30-07)

d.

Retirement accounts; and

(3-30-07)

e.

Exempt trusts as described in Section 872 of these rules.

(3-30-07)

05.
Countable Income. Countable income is calculated using exclusions and disregards as described
in Sections 300 through 499 547 of these rules.
~

a.
An individual's countable income cannot exceed five hundred percent (500%) of the current federal
poverty guideline for a household ofone (!).
(3-30-07)
b.
A couple's countable income cannot exceed five hundred percent (500%) of the current federal
(3-30-07)
poverty guideline for a household of two (2).

06.
Earned Income Test. Gross income is the total of earned and unearned income before exclusions
or disregards. Each individual's gross earned income must be at least fifteen percent ( 15%) of his total gross income
to qualify.
(3-30-07)
06.
Cost-Sharing. A participant in the Medicaid for Workers with Disabilities coverage group may be
required to cost-share. If a participant is required to cost-share for Medicaid, the costs are determined under the
provisions in IDAPA 16.03.18, "Medicaid Cost-Sharing."
(3-30-07)

(BREAK IN CONTINUITY OF SECTIONS)
834.
PERIOD OF RESTRICTED COVERAGE FOR ASSET TRANSFERS.
The period of restricted coverage is the number of months computed by dividing the net uncompensated value of the
transferred asset by the statewide average cost of nursing facility services to private patients. The cost is computed for
the time of the participant's most recent request for Medicaid. If the spouse becomes eligible for long-term care
Medicaid, the rest of the period ofrestricted coverage is divided between the participant and spouse.~

(BREAK IN CONTINUITY OF SECTIONS)
837.

LIFE ESTATE AS ASSET TRANSFER.

01.
Transfer of a Remainder Interest. When a life estate in real property is retained by an individual,
and a remainder interest in the property is transferred during the look-back period for less than the fair market value
of the remainder interest transferred, the value of the uncompensated remainder is subject to the asset transfer penalty
as described in Sections 831 through 83 5 of these rules. To compute the value of the life estate remainder, multiply
the fair market value of the real property at the time of transfer by the remainder factor for the participant's age at the
time of transfer listed in the following table:

Age
0

.02812

Idaho Administrative Bulletin

1

"........

~--····

~

Remainder
2
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~~it/
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Remainder

ie••

.01019

5

.01062

6

I.lie .....
Remall\der
.,.
.01116

.01252

9

.01337

10

.01435
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TABLE 837.Jll. - l.llOli ' "r.415 ~EMAlNDER TABLE
Age

wfe
Remainder

0:<

Age

.

.

A~e

~'-\'..'

""" ......

RemaJnder
..,.._;_

7

.01178

11

.01547

12

.01671

13

.01802

14

.01934

15

.02063

16

.02185

17

.02300

18

.02410

19

.02520

20

.02635

21

.02755

22

.02880

23

.03014

24

.03159

25

.03322

26

.03505

27

.03710

28

.03938

29

.04187

30

.04457

31

.04746

32

.05-:-058

33

.05-:-392

34

.05.750

35

.06132

36

.06540

37

.06974

38

.07433

39

.07917

40

.08429

41

.08970

42

.09543

43

.10145

44

.10779

45

.11442

46

.12137

47

.12863

48

.13626

49

.14422

50

.15257

51

.16126

52

.17031

53

.17972

54

.18946

55

.19954

56

.20994

57

. 22069

58

.23178

59

.24325

60

.25509

61

.26733

62

.27998

63

.29304

64

.30648

65

.32030

66

.33449

67

.34902

68

.36390

69

.37914

70

.39478

71

.41086

72

.42739

73

.44429

74

.46138

75

.47851

76

.49559

77

.51258

78

.52951

79

.54643

80

.56341

81

.58033

82

.59705

83

.61358

84

.63002

85

.64641

86

.66236

87

.67738

88

.69141

89

.70474

90

.71779

91

.73045

92

.74229

93

.75308

94

.76272

95

.77113

96

.77819

97

.78450

98

.79000

99

.79514

100

.80025

101

.80468

102

.80946

103

.81563

104

.82144

105

.83038

106

.84512

107

.86591

108

.89932

109

.95455

(3 3(} 07)L_l
02.
Transfer of a Life Estate. When a life estate in real property is transferred by an individual during
the look-back period for less than fair market value, the value of the life estate is subject to the asset transfer penalty
as described in Sections 831 and 835 of these rules . To compute the value of the life estate. multiply the fair market
value of the real property at the time of transfer by the life estate factor for the participant's age at the time of transfer
listed in the following table :
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fil!
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33764

.[l
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.30859

§j

.29526
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.28221
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2fil§§
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.25771

~

.24692

~

.23728

~
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it§
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fil

.21550
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.1l!Q
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1Q2

.19054

w
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~
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fil
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1!U
lli
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lli

.10068
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.04545

.20486
.13409

L_.l
ANNUITY AS ASSET TRANSFER
838.
Except as provided in this rule, when assets are used to purchase an annuity during the look-back period, it is an asset
transfer presumed to be made for the purpose of qualifying for Medicaid. To rebut this presumption, the participant
must provide proof that clearly establishes the annuity was not purchased to make the participant eligible for
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Medicaid or avoid recovery from the estate following death . In addition, the participant must show the annuity will be
paid out in the participant's expected life, is irrevocable, earns interest at a reasonable rate of return, and names the
state as the remainder beneficiary as described in Subsections 838.02 through 838.04 of these rules, unless the
(3-30-07)
annuity is permitted under Section 838.05 .
01.

Revocable Annuity. The surrender amount of a revocable annui ty is a countable resource.
(3-30-07)

02.
Irrevocable Annuity. An irrevocable annuity is an annuity that under no circumstance can be sold
or traded for value, including the sale of the stream of income from the annuity. The purchase price of an irrevocable
annuity is treated as an asset transfer, unless the requirements of Subsections 838.02.a, 838.02.b., 838.03 and 838.04
of these rules are met.
(3-30-07)
a.
Irrevocable Annuity Life Expectancy Test. The participant's life expectancy, as shown in the
following table, must equal or exceed the term of the annuity. Using Table 838.02.a. compare the face value of the
annuity to the participant's life expectancy at the purchase time. The annuity meets the life expectancy test if the
participant 's life expectancy equals or exceeds the term of the annuity. If the exact age is not in the Table, use the next
lower age.

--·- -

..

·-

-

'

. 1:

TABLE 83'.02.a. • LIF~ EXPECTANCY TABLE
i

'

Age
.~

Yeara of Life
Remaining
Male

·-

Years of Life
RemalnJng
Femaltf

Age

..

..

:i:,,- .,_. --

Years Of Ute

YearsOfUfe'

Renullnlng

Remaining

.

Female

0

73.26

79.26

74

10.12

12.74

10

64.03

69.93

75

9.58

12.09

20

54.41

60.13

76

9.06

11.46

30

45.14

50.43

77

8.56

10.85

40

35.94

40.86

78

8.07

10.25

50

27.13

31.61

79

7.61

9.67

60

19.07

22.99

80

7.16

9.11

61

18.33

22.18

81

6.72

8.57

62

17.60

21.38

82

6.31

8.04

63

16.89

20.60

83

5.92

7.54

64

16.19

19.82

84

5.55

7.05

65

15.52

19.06

85

5.20

6.59

66

14.86

18.31

86

4.86

6.15

67

14.23

17.58

87

4.55

5.74

68

13.61

16.85

88

4.26

5.34

69

13.00

16.14

89

3.98

4.97

70

12.41

15.44

90

3.73

4.63

71

11 .82

14.75

95

2.71

3.26

72

11 .24

14.06

100

2.05

2.39

73

10.67

13.40

110

1.14

1.22
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(3-30-07)
b.
Annual Interest and Insurer Rating Test. The annuity must produce annual interest of at least
five percent (5%). A variable rate annuity meets the interest rate test ifthe average yearly rate for the most recent five
(5) year period is five percent (5%) or more. To rebut the five percent (5%) interest test, the participant must show
that single premium annuities were not offered by insurers when the annuity was purchased and it would not be
practical to exchange the annuity for one with a higher interest rate. The insurer must be rated excellent or superior by
an insurance rating firm.
(3-30-07)
03.
State Named as Beneficiary. The purchase of an annuity is treated as an asset transfer unless the
State ofldaho, Medicaid Estate Recovery is named as:
(3-30-07)
a.
The remainder beneficiary in the first position for at least the total amount of medical assistance
~
paid on behalf of the t1nH1;1;ittlnt institutionalized individual under this title; or
b.
The remainder beneficiary in the second position after the community spouse or minor or disabled
child and is named in the first position if the community spouse or a representative of the minor or disabled child
(3-30-07)
disposes of any remainder for less than fair market value.

04.
Equal Payment Test. The annuity must provide for payments in equal amounts during the term of
the annuity with no deferral and no balloon payments made.
(3-30-07)
05.
Permitted Annuity. The purchase of an annuity is not treated as an asset transfer if the annuity
meets any of the descriptions in Sections 408(b), or 408(q), Internal Revenue Code; or is purchased with proceeds
from an account or trust described in Sections 408(a), 408(c), or 408(p), Internal Revenue Code, or is a simplified
employee pension as described in Section 408(k), Internal Revenue Code, or is a Roth IRA described in Section
408A, Internal Revenue Code.
(3-30-07)

(BREAK IN CONTINUITY OF SECTIONS)

841.
PENALTY EXCEPTIONS FOR ASSET TRANSFERS.
A participant is not subject to the asset transfer penalty for taking any action described in Subsections 841.01 through
841.14 offhere this rule~.
~
01.

spouse.

Home to Spouse. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to the
(7-1-99)

02.
Home to Minor Child or Disabled Adult Child. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the
home was transferred to the child of the participant or spouse. The child must be under age twenty-one (21) or blind
or totally disabled under Social Security and SSI rules in 20 CFR Part 416.
(7-1-99)
03.
Home to Brother or Sister. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to
a brother or sister of the participant or spouse. The brother or sister must have an equity interest in the transferred
home. The brother or sister must reside in that home for at least one (1) year immediately before the month the
participant starts long-term care.
(7-1-99)
04.
Home to Adult Child. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to a son
or daughter of the participant or spouse, other than a child under the age of twenty-one (21 ). The son or daughter must
reside in that home for at least two (2) years immediately before the month the participant started long-term care. The
adult child must prove he provided nursing facility level medical care to the participant which permitted him to live at
home rather than enter long-term care. The son or daughter must not have fFffliJided received payment from Medicaid
for home and community based services ~ a paid Medict1idpt'<7l'ide1· provided to the participant.
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(3-30-07)

834.
PERIOD OF RESTRICTED COVERAGE FOR ASSET TRANSFERS.
The period ofrestricted coverage is the number of months computed by dividing the net uncompensated value of the
transferred asset by the statewide average cost of nursing facility services to private patients. The cost is computed for
the time of the participant's most recent request for Medicaid. If the spouse becomes eligible for long-term care
(4-2-08)
Medicaid, the rest of the period ofrestricted coverage is divided between the participant and spouse.
835.
APPLYING THE PENALTY PERIOD OF RESTRICTED COVERAGE.
Restricted coverage continues until the participant or spouse recovers all the assets, receives fair market value at the
time of the transfer for all of the assets, or the period of restricted coverage ends. The penalty continues whether or
(3-30-07)
not the participant is in long-term care. The penalty period for asset transfers is applied as follows:
01.
Penalty Period for Transfer Prior to February 8, 2006. For assets transferred prior to February
8, 2006, there is no penalty ifthe amount transferred is less than the cost of one (1) month's care. The penalty period
begins running the month the transfer took place. The month the transfer took place is counted as one (1) of the
penalty months. A penalty period is computed for each transfer. A penalty period must expire before the next begins.
Each partial month before the end of consecutive penalty periods is a penalty month. A partial month at the end of
consecutive penalty periods is dropped.
(3-30-07)
02.
Penalty Period for Transfers On or After February 8, 2006. For assets transferred on or after
February 8, 2006, the penalty period begins running the first day of the month after the month the transfer took place,
or the date the individual would have been eligible for long-term care services, if not for the transfer, whichever date
is later in time. The value of all asset transfers made during the look-back period is accumulated for the purpose of
calculating the penalty. If an additional transfer is discovered after the penalty has been served, a new penalty period
begins the month following timely notice of closure of benefits. When a penalty period ends after the first day of the
month, eligibility for long-term care services begins the day after the penalty period ends.
(3-30-07)
836.
MULTIPLE PENALTY PERIODS APPLIED CONSECUTIVELY.
A penalty period is computed for each transfer. One (1) penalty period must expire before the next begins. (3-30-07)
837.

LIFE ESTATE AS ASSET TRANSFER.

01.
Transfer of a Remainder Interest. When a life estate in real property is retained by an individual,
and a remainder interest in the property is transferred during the look-back period for less than the fair market value
of the remainder interest transferred, the value of the uncompensated remainder is subject to the asset transfer penalty
as described in Sections 831 through 835 of these rules. To compute the value of the life estate remainder, multiply
the fair market value of the real property at the time of transfer by the remainder factor for the participant's age at the
time of transfer listed in the following table:

.02812

1

4

.01019

5

.01062

6

.01116

7

.01178

8

.01252

9

.01337

10

.01435

11

.01547

12

.01671

13

.01802

14

.01934

15

.02063

16

.02185

17

.02300

18

.02410

19

.02520

20

.02635

21

.02755

22

.02880

23

.03014

0

2

.01012

.00983

3

.00992

24

.03159

25

.03322

26

.03505

27

.03710

28

.03938

29

.04187

30

.04457

31

.04746
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32

.05058

33

.05392

34

.05750

35

.06132

36

.06540

37

.06974

38

.07433

39

.07917

40

.08429

41

.08970

42

.09543

43

.10145

44

.10779

45

.11442

46

.12137

47

.12863

48

.13626

49

.14422

50

.15257

51

.16126

52

.17031

53

.17972

54

.18946

55

.19954

56

.20994

57

.22069

58

.23178

59

.24325

60

.25509

61

.26733

62

.27998

63

.29304

64

.30648

65

.32030

66

.33449

67

.34902

68

.36390

69

.37914

70

.39478

71

.41086

72

.42739

73

.44429

74

.46138

75

.47851

76

.49559

77

.51258

78

.52951

79

.54643

80

.56341

81

.58033

82

.59705

83

.61358

84

.63002

85

.64641

86

.66236

87

.67738

88

.69141

89

.70474

90

.71779

91

.73045

92

.74229

93

.75308

94

.76272

95

.77113

96

.77819

97

.78450

98

.79000

99

.79514

100

.80025

101

.80468

102

.80946

103

.81563

106

.84512

107

.86591

104

.82144

105

.83038

108

.89932

109

.95455
(4-2-08)

02.
Transfer of a Life Estate. When a life estate in real property is transferred by an individual during
the look-back period for less than fair market value, the value of the life estate is subject to the asset transfer penalty
as described in Sections 831 and 835 of these rules. To compute the value of the life estate, multiply the fair market
value of the real property at the time of transfer by the life estate factor for the participant's age at the time of transfer
listed in the following table:

0

.97188

1

.98988

2

.99017

3

.99008

4

.98981

5

.98938

6

.98884

7

.98822

8

.98748

9

.98663

10

.98565

11

.98453

12

.98359

13

.98198

14

.98066

15

.97937

16

.97815

17

.97700

18

.97590

19

.97480
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20

.97365

21

.97425

22

.97120

23

.96986

24

.96841

25

.96678

26

.96495

27

.96290

28

.96062

29

.95813

30

.95543

31

.95254

32

.94942

33

.94608

34

.94250

35

.93868

36

.93460

37

.93026

38

.92567

39

.92083

40

.91571

41

.91030

42

.90457

43

.89855

44

.89221

45

.88558

46

.87863

47

.87137

48

.86374

49

.85578

50

.83743

51

.83674

52

.82969

53

.82028

54

.81054

55

.80046
.75675

56

.77006

57

.77391

58

.76822

59

60

.74491

61

.73267

62

.72002

63

.70696

64

.69352

65

.67970

66

.66551

67

.65098

68

.63610

69

.62086

70

.60522

71

.58914

72

.57261

73

.55571

74

.53862

75

.52149

79

.45357

76

.50441

77

.48742

78

.47049

80

.43659

81

.41967

82

.40295

83

.38642

84

.36998

85

.35359

86

.33764

87

.32262

88

.30859

89

.29526

90

.28221

91

.26955

92

.25771

93

.24692

94

.23728

95

.22887

96

.22181

97

.21550

98

.21000

99

.20486

100

.19975

101

.19532

102

.19054

103

.18437

104

.17856

105

.16962

106

.15488

107

.13409

108

.10068

109

.04545
(4-2-08)

ANNUITY AS ASSET TRANSFER.
838.
Except as provided in this rule, when assets are used to purchase an annuity during the look-back period, it is an asset
transfer presumed to be made for the purpose of qualifying for Medicaid. To rebut this presumption, the participant
must provide proof that clearly establishes the annuity was not purchased to make the participant eligible for
Medicaid or avoid recovery from the estate following death. Proof is met if the participant shows the annuity meets
the requirements described in Subsections 838.02 through 838.05 of this rule.
(4-2-08)
01.
Revocable Annuity. A revocable annuity is an annuity that can be assigned. The surrender amount
of a revocable annuity is a countable resource.
(4-2-08)
02.
Irrevocable Annuity. The purchase price of an irrevocable, non-assignable annuity is treated as an
asset transfer, unless the requirements of Subsections 838.02.a, 838.02.b., 838.03 and 838.04 of this rule are met.
(4-2-08)
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a.
Irrevocable Annuity Life Expectancy Test. The participant's life expectancy, as shown in the
following table, must equal or exceed the term of the annuity. Using Table 838 .02.a. compare the face value of the
annuity to the participant's life expectancy at the purchase time. The annuity meets the life expectancy test if the
participant 's life expectancy equals or exceeds the term of the annuity. If the exact age is not in the Table, use the next
lower age.

I' .

I

'')+;'~;~,[~Ji"'

'

,f'.lli'''TABLE 838.02.a. ·LIFE EXPECTANCYTA8L.E
._

..,
Age

~·-·

I

Year.a of Life
Remaining
Female

YeanofUfe
Remaining
Male

I

Years of Ute

YQrsofLife
Remaining

Age
•L.

-~

·;?,~~-;~;

Male

.:_

Remalnlng
Female

0

73.26

79.26

74

10.12

12.74

10

64.03

69.93

75

9.58

12.09

20

54.41

60 .13

76

9.06

11.46

30

45.14

50.43

77

8.56

10.85

40

35.94

40 .86

78

8.07

10.25

50

27.13

31.61

79

7.61

9.67

60

19.07

22.99

80

7.16

9.11

61

18.33

22.18

81

6.72

8.57

62

17.60

21 .38

82

6.31

8.04

63

16.89

20.60

83

5.92

7.54

64

16.19

19.82

84

5.55

7.05

65

15.52

19.06

85

5.20

6.59

66

14.86

18.31

86

4.86

6.15

67

14.23

17.58

87

4.55

5.74

68

13.61

16.85

88

4.26

5.34

69

13.00

16.14

89

3.98

4.97

70

12.41

15.44

90

3.73

4.63

71

11.82

14.75

95

2.71

3.26

72

11.24

14.06

100

2.05

2.39

73

10.67

13.40

110

1.14

1.22

(3-30-07)
Annual Interest Test. Any annuity is presumed to produce interest, at minimum, that is equal to
b.
the treasury rate.
(4-2-08)
03.
State Named as Beneficiary. The purchase of an annuity is treated as an asset transfer unless the
State ofldaho, Medicaid Estate Recovery is named as:
(3-30-07)
a.
The remainder beneficiary in the first position for at least the total amount of medical assistance
(4-2-08)
paid on behalf of the institutionalized individual under this title; or
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b.
The remainder beneficiary in the second position after the community spouse or minor or disabled
child and is named in the first position if the community spouse or a representative of the minor or disabled child
disposes of any remainder for less than fair market value.
(3-30-07)
04.
Equal Payment Test. The annuity must provide for payments in equal amounts during the term of
the annuity with no deferral and no balloon payments made.
(3-30-07)
05.
Permitted Annuity. The purchase of an annuity is not treated as an asset transfer if the annuity
meets any of the descriptions in Sections 408(b), or 408( q), Internal Revenue Code; or is purchased with proceeds
from an account or trust described in Sections 408(a), 408(c), or 408(p), Internal Revenue Code, or is a simplified
employee pension as described in Section 408(k), Internal Revenue Code, or is a Roth IRA described in Section
408A, Internal Revenue Code.
(3-30-07)
839.

TRUSTS AS ASSET TRANSFERS.

A trust established wholly or partly from the participant's assets is an asset transfer. Assets transferred to a trust on or
after August 11, 1993 are subject to the asset transfer penalty, regardless of when the trust was established. If the trust
includes assets of another person, the asset transfer penalty applies to the participant's share of the trust.
(7-1-99)
840.

TRANSFER OF JOINTLY-OWNED ASSET.

Transfer of an asset owned jointly by the participant and another person is considered a transfer by the participant.
The participant's share of the asset is used to compute the penalty. If the participant and his spouse are joint owners of
the transferred asset, the couple's combined ownership is used to compute the penalty. If the spouse becomes eligible
for long-term care Medicaid, the rest of the period of restricted coverage is divided between the participant and
spouse.
(7-1-99)
841.

PENALTY EXCEPTIONS FOR ASSET TRANSFERS.

A participant is not subject to the asset transfer penalty for taking any action described in Subsections 841.01 through
841.14 of this rule.
(4-2-08)
01.

Home to Spouse. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to the

(7-1-99)

spouse.

02.
Home to Minor Child or Disabled Adult Child. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the
home was transferred to the child of the participant or spouse. The child must be under age twenty-one (21) or blind
or totally disabled under Social Security and SSI rules in 20 CFR Part 416.
(7-1-99)

03.
Home to Brother or Sister. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to
a brother or sister of the participant or spouse. The brother or sister must have an equity interest in the transferred
home. The brother or sister must reside in that home for at least one ( 1) year immediately before the month the
participant starts long-term care.
(7-1-99)
04.
Home to Adult Child. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to a son
or daughter of the participant or spouse, other than a child under the age of twenty-one (21). The son or daughter must
reside in that home for at least two (2) years immediately before the month the participant started long-term care. The
adult child must prove he provided nursing facility level medical care to the participant which permitted him to live at
home rather than enter long-term care. The son or daughter must not have received payment from Medicaid for home
and community based services provided to the participant.
(4-2-08)
05.

Benefit of Spouse. The assets were transferred to the participant's spouse or to another person for

the sole benefit of the spouse.

(7-1-99)

06.
Transfer From Spouse. The assets were transferred from the participant's spouse to another
person for the sole benefit of the participant's spouse.
(7-1-99)
07.
Transfer to Child. The assets were transferred to the participant's child, or to a trust established
solely for the benefit of the participant's child. The child must be blind or totally disabled under Social Security and
SSI rules in 20 CFR Part 416. The child may be any age.
(7-1-99)
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look-back period is thirty-six (36) months, unless the transfer is to or from a trust. If the transfer is to or from a trust,
the look-back period is sixty (60) months. If the person is entitled to Medicaid or HCBS services, the look-back
period is counted from the month long-term care or HCBS services began, or would have begun, were it not for a
penalty. If the person is not entitled to Medicaid, the look-back period is counted from the month prior to the month
(3-30-07)
the application was submitted.
02.
Transfers On or After February 8, 2006. Any asset transferred on or after February 8, 2006,
regardless of type, is subject to a look-back period of sixty (60) months. The look-back period is counted from the
date of the application for long-term care or HCBS services or the date of the transfer, whichever is later in time.
(3-30-07)
834.
PERIOD OF RESTRICTED COVERAGE FOR ASSET TRANSFERS.
The period ofrestricted coverage is the number of months computed by dividing the net uncompensated value of the
transferred asset by the statewide average cost of nursing facility services to private patients. The cost is computed for
the time of the participant's most recent request for Medicaid. If the spouse becomes eligible for long-term care
(4-2-08)
Medicaid, the rest of the period ofrestricted coverage is divided between the participant and spouse.
835.
APPLYING THE PENALTY PERIOD OF RESTRICTED COVERAGE.
Restricted coverage continues until the participant or spouse recovers all the assets, receives fair market value at the
time of the transfer for all of the assets, or the period of restricted coverage ends. The penalty continues whether or
(3-30-07)
not the participant is in long-term care. The penalty period for asset transfers is applied as follows:
01.
Penalty Period for Transfer Prior to February 8, 2006. For assets transferred prior to February
8, 2006, there is no penalty if the amount transferred is less than the cost of one (1) month's care. The penalty period
begins running the month the transfer took place. The month the transfer took place is counted as one (1) of the
penalty months. A penalty period is computed for each transfer. A penalty period must expire before the next begins.
Each partial month before the end of consecutive penalty periods is a penalty month. A partial month at the end of
consecutive penalty periods is dropped.
(3-30-07)
02.
Penalty Period for Transfers On or After February 8, 2006. For assets transferred on or after
February 8, 2006, the penalty period begins running the first day of the month after the month the transfer took place,
or the date the individual would have been eligible for long-term care services, if not for the transfer, whichever date
is later in time. The value of all asset transfers made during the look-back period is accumulated for the purpose of
calculating the penalty. If an additional transfer is discovered after the penalty has been served, a new penalty period
begins the month following timely notice of closure of benefits. When a penalty period ends after the first day of the
(3-30-07)
month, eligibility for long-term care services begins the day after the penalty period ends.
836.
MULTIPLE PENALTY PERIODS APPLIED CONSECUTIVELY.
A penalty period is computed for each transfer. One (1) penalty period must expire before the next begins. (3-30-07)
837.

LIFE ESTA TE AS ASSET TRANSFER

01.
Transfer of a Remainder Interest. When a life estate in real property is retained by an individual,
and a remainder interest in the property is transferred during the look-back period for less than the fair market value
of the remainder interest transferred, the value of the uncompensated remainder is subject to the asset transfer penalty
as described in Sections 831 through 835 of these rules . To compute the value of the life estate remainder, multiply
the fair market value of the real property at the time of transfer by the remainder factor for the participant's age at the
time of transfer listed in the following table:

TABLE 837.01 • Rl:MAlNl:>ER TABU!

Remainder

Remainder

4

.01019

5

.01012

2

.00983

3

.00992

.01062

6

.01116

7

.01178
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TABLE 837.01- REMAINDERTABLE

£- - ·- -

.. .

~

•

~· . : ..i. ,t;,.,-.i,...~

Remainder

Age

Remainder

Age

Remainder

Age

Remainder

8

.01252

9

.01337

10

.01435

11

.01547

12

.01671

13

.01802

14

.01934

15

.02063

16

.02185

17

.02300

18

.02410

19

.02520

20

.02635

21

.02755

22

.02880

23

.03014

24

.03159

25

.03322

26

.03505

27

.03710

Age

28

.03938

29

.04187

30

.04457

31

.04746

32

.05058

33

.05392

34

.05750

35

.06132

36

.06540

37

.06974

38

.07433

39

.07917

40

.08429

41

.08970

42

.09543

43

.10145

44

.10779

45

.11442

46

.12137

47

.12863

48

.13626

49

.14422

50

.15257

51

.16126

52

.17031

53

.17972

54

.18946

55

.19954

56

.20994

57

.22069

58

.23178

59

.24325

60

.25509

61

.26733

62

.27998

63

.29304

64

.30648

65

.32030

66

.33449

67

.34902

68

.36390

69

.37914

70

.39478

71

.41086

72

.42739

73

.44429

74

.46138

75

.47851

76

.49559

77

.51258

78

.52951

79

.54643

80

.56341

81

.58033

82

.59705

83

.61358

84

.63002

85

.64641

86

.66236

87

.67738

88

.69141

89

.70474

90

.71779

91

.73045

92

.74229

93

.75308

94

.76272

95

.77113

96

.77819

97

.78450

98

.79000

99

.79514

100

.80025

101

.80468

102

.80946

103

.81563

106

.84512

107

.86591

104

.82144

105

.83038

108

.89932

109

.95455
(4-2-08)

02.
Transfer of a Life Estate. When a life estate in real property is transferred by an individual during
the look-back period for less than fair market value, the value of the life estate is subject to the asset transfer penalty
as described in Sections 831 and 835 of these rules. To compute the value of the life estate, multiply the fair market
value of the real property at the time of transfer by the life estate factor for the participant's age at the time of transfer
listed in the following table:
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0

.97188

1

.98988

2

.99017

3

.99008

4

.98981

5

.98938

6

.98884

7

.98822

8

.98748

9

.98663

10

.98565

11

.98453

12

.98359

13

.98198

14

.98066

15

.97937

16

.97815

17

.97700

18

.97590

19

.97480

20

.97365

21

.97425

22

.97120

23

.96986

24

.96841

25

.96678

26

.96495

27

.96290
.95254

28

.96062

29

.95813

30

.95543

31

32

.94942

33

.94608

34

.94250

35

.93868

36

.93460

37

.93026

38

.92567

39

.92083

40

.91571

41

.91030

42

.90457

43

.89855

44

.89221

45

.88558

46

.87863

47

.87137

48

.86374

49

.85578

50

.83743

51

.83674

52

.82969

53

.82028

54

.81054

55

.80046

56

.77006

57

.77391

58

.76822

59

.75675

60

.74491

61

.73267

62

.72002

63

.70696

64

.69352

65

.67970

66

.66551

67

.65098

68

.63610

69

.62086

70

.60522

71

.58914

72

.57261

73

.55571

74

.53862

75

.52149

76

.50441

77

.48742

78

.47049

79

.45357

80

.43659

81

.41967

82

.40295

83

.38642

84

.36998

85

.35359

86

.33764

87

.32262

88

.30859

89

.29526

90

.28221

91

.26955

92

.25771

93

.24692

94

.23728

95

.22887

96

.22181

97

.21550

98

.21000

99

.20486

100

.19975

101

.19532

102

.19054

103

.18437

104

.17856

105

.16962

106

.15488

107

.13409

108

.10068

109

.04545
(4-2-08)

838.
ANNUITY AS ASSET TRANSFER
Except as provided in this rule, when assets are used to purchase an annuity during the look-back period, it is an asset
transfer presumed to be made for the purpose of qualifying for Medicaid. To rebut this presumption, the participant
must provide proof that clearly establishes the annuity was not purchased to make the participant eligible for
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Medicaid or avoid recovery from the estate following death. Proof is met if the participant shows the annuity meets
(4-2-08)
the requirements described in Subsections 838.02 through 838.05 of this rule.
01.
Revocable Annuity. A revocable annuity is an annuity that can be assigned . The surrender amount
of a revocable annuity is a countable resource.
(4-2-08)
02.
Irrevocable Annuity. The purchase price of an irrevocable, non-assignable annuity is treated as an
asset transfer, unless the requ irements of Subsections 838.02.a, 838.02.b., 838.03 and 838 .04 of this rule are met.
(4-2-08)
a.
Irrevocable Annuity Life Expectancy Test. The participant's life expectancy, as shown in the
following table, must equal or exceed the term of the annuity. Using Table 838.02.a. compare the face value of the
annuity to the participant's life expectancy at the purchase time. The annuity meets the life expectancy test if the
participant's life expectancy equals or exceeds the term of the annuity. If the exact age is not in the Table, use the next
lower age.

Wtk ~~,
!.

.,~

-

«'.1~

_.,_ -

.

Years of, Ufe
Remaining
Male

Age

-

TABLE 838.02.a. - LIFE EXPECTANCY TABLE
Years of Life
Remaining

Age

Female

. ..
)

-"--

Years.of Ufe
Remlt_nlng
Mate
.
-

Years of Life
Remaining

-

Female

0

73.26

79.26

74

10.12

12.74

10

64.03

69.93

75

9.58

12.09

20

54.41

60.13

76

9.06

11.46

30

45.14

50.43

77

8.56

10.85

40

35.94

40 .86

78

8.07

10.25

50

27 .13

31.61

79

7.61

9.67

60

19.07

22.99

80

7.16

9.11

61

18.33

22.18

81

6.72

8.57

62

17.60

21.38

82

6.31

8.04

63

16.89

20.60

83

5.92

7.54

64

16.19

19.82

84

5.55

7.05
6.59

65

15.52

19.06

85

5.20

66

14.86

18.31

86

4.86

6.15

67

14.23

17.58

87

4.55

5.74

68

13.61

16.85

88

4.26

5.34

69

13.00

16.14

89

3.98

4.97

70

12.41

15.44

90

3.73

4.63

71

11.82

14.75

95

2.71

3.26

72

11 .24

14.06

100

2.05

2.39

73

10.67

13.40

110

1.14

1.22
(3 -30-07)
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Annual Interest Test. Any annuity is presumed to produce interest, at minimum, that is equal to
b.
the treasury rate.
(4-2-08)
03.
State Named as Beneficiary. The purchase of an annuity is treated as an asset transfer unless the
State of Idaho, Medicaid Estate Recovery is named as:
(3-30-07)
a.
The remainder beneficiary in the first position for at least the total amount of medical assistance
(4-2-08)
paid on behalfofthe institutionalized individual under this title; or
b.
The remainder beneficiary in the second position after the community spouse or minor or disabled
child and is named in the first position if the community spouse or a representative of the minor or disabled child
(3-30-07)
disposes of any remainder for less than fair market value.

Equal Payment Test. The annuity must provide for payments in equal amounts during the term of
04.
the annuity with no deferral and no balloon payments made.
(3-30-07)
Permitted Annuity. The purchase of an annuity is not treated as an asset transfer if the annuity
05.
meets any of the descriptions in Sections 408(b), or 408(q), Internal Revenue Code; or is purchased with proceeds
from an account or trust described in Sections 408(a), 408(c), or 408(p), Internal Revenue Code, or is a simplified
employee pension as described in Section 408(k), Internal Revenue Code, or is a Roth IRA described in Section
408A, Internal Revenue Code.
(3-30-07)
839.
1RUSTS AS ASSET 1RANSFERS.
A trust established wholly or partly from the participant's assets is an asset transfer. Assets transferred to a trust on or
after August 11, 1993 are subject to the asset transfer penalty, regardless of when the trust was established. If the trust
includes assets of another person, the asset transfer penalty applies to the participant's share of the trust.
(7-1-99)
840.
1RANSFER OF JOINTLY-OWNED ASSET.
Transfer of an asset owned jointly by the participant and another person is considered a transfer by the participant.
The participant's share of the asset is used to compute the penalty. If the participant and his spouse are joint owners of
the transferred asset, the couple's combined ownership is used to compute the penalty. If the spouse becomes eligible
for long-term care Medicaid, the rest of the period of restricted coverage is divided between the participant and
spouse.
(7-1-99)
841.
PENALTY EXCEPTIONS FOR ASSET 1RANSFERS.
A participant is not subject to the asset transfer penalty for taking any action described in Subsections 841.01 through
(4-2-08)
841.14 of this rule.
01.
spouse.

Home to Spouse. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to the
(7-1-99)

02.
Home to Minor Child or Disabled Adult Child. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the
home was transferred to the child of the participant or spouse. The child must be under age twenty-one (21) or blind
or totally disabled under Social Security and SSI rules in 20 CFR Part 416.
(7-1-99)
03.
Home to Brother or Sister. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to
a brother or sister of the participant or spouse. The brother or sister must have an equity interest in the transferred
home. The brother or sister must reside in that home for at least one (1) year immediately before the month the
participant starts long-term care.
(7-1-99)
04.
Home to Adult Child. The asset transferred was a home. Title to the home was transferred to a son
or daughter of the participant or spouse, other than a child under the age of twenty-one (21 ). The son or daughter must
reside in that home for at least two (2) years immediately before the month the participant started long-term care. The
adult child must prove he provided nursing facility level medical care to the participant which permitted him to live at
home rather than enter long-term care. The son or daughter must not have received payment from Medicaid for home
(4-2-08)
and community based services provided to the participant.
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